
DILEMMAS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

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Abstract: *European security is a subject of multiple, dynamic and evolving threats, namely the economic and financial crisis triggered in 2007, the assertiveness of Russia, the recrudescence of jihadist terrorism and the explosive expansion of illegal migration to Europe. These threats to the stability of the international system and global security as well have produced systemic effects, eroded public confidence in nation-state institutions, shattered the internal cohesion of the EU and NATO, and have produced the drift of the center of gravity of world politics from Europe to Southeast Asia. The solutions that are being taken to counter this negative development must be put into practice by a collective and cooperative effort of all nations in the Euro-Atlantic area. Strengthening European and transatlantic solidarity, as well as institutional efficiency and good governance are key elements in this concerted effort.*

Keywords: *jihadist terrorism, explosive migration, populism, xenophobia, anti-immigration, trans-Atlantic solidarity, good governance.*

For several years, European security has been in a strong dynamic process of redefining its characteristic coordinates and strategic rebalancing itself. This process is determined and shaped by several forces that are generated both within Europe and beyond it.

1. These forces generate **multiple threats to European security**, dynamic threats with a pronounced evolutionary potential.

1.1. A first event that significantly affected Europe's stability with significant security implications was **the economic and financial crisis** triggered in 2007 in the US and spread over the Atlantic in a short time, a crisis that in its home country was initially triggered by real estate speculative activities, but which, in Europe, primarily affected those states

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with a high public debt, as they were and still are Greece, Italy and Spain, whose international financial credibility was greatly affected, one after another, in moments of crisis.

If the crisis in the US had quickly and dramatically affected both the private financial and banking system and the common citizens, in Europe, the most affected ones were the public institutions of the states as well as the European Union as a whole that have not been able to find and apply swift measures to manage the crisis, generating first of all a major crisis of confidence and image.

Both in the US and in the EU, the way governments managed the crisis stimulated criticism of contemporary capitalism on the grounds that it benefited big transnational corporations and ignored the fate of ordinary citizens. As a direct consequence, the radical and extremist movements, namely, the extreme left and the far right respectively, gained more adepts by promoting anti-system visions for different reasons and identifying the culprits in the large multinational corporations and in the capitalist economic system itself.

Although the effects of the financial and economic crisis have diminished significantly, its psychological consequences and its association in the collective mentality with the servitudes of the current economic system and the slow and inefficient state response to the crisis have continued to persist. Also, there is a negative trend in the evolution of defense budgets in the European member countries of NATO, a trend that has its origin in the measures of reducing the budget expenditures adopted during 2008-2010. Although Europe managed to come out from the crisis, this trend has been perpetuated.

1.2. A second issue is **Russia's assertiveness**, manifested openly after Vladimir Putin's return to Kremlin in his third presidential term. Russia's aggressiveness is manifested in two dimensions. The first one is concrete, physical, including subversive and even military actions, against neighboring states, formerly part of USSR, 27-years ago, but now independent and sovereign states, but which, according to Putin, must remain in Russia's area of influence and have to manifest their obedience, acting as submissive satellites and having economies and security systems controlled by Kremlin. In the event of non-compliance, Russia proved ready to implement various interference instruments, ranging from direct or

intermediate aggression, as it happened in Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia. The second plan is more subtle, it is specific to information and psychological warfare, communicational aggression, and subversion¹, and is directed against the West, which must be intimidated if it can not be convinced of the “righteousness” of Kremlin’s claims. Russia’s behavior, based on non-compliance with international law, on the disregard of its neighbors, once part of the USSR, but now independent states, but whose independence Russia *de facto* violates or at least, doubts, by using subversion and imposing political control over the governments of independent and sovereign states is totally unacceptable in a civilized world in which the democratization of international relations is and must remain a reality.

Russia is able to use more power tools at the same time to achieve its goals.

First, it uses aggressive diplomacy to intimidate competitors, which it increasingly identifies as opponents.

Secondly, it uses the economic instrument of national power, by stimulating regimes and states with a favorable or at least positive attitude towards it, through preferential economic regimes, especially by lower prices for petroleum and natural gas exports to these countries.

Thirdly, it uses subversion measures, such as cyber attacks, meant to influence political leaders, the mass media and opinion leaders by attracting them with onerous-based persuasion. All of this is obviously orchestrated in a very good way by Russian intelligence services.

Finally, fourth, Russia uses the military instrument of power extensively, in two different ways that we are going to describe below.

In order to intimidate NATO and EU member states, Russia has been planning and carrying out large-scale military exercises with massive troop deployments in its western and northern military regions, with the participation of North Fleet and the Black Sea Fleet, the deployment of strategic aviation and airborne and seaborne forces. Moreover, Russia changed its national security strategy in December 2015, identifying NATO

¹ NATO Post Warsaw: „*Strengthening Security in a Tough Neighbourhood*”, speech by NATO Deputy Secretary General, Ambassador Alexander Wershow at the Annual Meeting of Romanian Ambassadors in Bucharest, 29 August 2016.

as the main threat to its security². Over the past year, it altered its nuclear strategy in the same direction, adopting a more threatening posture, it adopted a new naval strategy, and made sustained efforts to supply its troops with modern military equipment, including capabilities to enable it to conduct cyber operations and actions and space operations as well. Russia also announced that it has unilaterally renounced the provisions of the CFE treaty³, signed in Vienna in 1990 and subsequently re-signed in 1996, which limits the main categories of offensive weapon systems in Europe.

In addition to this use of military power for deterrence and intimidation, Russia has used and is still effectively using it through limited objective combat operations, in order to meet its strategic objectives. The offensive operation in August 2008 against Georgia, as well as supporting pro-Russia forces in the separatist regions of Ukraine, namely Donetsk and Luhansk fall into this category. The same thing happened in August 2014, when the Crimean peninsula was occupied by the Russian military forces, without the Ukrainian army opposing resistance, before the so-called referendum on the annexation of this territory by the Russian Federation.

1.3. Another up-to-date phenomenon is **the recrudescence of international jihadist terrorism**. If, twenty years ago, international terrorism still showed the characteristics of the Cold War and could even be considered one of its reminiscences, being mostly secular and extreme leftist, i.e. communist, or extreme rightist, i.e., anticommunist, in addition to which there were some forms of ethnic terrorism, such as ETA (militating for Basques rights in Spain and France) and religious, such as IRA, nowadays the situation is completely different.

Along with the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001, international terrorism has increasingly gained an Islamic-jihadist character, anti-Western in general and anti-American in particular.

This type of terrorism is a direct consequence of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism and its radicalization within a traditionalist society such as the Islamic one, all of which is stimulated and facilitated by globalization. In other words, the coming into contact of the Islamic world

²<http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf>, at 21.03.2017.

³<http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-19604507-tratatul-privind-armele-conventionale-europa-rusia-retrage-din-grupul-consultativ.htm>, at 08.05.2017

with cultural values and products and with Western civilization's artifacts is now much more direct and brutal than in earlier times, new IT technologies, the Internet, satellite communications, and television news being just some of its vectors. This frustrating contact can produce both a rejection and a sense of impossibility of reaction at the same time, the sense of inability to stop the course of events and of history.

Under these circumstances, some of the Islamic fundamentalists, who regard the return to the traditional, original Islamic values and precepts as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad and as recorded after his dictation in Quran, as the only way to save the world from desolation and destruction, can desperately choose the way of terrorist attacks aimed at destroying the Western world and even the political allies of the West in the Muslim world, who are considered apostates and traitors of Islam. The political objective of fundamentalist Islam is the establishment of universal caliphate, an Islamic theocratic state that would encompass the entire world.

From this perspective, the only difference between Al Qaeda and Daesh / ISIS is that while the first organization first pursues the destruction of the West and then the creation of Caliphate, the second began with declaring the establishing of Caliphate, having also a leader, Ibrahim Awwad Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai, named after Caliph Ibrahim⁴, and then fighting for the destruction of the Western world. The difference is just about priorities and not about goals. The terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, those in Brussels in 2016 and Berlin and Paris again, earlier this year are just the latest examples of the effectiveness of jihadist terrorist organizations.

1.4. Another phenomenon is the **explosive amplification of migration towards Western Europe**, the unprecedented increase in the number of refugees and other immigrant populations from the conflict areas in the Middle East, especially Syria, and the Maghreb, Sub-Saharan Africa, Afghanistan, and other disadvantaged areas. These refugees also include economic migrants who, in search of a better life, leave their native countries, whether Pakistan, Somalia, Afghanistan or Albania, Kosovo or Bosnia-Herzegovina.

⁴ www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/en_whos_who.pdf, at 15.03.2017.

Indeed, there is evidence that some asylum seekers do not come from conflict zones, some of them being in fact even from European states that are not members of the EU and who are trying to build themselves a new life in Western Europe. The large number of immigrants who have entered the EU Member States since 2014 raised significant problems with the capacity of these states to manage such a large number of people during the years 2015 and especially 2016 as the total number of immigrants of all kinds was about one million a year, targeting countries with higher living standards and more developed social protection programs, but primarily Germany.

The fact that a large number of immigrants, mostly claiming to be refugees and asylum seekers, entered the EU without the possibility of the border control authorities to check their antecedents and even their identity, made it possible for some of them to be criminals, even members of trans-border organized crime networks and for others to be members of terrorist groups and networks, especially Daesh-ISIS, deliberately infiltrating European countries just in order to prepare terrorist attacks, possibly in cooperation with locally acting terrorist hubs and organizations. The violent incidents that took place on the New Year's Eve 2017, especially against women, in several German localities, only confirm this assertion.

Added to this are the threats launched by Daesh-ISIS leaders against Europe to send 50,000 members of this terrorist group to commit attacks aimed at destroying Western civilization. Even without this connection between international Islamic terrorism and massive migratory flows from the Middle East, the issue of immigrants' cultural, linguistic and labor market integration in a short time creates significant problems for European states but primarily for South Europe, where there are access points to the EU, especially Greece and Italy, where the main refugee reception centers are located.

It should not be forgotten that a significant number, about 2.5 million refugees are in Turkish camps, and several hundred thousand in Lebanon and Jordan. Without the last year agreement between the EU and Turkey, which requires Turkey to keep refugees on its territory and not allow them

to go to the EU, the situation in Europe would have been even more dramatic⁵.

2. These four threats to the stability of the international system and global security have produced **systemic effects**, which are very significant because they are summed up, but also on each individual state, especially in Europe and North America.

2.1. First of all, all these cumulative phenomena have eroded the population's trust in state institutions designed to protect and ensure their security. Moreover, confidence in the entire capitalist economic system has generally fallen, on the grounds that it does not protect or sufficiently protect the poorest, the most disadvantaged ones and, instead, it favors the richest of the rich. This has materialized in the success of anti-system movements and groups, such as the "Tea Party" movement in the United States of America, as well as populist, anti-immigration, xenophobic, right-wing and Isolationists ones.

The surprising success of Brexit is precisely an embodiment of such a trend. Running under the slogan "We want our country back," the campaign for UK's EU exit was conducted under the sign of protection against the immigration from continent, keeping jobs for the British and removing the so-called "tyranny" of Brussels.

In France, the leader of the far-right National Front, Marine Le Pen, won over 21% of the votes in the first round of presidential elections held in April this year, ranking second and gaining over a third of the votes (i.e. over ten million) at the second ballot, won by the pro-European centrist Emmanuel Macron on May 7. It should be mentioned that there was a series of cyber-attacks against Emmanuel Macron's campaign team, attacks attributed to Russian hackers, which began in January and culminated two days before the second round of voting⁶.

The outcome of the April parliamentary elections in the Netherlands reveals an increase in the number of votes cast by the extreme right party, led by Geert Wilders, who has focused his campaign on anti-Islam measures. Even if this party did not win the election, the result of the vote

⁵ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_en.htm, at 15.03.2017.

⁶ www.agerpres.ro/externe/2017/04/26/franta-echipa-de-campanie-a-lui-macron-confirmata-a-fost-vizata-de-atacuri-cibernetice-14-24-03, at 08.05.2017.

indicates a significant increase in the audience enjoyed amongst the electorate. Donald Trump's categorical victory in the US presidential election in November 2016, under the slogan "America First", is the most eloquent materialization of the success of populism and of anti-immigration and anti-globalization measures in general. It remains to be seen on what coordinates the German election campaign will take place, taking into consideration the legislative elections to be held in this country this year.

The rise of populism, of isolationist measures, criticism directed against the European Union and even against NATO, cannot be ignored. Centrifugal trends within the European Union were strongly stimulated by Brexit and Donald Trump's success in the US elections. At the same time, it is regrettable but also strange that, sixty years after the signing in 1957 of the Treaties of Rome establishing the European Economic Community and EURATOM, which, together with the European Coal and Steel Community, which was set up by the Treaty of Rome in Paris in 1951, marked the constituent elements of the European Union, as it is today, and after constant efforts made by the member states to make the European project a success, today, with great ease, far less peripheral movements and destruction trends become more and more vocal and gain more and more audiences, including in the media, but without explaining what would replace the benefits of the EU, if it did indeed collapse.

People should not forget what the European Union means: a single common market, a security space, wellbeing and democracy, the right to work and free movement. It also means common policies and mechanisms to increase competitiveness and stimulate the economic development of countries with a lower level, including our country. Furthermore, it means a Common Foreign and Security Policy, a stronger and more respected voice of the Union as a whole, in global issues, global economy and global politics. If we were to give up all these, what would we put in their place? Are we going back to the situation from the interwar period, that is, to a competitive system, but with Russia as the main European power, in a situation where the balance of power would no longer exist? Who would benefit from such a situation? Obviously, only Russia, not Europe and certainly not Romania.

2.2. A second consequence, not as visible, but equally dangerous, is the **shattering of internal EU and NATO cohesion**. The main reason for

disagreement is the attitude towards Russia's aggression against Ukraine, materialized in the illegal annexation of Crimea, and in supporting the separatist movements in Luhansk and Donetsk regions, both of which are in Donbas in the East of Ukraine. While the states of Eastern Europe, including Romania, consider Russia's aggressive attitude and the hybrid war that it launched and is now sponsoring in Ukraine as the main threat to European security, some of the Western and Southern European states do not have the same perspective, considering illegal migration more threatening to their security. Moreover, there are political forces, generally the extreme right, who believe that the attitude of the EU and NATO towards Russia should be reconsidered, and that in fact the aggressive attitude of this state should be overlooked, especially in relationship with its neighbors, because Russia is a great power, and the rules of conduct should be different for the great powers in contrast with other states.

It should be noted that after the end of the Cold War, the European states gradually diminished the importance given to security and defense, including within NATO, especially after the financial and economic crisis started in 2007, which was highlighted by the continuous diminishing of their military budgets until the last year, relying on the remarkable capabilities of the US and, at the same time, on its financial effort. Only a few member states have complied with NATO's recommendation that defense budgets account for at least 2% of GDP, and defense investment spending accounts for at least 20% of these expenditures⁷. The occupation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 was a serious alarm signal that NATO member countries from the eastern flank of the Alliance took far more seriously than many of the others, and we could say that NATO Summits in Wales in 2014 and especially Warsaw in July 2016 were turning moments, from this point of view.

The same attitude of discouragement and somewhat confusion are also manifesting within the EU institutions. Out of the five scenarios presented by the President of the European Commission on March 1, 2017, in the White Paper on the Future of Europe⁸, which sets out five possible

⁷http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_03/20170313_170313-pr-2017-045.pdf, at 16.03.2017.

⁸ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-385_en.htm, at 16.03.2017.

paths of the EU evolution up to 2025, only two foresee an evolution that would reinforce or at least maintain the current level of integration, while the other three envisage a reduction. This White Paper was developed with the stated purpose of being the Commission's contribution to the preparation of the Rome Summit on 25 March 2015.

2.3. Another consequence of all developments in recent times is the shift in the weighting of global politics from Europe to Southeast Asia. The rise of China, India, Turkey and Brazil as regional powers and even having ambitions that exceed this status, the return of Russia to the first echelon of power, in a word the emergence of BRICs, and the emergence of Iran, especially after the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, are all geostrategic considerations to be taken into account in defining the new global equation of power and also a proof of a return to the politics of power in the international arena.

None of these countries suffered from the economic crisis that has affected North America and Europe over the last decade, but on the contrary, they were its beneficiaries, with the exception of Russia, replacing Western states, especially in emerging markets. These countries have benefited not only economically but have also made consistent investments in the military sector, significantly improving their power and international status. In addition, it is worth noting Russia's efforts to build a new security complex, together with Turkey and Iran, to counterbalance the influence of the EU and NATO in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea area. This tendency to change the *status quo* and thus to change the current international order by some of the emerging powers is the result of the ambitions of authoritarian and ambitious political leaders to redefine the areas of influence and to challenge not only the role of the West in general but also of the international order established after the end of the Cold War.

3. Given the threats to European security, whose dynamics we have presented above, and the effects they have been producing, we can ask the legitimate question of what European countries should do in concrete terms, in order to counteract them and **what measures should be taken**.

3.1. First of all, we must strengthen European solidarity, solidarity based on the sharing of common values, such as democracy, respect for human rights, political pluralism, social inclusion, respect for principles and institutional consolidation of the rule of law, but also on a sense of common

European identity, which is unfortunately not yet sufficiently consolidated and for which educational systems should do more, as identity is modeled by education, both in the family and in education systems. Moreover, in the strict terms of political realism, European countries have, first of all, the common interest to protect their security which is under threat.

European solidarity must be manifested at two levels. The first level is the national one, with nation-states having to develop more coherent and concerted relations, to support each other and work together, showing more goodwill and good faith in their mutual relations. The second level is the most consistent one, of the European and Euro-Atlantic intergovernmental organizations, first of all, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and secondly the Organization for European Security and Cooperation.

Although the EU and NATO were established and evolved independently of each other, with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and especially with the EU's takeover of the tasks and attributions of the Western European Union in 2000, that is to say with the assumption of a European security and defense identity and subsequently the assumption of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in which the Common Security and Defense Policy emerged, it is obvious that these two organizations assume areas of convergent responsibility. Their areas of responsibility in the field of security and defense are not and must not be competing but must remain complementary, as intended from the beginning. EU military mission tasks are expressed in the so-called Petersberg tasks, which essentially relate to a wide range of military missions, with the exception of those of high-intensity combat missions, while the level of ambition is expressed in military objectives (Military Headline Goal, the last assumed being the one in 2010, and a new one being currently in a process of refection).

However, solidarity and cooperation between NATO and the EU are institutionalized, based on the Berlin Plus Agreement, which set out the concrete modalities and procedures by which NATO offers military capabilities to EU, including command and control and early warning and surveillance, for the operations it manages.

However, this cooperation needs to be intensified and structured. As such, at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016, the NATO Secretary

General, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission signed a joint declaration aimed at strengthening the structured cooperation between the two organizations⁹. In November 2016, the European Council, on the basis of this statement, endorsed the implementation plan for the EU Global Strategy in the fields of security and defense, which sets a new level of ambition for the Union, more ambitious and adapted to the current security situation¹⁰.

3.2. **Transatlantic solidarity** is an essential area of strategic stability and balance of power in the northern hemisphere. The US intervened in both World War I and World War II to save Europe from the excesses of totalitarianism and to restore freedom and democracy as basic principles of international relations. Considering that NATO defense spending represents only about one-third of the total defense budgets of Alliance member states, it is obvious that the financial burden in this area is borne by the US, which has the most significant contribution, of 3.61% of GDP in 2016, out of the total military spending, 25% representing investments in military equipment. At the Alliance level, out of a total of \$ 892 billion, representing total military spending, \$ 627 billion is the combined US and Canadian budgets, or 71.3% of the total¹¹. NATO Allies must make more efforts to comply with the recommendation to ensure a minimum level of 2% of GDP for defense budgets, of which at least 20% represent defense investments. Our country, following the political engagement assumed in January 2015 by all parliamentary parties, at the initiative of the President of Romania and due to the efforts made earlier this year by the President and the Government, succeeded for the first time after joining NATO, 13 years ago, in having a defense budget that respects both NATO recommendations.

Under these circumstances, the US contribution is essential to Europe's security and defense.

3.3. **Institutional efficiency and good governance.** At EU and national level a broad reflection process is needed to identify the best course of action in order to make the decision-making process more flexible,

⁹ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133163.htm, at 20.03.2017.

¹⁰ https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_implementation_plan_st14392.en16_0.pdf, at 20.03.2017

¹¹ http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_03/20170313_170313-pr-2017-045.pdf, at 20.03.2017

especially at EU level, to bring the Union closer to its citizens and to return to the philosophy that founding fathers have had in mind when launching the European Idea in the early '50s of the last century. As long as the enlargement of the EU has advanced and it has assumed widespread accountability, its institutions have become more and more preoccupied with the regulatory process and the imposition of new rules, which often prove to be too restrictive for member nations. It is therefore necessary to rethink the relations between the European institutions and the member states, on the one hand, but also to rethink the role of the citizen in the Union and its relations with its own government. Good governance is a concept to be promoted and implemented not only at the level of the state, at local and national level, but also at the EU level, horizontally - between the European institutions, but also vertically, between these institutions, those of the member states and citizens.

This reflection process, fortunately, has already begun: for example, the EU is reviewing the European Neighborhood Policy¹², a tool launched in 2004 to prevent a new division of Europe, as happened during the Cold War between East and West, this time between EU Member States and those outside it but at its border, and also to contribute to the consolidation of the prosperity, stability and security of both the member states and those of the European Union's neighborhood, a tool that proved to be largely ineffective.

That is why an essential objective is to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the European Neighborhood Policy by involving Member States more closely in the definition and implementation of the policy in the Neighborhood Policy partner countries. There will be a set of new working methods, including the abolition of the traditional annual report package for each country. Reporting will need to be better suited to the specificity and timing of each relationship. The European Neighborhood Policy will have to use the available financial resources in a more flexible way so that the EU can react more quickly to the new challenges that will arise in its neighborhood. In this effort, civil society and social partners, including representatives of youth organizations, should be more actively and responsibly involved.

¹² <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/enp.htm>, at 21.03.2017.

Another particularly sensitive area, which is a component of good governance, is to increase the resilience of states, national and European institutions, to hybrid threats, which generally include a wide range of aggressive actions that remain under the officially declared state of war¹³. Resilience is, in this context, the ability to cope with stress and to recover, becoming stronger in the face of challenges¹⁴. Increasing national resilience is and must remain an important preoccupation of states in order to be able to successfully cope with all unforeseen situations, crises and dangers that concern the security of communities and institutions.

We can assert, without fear of mistaking, that the current global and European security situation has been more volatile than ever since the end of the Cold War, and the risks and threats faced by European states are the most heterogeneous and complex of the past 27 years. It is not enough, however, to perceive this situation at the official and institutional level; it needs to be understood by the political class, the mass media and the general public, in order to allow the development of a security culture, a factor for increasing social cohesion and stability and a basis for normative and even coercive measures.

A first step on the path to the restoration of European unity was made with the adoption of Rome Declaration on 25 March 2017 by the Heads of State and Government of the EU Member States at the European Council dedicated to marking the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome, a political document aimed at defining a common vision of the continuation of the European project for the next decade and contributing to rebuilding citizens' confidence in this project.

As stated by the President of Romania, Klaus Werner Iohannis, "*it is extremely important that, after 60 years, the vision of the founders of the European project enshrined in the preamble to the original Treaty of Rome, to create an ever closer union between the peoples of Europe, remains topical and is also found in the Declaration that we have adopted today. Keeping the unity of the 27 Member States is and must remain our motto. In*

¹³ European Commission, JOIN (2016) 18, Common statement to the European Parliament and Council, Common framework regarding countering hybrid threats, p. 2.

¹⁴ *Idem*, p. 6.

a globalized world with countless challenges, a better integrated Union offers better prospects for us than a fragmented Union."¹⁵



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¹⁵ <http://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/agenda-presedintelui/declaratie-de-preses1490442889>, at 26.03.2017