

EUROATLANTIC SECURITY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

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This article briefly presents the international security environment developments, evaluated in a realistic way in the new „Strategic Concept – NATO (Lisbon 2010)”; potential threats and hazards, both military and non-military, are present on a global, regional, national scale, determining an adequate NATO and EU reaction, and also from the member states. States and organizations currently pay and will pay special attention to building up and strengthening viable and effective systems of „Emergency Situations (Crisis) Management”. This is also the case of Romania which has started this complex and expensive process in 2004, with satisfying results until now.

Keywords: Euro-Atlantic security; management; crisis; NATO; EU.

The developments in the political, military, economic, financial, demographic, technological and environmental field manifested at global, regional, zonal, and state level urgently call for an ongoing and multidisciplinary review of the international security environment both in the existing multinational structures and in each state.

Romania, in its capacity of responsible member of the international community, member of NATO (April 2004) and member of the European Union (January 2007) is bound by multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements to efficiently implement in good faith in its domestic law and practice all the necessary provisions, including those regarding crisis management:

- The Regulations and Resolutions of the UN and other bodies of which Romania is a member state;
- The North Atlantic Treaty (Washington, April 04, 1949);

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□ The Principles and objectives mentioned in the NATO Strategic Concept, approved by the heads of states and governments in Lisbon in November 2010;

□ The responsibilities and objectives of the NATO bodies and operational headquarters, such as: the North Atlantic Council; the Defense Planning Committee; The Political Committee; The Military Committee; The Civil Emergency Planning Committee; Strategic and operational headquarters of NATO in Europe, other agencies and NATO committees; The NATO Situation Centre;

□ The obligations of the European Union regulations for each Member State (in background documents and plans mention EDA / EU and specific rules of crisis management and critical infrastructure protection - Directive 2008/114/08 December);

□ Romania's obligations as a result of the multilateral and bilateral treaties where Romania is a member state;

□ Regulations and actions regarding the environmental protection;

□ Regulations and obligations for Romania for the protection of human rights.

The complex, dynamic, fluid, often having unpredictable and contradictory developments issue of global security in general has long been the object of analysis and study of the above mentioned bodies, and also of the authorities and think-tanks in our country, especially in the past ten years. I would like to mention here research structures in the academic field (The Romanian Academy, the Academy of Romanian Scientists, „Carol I” National Defense University, Bucharest Politehnica University, “Dimitrie Cantemir” Christian University, through the Institute for Security Studies, etc.), as well as foundations (Eurisc) and associations (e.g. „Ion Conea” Association of Geopolitics), etc.

For those interested, an inventory is necessary as well as thorough knowledge of numerous studies, articles and documentary material published or communicated in books, journals, symposia, round tables, etc¹.

¹ The military Magazine, issued by the Military Sciences Department of the ARS, issued every three months; Strategic Impact Magazine, issued by the Center for Strategic Studies on Security and Defense – issued by “Carol I” NDU, every three months; “Strategic Universe” Magazine, issued by “Dimitrie Cantemir” Christian University - Institute for Security Studies, issued every three months

The effort is worth making, particularly by representatives of state executive, with direct obligations in the field of security and crisis management established by law and other regulations.

NATO Approaches in the “Strategic Concept” - Lisbon 2010”

Taking into account that in NATO’s recent “**Strategic Concept**” adopted in Lisbon in November 2010 the Strategic Concept is being evaluated, and this evaluation is estimated as accurate and accepted by the member states, I find it necessary to underline those paragraphs having impact on the collective security as well as on the crisis management systems of all member states, including Romania, as follows:

□ “Although there is peace in the Euro-Atlantic zone, and the threat of a conventional attack against the NATO territory is low, the risk is there”:

- ✓ Many countries in different regions have lethal capacities;
- ✓ Proliferation of ballistic missiles as well as of nuclear weapons and of other weapons of mass destruction is a real threat to security;
- ✓ Terrorism is a direct threat for the citizens of countries of the Alliance as well as to the international stability and prosperity;
- ✓ Modern technology causes an increased destruction potential on behalf of the terrorists;
- ✓ The dependency on computer networks makes governments and economies vulnerable to cyber attacks, which are becoming increasingly frequent;
- ✓ Countries are more and more dependent on communication, transport and transit routes for commercial activities, including energy supply. This fact adds more vulnerabilities for NATO member states;
- ✓ The advance of technology, including the electronic spectrum, the use of laser and the possible limitation of access in the outer space can also limit NATO military planning and operations;
- ✓ Instability or conflict beyond the Alliance borders can threaten the security of NATO nations and global factors such as high competition on resources, climate changes and the influence of health factors can negatively affect the security environment.

The risks presented in the “**NATO Strategic Concept**” also affect

(see 2nd issue, June 2010); Geopolitics Magazine, issued by “Ion Conea” Geopolitics Magazine (www.geopolitic.ro).

Romania directly or indirectly, a fact for which the analysis of global, zonal and regional relations has to be the object of attention of the responsible factors who, using legislation and practical actions, involve human, material and financial resources, to protect the lives of the citizens and their belongings. The establishment and consolidation of a “**National System of Emergency Situations Management**” (N.S.E.S.M.) is the key element, without which, in this moment, the Romanian state can be confronted with serious problems (on this topic we will try to present some strong points but equally some weak ones at the level of 2011).

We will not insist further on the military capabilities of the Alliance presented in the “**Strategic Concept**”, but we will point out those provisions that are relevant for crisis management, mainly in non military aspects, which should be taken into account from an organizational, human and financial point of view by each member state.

□ The Alliance will have to respond to each emerging threat or challenge.

□ The Alliance will have to be prepared to operate a range of instruments and to cooperate with other factors in order to contribute to a comprehensive approach combining efficiently political, civil and military elements to fully meet its security goals.

□ The Alliance will have to support the reform efforts in the security and defense fields; this can include engaging support for the contractors;

□ Reconstruction efforts are also possible for stability and in all the stages of the crisis. Consequently, the Alliance should have the capacity to plan, prepare and carry out reconstruction and development activities.

□ C3 capabilities are pivotal enablers in the flexible and efficient meeting of the security objectives of the Alliance. This requires the definition and implementation of a clear C3 strategy enabling consistent consultancy and robust, flexible and measurable control functions. C3 systems should benefit from the cutting-edge technologies, as well as from those foreseen to be developed in the future. However, such arrangements will be efficient only if they are widely adopted by the allies, using the same underlying philosophy, especially as far as the extent to which they are prepared to share sensitive information or to allow access to these through mechanisms depending on the technological access between network federations. At the end of the day it is about the availability of nations to

allow for a NATO Network Enabled Capability.

□ NATO planning, and also that of the nations, should take into account the potential effects of the allies' access to the vital communication, transport and transit routes, energy supply, the likelihood of cybernetic attacks against the information systems or of other vital systems of the Alliance; the probability for the terrorists to be capable to use more and more sophisticated means in meeting their objectives in the future.

□ NATO will have as a goal to reduce the strategic impact of the asymmetric threats with improvised explosive devices (IED).

□ Interoperability is a multiplying factor enabling the Alliance to develop in partnership a package of capabilities/forces, able to carry out combat actions in any environment.

□ NATO will systematically monitor restricted access and the energy, natural, water/food resource, information and human deficit.

□ The Alliance must have its own capability for impact assessment and control technology, technical expertise and scientific community, the challenges and capabilities of international information security community, with reference to the operational environment, the catastrophic potential of emerging technologies, and the influence on defense and deterrence capabilities of the Alliance.

□ Membership in the Alliance entails a fair distribution of roles, risks and responsibilities. In this context, the defense budget within the national GDP and Membership in the Alliance entails a fair distribution of roles, risks and responsibilities. In this context, the defense budget as a percentage of the national GDP and the percentage of the budget expenditure allocated to procurement are indicators of a State effort for defense. In principle, it is recommended that Member States should consistently allocate 2% of GDP or more for defense (where is Romanian from this point of view?!).

Member countries that usually allocate less than this percentage are advised to stop this and to increase budgetary allocations in accordance with their commitments.

□ Cost-effectiveness will continue to be a particularly important factor. This requires (from Romania too) prioritization of investments, increased efficiency in terms of operations and maintenance costs, and redirecting resources to other structures and programs outdated priorities.

□ To increase efficiency in terms of costs, it also recommends to use

multinational cooperation in the rigging and use of funds allocated for producing some that are unachievable by a single member. It will encourage multinational approaches and cooperation in equipping, training and education, logistical support, creating large multinational units and the development of civilian capabilities, which help increase interoperability and operation planning and execution, even if in this context there are some technical and legal obstacles in this regard (e.g. regulatory requirements, different provisions on industrial offset, the existence of different terms in the agreements and cooperation between the armed forces of other countries and the armed forces and civil society of the same country, etc.), to develop capabilities at low costs.

□ Effective uses of critical resources require NATO member states and the EU to identify / develop common capabilities of both organizations.

The institutional, operational and technical situation in Romania, in the field of crisis management

a. Romania, being in full process of transition, could not pay enough attention on building a coherent and effective crisis management system. This reality has been added to the chronic lack of resources and the disputes between institutions over the place and role of institutions in these tasks.

However, studies and analysis of risk factors to national security (e.g. military, non-military, economic, etc.) have been made, on areas such as limitedly developed infrastructure and civil works, communications and computing, special means of intervention at the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, the National Romanian Intelligence Service, Special Telecommunications Service (but not yet a coherent and unified character).

Remarkable progress in fixed and mobile networks under the regulatory authority of the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology can be highlighted. Thus, after 1995 Connex mobile networks, Orange, Zapp, Cosmorom, came in, and in 1997 the National Telecommunications Company, Romtelecom SA, was privatized, with positive effects on the modernization of networks.

Communication networks and computer capabilities of the state (MIA, Ministry of National Defense, STS) and commercial networks, already allow, with little cost and effort, achievement of management technical support, cooperation and notice under the "National System of Emergency

Situations Management "(conditions in which these institutions are obliged to cooperate).

b. In some documents produced after 2003, the Romanian authorities and some political and military analysts have identified the main risk factors to the security and stability of Romania, as follows:

the existence of regional or sub-regional tensions and military conflicts that can escalate, uncontrolled and destabilizing accumulation of forces and combat equipment in the area of strategic interest for Romania;

uncontrolled proliferation and dissemination of technologies and nuclear materials, means of mass destruction, lethal unconventional weapons and other means;

extension of domestic economic difficulties, financial and social operation affecting critical and vital areas of the Romanian society (in particular due to amateurism in major economic decisions);

expansion of terrorist networks and activities and transnational organized crime (e.g. political terrorism, terrorism in ethnic, economic and financial crime, illegal border trafficking of persons, illegal drugs, radioactive materials and strategic weapons and ammunition, etc.)

environmental damage by non-compliance with environmental regulations and the existence of national borders in the vicinity of high-risk targets;

natural disasters (e.g. earthquakes, floods, fires, etc.);

limited access for the Romanian state to some resources that are vital for the population and for the economy (especially energy sources);

actions that may affect the Romanian state and its democratic institutions, leading to separatism, xenophobia, intolerance, ethnic and religious conflicts.

Certainly the political, economic and lately the social factors, among which we can mention Romania's integration in NATO (April 2004) and its integration in the European Union (January 2007), require review of the risk factors in the new context. It is worth mentioning that the importance of some of them is decreasing, while for others is rising and new risk factors and new threats appear, like terrorist attacks. In fact, these changes are partially reflected in EO no. 21/15.04.2004 (Law no. 15/2005).

c. In Romania, on April, 14th 2004 (before the adoption of E.O. no. 21/15.04.2004) the following institutions had responsibilities in the crisis management area:

- The Romanian Presidency;
- The Supreme Council for Defense of the Country;
- The Romanian Government;
- The Ministry of Administration and the Interior with its subordinated structures:

- The General Police Inspectorate;
- The General Border Police Inspectorate;
- The National Command of the Gendarmerie;
- The Civil Protection Command;
- The National Command of the Firefighters;
- Public community services for emergency situations.

The Ministry of National Defense, with large units and the subordinated units of the Land Forces, Air Force and Navy and the forces and means for implementation and operation of communications and strategic information (STAR);

- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- The Ministry of Transport, Construction and Tourism;
- The Ministry of Economy and Trade;
- The Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Rural Development;
- The Ministry of Environment and Water Administration;
- The Ministry of Health;
- The Ministry of Communication and Information Technology;
- The Romanian Intelligence Service;
- The Special Telecommunications Service;
- The Protection and Guard Service;
- The State Central Office for Special Problems.

d. The responsibilities of the institutions referred to in paragraph 3 in the emergency management have been and are still governed by laws, orders and decisions of the Government Emergency (within 180 days after publication of Ordinance no. 21/15.04.2004, respectively on 26/10/2004, would be changed, rejected or supplemented). This process has not yet been completed until 2011. About 20 laws still need to be harmonized.

e. From a comparative analysis of laws and other regulations referred to in paragraph d, as well as from laws governing the organization and operation of institutions referred to in paragraph c, a number of conclusions can be drawn:

there is an excessive number of rules (tens), often confusing and contradictory;

the framework refers only to part of the emergency situations that may occur (e.g. natural disasters, fires, accidents, others);

it established a series of committees that have permanent activity, with little discretion and without specific resources;

the current legal system delegates too many responsibilities to the institutions;

institutional relations, communications and computer systems, organization and preventive actions are poorly defined. There is still no specific equipment for a wide range of interventions;

one cannot really speak of any form of coherent institutional system, with well defined responsibilities, even though Law 15/2005 would take effect;

f. in terms of operational and technical responsibilities, ministries and central agencies have some civil works (specific buildings and facilities), command centers, communications and digital systems for voice, data and video, which, through joint effort, can be used to provide the necessary technical leadership, cooperation and notice of the "National System of Emergency Situations Management";

g. the domestic realities summarized in Section 2 and the evidence presented in the explanatory memorandum to the Emergency Order 21/15.04.2004 (Law 15/2005) could constitute an argument for strengthening the organizational and technical aspects of the new "National System of Emergency Situations Management". The action began in 2005 and is still ongoing, with limited financial and material resources (the process in its main elements is far from being complete).

In this process of consolidation the following will have to be taken into account too:

the emergence of new risk factors and threats that can affect Romania, including major terrorist actions;

- changes in importance and in the likelihood of critical events in the range of risk factors measured;
- the existence of a cluttered and confusing legal framework that, based on their experience and the European one, has changed, but operation is very difficult;
- the existence of a stable institutional framework (i.e., ministries, central agencies, public services, local government) that can receive, by law, specific roles within a unitary "National System of Emergency Situations Management" and may be required to cooperate in reaching the targets, even if they do not want to;
- the persistence, to date, of an incoherent institutional system, in prevention and emergency management, which refers only to certain institutions and actions;
- favorable material conditions, due mainly to the existence of:
 - ✓ civil works in ministries and central agencies (i.e., buildings, operational centers);
 - ✓ systems and data communication networks and modern government, military and commercial operators;
 - ✓ specific equipment for various interventions, but old and of limited quality;
- managerial and technical capacity to properly capture system requirements, to establish information flows and to develop specific software for database management and development plans, currently undergoing development.

Defining the objectives to consolidate “the National System of Emergency Situations Management”

a. Taking into account the complexity of the “the National System of Emergency Situations Management”, the great number of institutions, forces and means involved, the international regulations in the field Romania is part of (i.e., UN, NATO, EU, treaties), the domestic realities (i.e., legal, institutional, operational and technical) and the available resources for short and medium term the following main objectives should be taken into account:

- to study and evaluate the legislation in member countries of NATO and the European Union;

□ to re-evaluate the domestic legislation to amend, supplement, or, if necessary, to reject certain provisions;

□ to study the local experience of intervention in case of natural disasters, critical accidents, other situations (lessons learned);

□ to draw an inventory of the human, material and financial institutions responsible for crisis management, in order to avoid unnecessary expenses (I have already indicated that more resources are to be considered);

□ to design and accomplish the interoperability of systems and data communication networks and to set up, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative additions. Proper trial centers, as well as operational and high-performance software are needed;

□ to define the relationship between institutions, information flow and content of key documents that will be developed and circulated in the system (this requires very difficult analysis and coordination work);

□ to analyze, develop and implement databases needed to run the system:

⇒ flood areas and dams;

⇒ developing, as a rough draft, regulations, plans, programs, operational documents, working instructions for staff intervention;

⇒ re-operation of the system after six months of the commissioning of the main elements in order to introduce the necessary corrections;

⇒ continuous adaptation to the realities of international and domestic crisis management.

⇒ seismic zones;

⇒ hazardous industrial facilities;

⇒ nuclear facilities in Romania and neighboring countries potentially dangerous;

⇒ forces and means of intervention for likely scenarios and emergency situations, including specific equipment requirements;

⇒ data required for operation and data communications systems (i.e., capacity, layout, working data, telephone, e-mail address books and other documents);

⇒ any other data crystallized over time (lessons learned);

b. In conclusion, those objectives, but also others that can be identified when designing the "National System of Emergency Situations

Management " (particularly in defining institutional interrelationships and communications and computing platform, databases and application-specific software); these can and must be addressed in the international context in which Romania activates (i.e., UN, NATO, EU), in order to achieve the required objectives of efficiency and interoperability.

Defining risk areas:

a. We believe that, before defining the areas of risk specific to this period in Romania, it is good to define the terms used, according to the Emergency Order no. 21/2004 (Law 15/2005), as follows:

□ The "National System of Emergency Situations Management " is set up, organized and operated to prevent and manage emergency situations, providing for and coordinating human, material, financial and other resources necessary to establish a state of normality;

□ The "National System of Emergency Situations Management" is organized by the government and consists of a network of bodies, organs and structures authorized in emergency management, based on levels or areas of expertise, infrastructure and available resources to accomplish the tasks prescribed by law;

□ The emergency situation – an exceptional event, non-military in nature, scale and intensity that threatens the lives and health of the population, environment, material and cultural values important to restore normality and requires urgent measures and actions, resource allocation. Additional forces and assets management are involved;

□ Emergency magnitude - the size of the area showing the destructive effects or affected persons, operation of democratic state institutions, values and community interests;

□ Emergency intensity – the speed of development of destructive phenomena and the degree of disruption of the normal state;

□ Potential state of emergency - a set of risk factors uncontrolled by their evolution and imminent threat which could affect life, important cultural and material values and environmental factors;

□ Impending threat - parameters for determining the status and the inevitable onset of an emergency;

□ Alert status – declaration of the law and immediate concerns as to the implementation of action plans and prevention measures, warning the population, mitigation of the consequences of emergency;

Crisis management - all activities and procedures used by policy makers, institutions and public services and the ability to identify sources of risk monitoring, evaluation and information analysis, development of forecasts, establishment of alternative courses of action and their implementation in order to restore normality;

Emergency monitoring - the process of supervision requiring systematic assessment of the situation dynamics parameters, knowledge of the type and magnitude of the event, of its social implications, and of the way to fulfill the measures taken for emergency management;

Risk factor - a phenomenon, or complex process matching circumstances, in the same time and space, which can cause or foster certain types of risk;

Emergency management - identifying, documenting and assessing the types of risk factors and their determinants, notifying stakeholders, public warning, limitation, mitigating the risk factors and negative consequences of these exceptional events ;

Operative intervention - action taken in a timely manner by specialized structures to prevent aggravation of the emergency, mitigation and removal, as appropriate, of its consequences;

Evacuation - protective measures taken against an imminent threat, the alert status, or production of a state of emergency in the areas affected or likely to be affected in organizations, public institutions, businesses, groups or groups of people or goods and their disposal in the areas and towns which provide conditions for the protection of persons, goods and values, functioning public institutions and businesses;

b. The risk domains (factors) defined by law are:

fire, referring to the large forested areas, industrial parks, cities, etc.

earthquakes, with reference to the potentially destructive seismic areas identified in Romania (i.e., Carpathian Arc bend - Vrancea, Banat). There are critical earthquakes in the east and south, as demonstrated by the 1940 and 1977 events;

major floods on rivers lacking hydro-technical or satisfactory work (i.e., the Mureş River, the three rivers Someş, Prut, Siret, Bistrita and sometimes the Danube);

accidents of different scale;

accidental explosion caused to industrial units during the transport

of dangerous substances;

- damage to industrial facilities, water works, civil works, etc.
- landslides or collapse of land due to floods or earthquakes;
- epidemics due to external causes or domestic phenomena related to the environment and living conditions;

collapse of some buildings, installations or facilities as a result of construction errors or natural disasters or terrorist attacks;

shipwreck or crashlanding of vessels or aircraft, as a result of various events;

- objects falling from the atmosphere or the cosmos;
- tornadoes;
- avalanches;
- major failures of public utilities;
- other natural disasters;
- critical or major public events caused, or contributed to, by specific risk factors;

terrorist actions targeted on the Romanian territory, including the hostage taking, in-country or abroad;

nuclear objective accidents in-country or in the neighboring countries (especially Ukraine and Bulgaria);

- other events that cannot be foreseen at this time;

c. In conclusion, the Law no. 15/2005 defines risk domains (factors) based on the experience gained so far and on nowadays realities worldwide. Risk factors change over time, but their scope and likelihood of becoming real threats is increasingly imminent.

The making and adoption of the decision on major responsibilities for each area of risk defined above:

a. In Romania, during 1990-2009 there were several attempts to legislate and implement a standardized crisis management system. These steps have been completed for several reasons:

- the Parliament and Government have not considered the issue as a priority;
- various political groups and parties have opposite views on certain principles and rules;
- ministries and central agencies have sought (and unfortunately still want) to enhance, strengthen and perpetuate specific tasks in this area,

regardless of the realities and international experience in the field (i.e., they still lack the will to cooperate in the best interest of the country and its citizens);

- the ministries and central bodies have not exchanged information to set a "common basket" resources needed to achieve the minimum cost of "National System of Emergency Situations Management";

- NATO's experience has been studied superficially or not at all and relevant conclusions have not been drawn into an authoritarian system application;

- numerous institutional changes, especially in the area of responsibility of the Ministry of Administration and Interior have created the necessary climate of stability, but the Romanian specialists are not allowed to propose a valid "National System of Emergency Situations Management ";

- the material and financial resources available have been insufficient.

b. In the spring of 2004, following political developments in the international and domestic areas, as well as NATO and EU requirements, the Romanian government asked ministries and central bodies to reach consensus on the principles, objectives and actions to be taken to make the "National System of Emergency Situations Management" effectively integrated and operational.

The result was the development effort and the adoption of the Emergency Order no. 21/2004, the "National System of Emergency Situations Management", which at this time is the basic legal act in this field. Although the GEO 21/2004 sets deadlines for legislative changes and practical actions, they have not been observed so far.

c. With regard to achieving consensus and making decisions on accurate and widely accepted primary responsibility for each domain (factor) of defined risk, efforts and actions are expected in the next period, resulting in the development of regulations, plans, instructions, etc.; the western experience in this approach is very important, in addressing the core problems and their representation in form of documents.

d. Depending on the nature, extent and effects of emergencies, the institutions and structures defined by law as part of the "National System of Emergency Situations Management" perform the following tasks:

- RED** – for general coordination – the Prime-minister;

- GREEN** – for operational coordination at national level – the

National Committee for Emergency Situation, under the control of the minister of administration and the interior;

□ **BLUE** – for coordination at department and local level – ministerial, municipal, town and village committees;

□ **YELLOW** – for execution, having a main role – ministry (organization) having access to forces and means tailored to the event;


□ **BROWN** – for execution, having a secondary role – ministries (organizations) providing human and logistic support to the secondary execution factor.

e. An example of certain emergency situation generating critical events and which impose institutional cooperation according to the law could be:

| RISK FACTORS: | | Fires | Earthquakes | Accidents | Mass diseases | Industrial damages | Drowning (shipwrecks) | Terrorist attack | Utilities services failure |
|--|----------------------|--------|-------------|-----------|---------------|--------------------|-----------------------|------------------|----------------------------|
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Ministry (organization) | | | | | | | | | |
| National Committee for Emergency Situations | | Green | Green | Green | Green | Green | Green | Green | Green |
| Ministry of Administration and Home Office | General Inspectorate | Green | Green | Green | Green | Green | Green | Green | Green |
| | Public Services | Yellow | Yellow | Yellow | Yellow | Yellow | Yellow | Yellow | Yellow |
| Ministry of National Defense | | Red | Yellow | Red | Red | Red | Red | Red | Red |
| Ministry of Foreign Affairs | | White | Red | White | Red | Red | Red | Red | Red |
| Ministry of Transport, Construction and Tourism | | Red | Red | Red | Red | Yellow | Red | Red | Red |
| Ministry of Economy and Trade | | Red | Red | White | Red | Yellow | Red | Red | Red |
| Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Rural Development | | Red | Red | White | Red | Red | Red | Red | Red |
| Ministry of Environment and Water Administration | | Red | Red | White | Red | Red | Red | Red | Red |
| Ministry of Health | | Red | Red | Yellow | Yellow | Red | Yellow | Red | Red |
| Ministry of Communication Technology of Information | | Red | Red | Red | Red | Red | Red | Red | Red |
| Romanian Intelligence Service | | Red | Red | Red | Red | Red | Yellow | Red | Red |
| Special Telle communication Service | | Red | Red | Red | Red | Red | Red | Red | Red |
| Protection and Security Service | | Red | Red | White | White | White | Yellow | White | White |
| State Central Office for Special Problems | | Red | Red | White | Red | Red | Red | Red | Red |
| Other Organizations (case based) | | Red | Red | Yellow | Red | Red | Red | Red | Red |

f. A schematic representation of the NSESMS composition and its interrelationships are presented as follows:

National System of Emergency Situations Management Structure [NSESMS]



As a final conclusion, analysis and evaluation of complex issues of crisis management of any kind should remain in the attention of the authorities designated by law, and also the concern of specialists in the scientific environment, able and willing to make a real contribution to the benefit of the community. However, Romania's compliance in good faith with its commitments as a member state of the UN, NATO and EU in the field of security and crisis management is a prerequisite of the prestige of a modern democratic country.



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