

NEW REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL MILITARY ACTION

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Abstract: *Modern warfare increasingly gives the actual size of the contribution of intelligence and military technology success strategic, operational and tactical. Most recent wars, we consider at least the conflicts in Afghanistan (2001-2002), Iraq (1991 and 2003), Libya (2011) and again Afghanistan have proved fully valences binomial determinants of intelligence - technology in military confrontation.*

Demonstrated, no doubt, especially in the last great conflict of amplitude and dynamic act that surprise and information technology, human and artificial intelligence sublimed had, has and will have a decisive role in military confrontation. Consistency value judgments, elaborations decision, which in future are expected to be less sequential, simultaneous and ever more forward-looking, will have a decisive impact on the conduct of military operations and the success of them. All these require diversions, reassessments and reorganizations of the organization system and fighting military conflicts.

Keywords: *revolution in military thinking, the battlefield of the future operational concepts.*

A concentrated expression of thought, creativity and intelligence on the battle space it is represented by each elaboration of the Alliance, of the U.S. security strategy and key NATO member states, combating international terrorism, including the concepts of network-centric warfare, intelligences war, the confrontation information, computing and technology, the new initiative on capacity, actions other than war, non-combat operations, major roles, operations "out of area" or PSO (non-art. 5 or crisis response operations and humanitarian assistance) or crisis management.

Actual warfare theoreticians have in mind when confronted with the enemy, the ability of military and civilian authorities, private sector, civil society to collaborate in the field to move the war to the opponent, to use means of counteracting specific

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systems to multiply command and control and security measures to trigger decisive preventive action.

For this will successfully compete in future confrontations - the war theorists and politico-military analysts consider - various technological achievements included in sophisticated systems, human involvement being found only at the strategic or political decision.

1. THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF MODERN WARFARE IN THE PARADIGM OF THE CHALLENGES OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM

Transformation of the global geopolitical system requires a revolution in military thinking, a revolution to reflect new economic and technological forces. Science and communication will be engines XXI century. This is the new power, says A. Toffler. Smart tools produce smart guns. Nothing proves better than the way it was conducted in 1991 in the Persian Gulf War, which can be characterized as a "war of the mind (spirit) against the matter."

War changes its physiognomy namely: design, typology, strategic paradigm, doctrine, actions (training troops, weapons and leadership battles, forms and methods of combat, etc.).

Theaters of military operations of the last decade of the twentieth and early twenty-first century became the armed expression of mass jumps from task forces of light and classical systems of weapons systems is not only the confrontation of forces and means, but also military systems. In fact, the Persian Gulf War - appreciate Newt Gingrich - "the world witnessed the first war between the military systems of the third wave and the second wave machine.

Operation "Desert Storm" was the annihilation of Iraqis by Americans and their allies, largely because "third wave" type systems proved simply overwhelming. Very sophisticated anti-aircraft systems, fit of the Second Wave, they were of no use in dealing with aircraft undetectable Third Wave. Armies in the trenches of the Second Wave was simply overcome and dismantled before targeting systems and logistics Third Wave. The result was a campaign as decisive as defeating forces of the Mahdi genre's first wave of Omdurman by the Anglo-Egyptian army Second Wave in 1889. Conducting war was entirely reversed. Future war will change the whole nature of belligerence, namely:

- movement of causes of military conflicts in the real (economic) to the predominant ethnic and religious where the enemy is no longer considered "the

alien" that can not communicate through language, but relatives, friends, the speaker of the same language or dialect, more precisely it can be stated that, from the economic area, the conflict moved in the moral and religious, then the ideology, and today, moral and ideological vacuum is introduced ethnic rasial and religiosity (inter and interconfesional);

- passing from the brutal use of force to more subtle ways: armed intervention to support or installation of a constitutional regime or not favorable politico-military power interventionist, imposing or maintaining peace, blockades and so on, in other words, the emergence of new types of military operations against the classics other than war;

- combining classical type of aggression with new types: economic, cultural, psychological, religious, computer, information aggression, among which the symbolic one plays an important role. Information warfare has become a reality in a world of signs and symbols of consumption. In fact, this type of warfare can be defined as the conquest and mastery of the mind by means of signs, symbols and consensus on their meaning, it will be a war of civilizations and not a war of cultures. It will be total and absolute war, as the target is the entire population of a state, and the aim is, ultimately, the change of mentalities and values. Actually the battlefield will be the world we think;

- armed forces, military assets retain their role as "the best solution" whereby a politico-military power to impose its interests to restore or maintain political order, to enforce or maintain peace in its area of interest. The new armies that are currently building will have to change their orientation space with an orientation to time, taking action a force shaping meet present and future imperatives. A feature will be essential in the future, professionalism, which will increase the value of employment, based on competence and responsibility;

- adequacy of military doctrines in order to increase the ability to project power over long distances with high speed, with emphasis on joint operations between different services, multinational operations, simultaneous attacks synchronized, real-time control of their execution and tempo battles, as well as further development of the initiative and greater confidence in the quality soldiers. Military doctrine – A. Toffler notes - continues to change in all the world's armies. But if you look closely, whether formulated in terms of Chinese or Italian, French or Russian central themes remain those of "Battle Aero-Terrestrial" and "Aero-Terrestrial Operations," in other words, the ability to see depth. The new military doctrine retains the role of nuclear weapons deterrent and threat. The basic purpose

of the nuclear forces N.A.T.O. - reads the papers NATO - remains Political preserve peace and avoids war or any kind of constraint. New technologies, high-tech weapons that defy the old military doctrine are designed and introduced. Their introduction on the battlefield were imposed as part of the new doctrine to focus on close coordination between ground and air, to prevent strokes in depth echelons first, second and next to arrive in theater and most significantly - the using new technology to hit the targets previously assigned to nuclear weapons¹. This reduces the risk of nuclear confrontation;

- military actions, especially fighting actions will differ greatly from those in the Second World War and postwar military conflicts.

Today, as in future military action is distinguished in relation to the postwar through: scale in time and space, special forces and means, complexity, intensity, sudden change situations at all levels; warfare will result in all environments on land, sea, air, underwater and in space, the use of forces and means varied with superior tactical and technical features with great mobility, firepower, beating, accuracy increased effect of annihilation and destruction, context in which technological surprise and measures to prevent it will continue to play an important role; shares a particularly maneuver, insisting especially on the surround and back, high consumption of ammunition, fuel and other material, destroy routes and node communication, works of art, and dislocations huge population on ethnic, religious and so on; tendency in most situations, to avoid direct confrontations, front, the actions taken by small parties, with great firepower relative autonomy in action through a variety of tactical processes, particularly in the wings at intervals through a variety of tactical processes, particularly in the wings, every enemy in depth device, where and when you least expect it, engaging in a battle of true professionals with high mental and physical qualities, able to engage complex actions, quick and great violence, various conditions of terrain, climate, seasons, night and day, achieving a balance between an outstanding level of training and armament and combat equipment and peripheral systems. The new features of the operation and the fight are outlined in various studies carried out by military experts, as: asymmetrical actions, mobility, adaptability, decentralization, handling, flexibility, simultaneity, continuity, high pace of action, modularity, digitizing, amplifying the impact force, etc.

- achieving success on the battlefield also in the future will be based on sound and thorough organization and preparation of actions in the smallest detail,

¹ Cf. North – Atlantic Organization, Partnership and cooperation, A.I, S. M, 1994, p.45.

and a normalization clear, precise and flexible. In this respect, the armies of almost all developed countries in Europe, North America, Middle East and Asia intensified effort for fighting new regulations in line with the strategic objectives, the development of modern technology and organizational structures adopted or the adoption of new concepts to design the military and in other media than war, and the fact that today and in the future, commanders action on the lowest step of the military hierarchy is consistent with the policy objectives in conflict of authority at the highest level;

- battlefield of future military actions will be completely different from before. A number of studies battlefield 2000s, or the "Third Wave war" introduced the concept of "expanded field loupe." Traditional Concept (linear) that there is a front and depth, will follow a battlefield extended (three-dimensional), in which any area will not be safe from precise and devastating attacks. Some military experts even foresee that the battle will take place after the model of the ship, i.e. 3600°. Expanding the battlefield in time, space and purpose all available resources will require a variety of options in decision-making, decentralization of implementation, access to information, civil-military relations, the ability of the post-conflict management etc.

Nature of future wars is hard to predict, but more strikingly manifested two major trends. The first is that all countries of the world are armed with more sophisticated weapons and equipment, which opens the possibility of an outbreak of conflicts or wars between the forces and means well prepared variable is symmetrical wars. A second trend is the regular forces confrontation with irregular forces, placed under the command centers of economic power, religious, ethnic, ideological, etc., Representing variant of asymmetric warfare. What is certain is that the next war will not enter fully into any of the forms or types expressed, but it will manifest itself as a multifaceted war where combat forces will have to cope with a wide variety of actions in all three natural environments, all bearing the burden of international component.

Picture of the battlefield in the coming decades will be almost completely different from that of the present. The countries which will come off victorious are the states that take third generation wars, the dominant role of information returns. War beginning of this millennium will be heavily modified and will require a greater concentration of military force, the potential integrator and low capacity maneuver echelons until the fighter, which will be the consequence, a consummate technician. Battlefield of the years 2010-2020 could be characterized as follows:

- three dimensional - caused by intense exploitation of the third dimension, the vertical;
 - transparent - due to the performance by research systems, detection and determination arranged in space;
 - dynamic and pulsating - it will require both combatants movement in the horizontal and vertical in order to hit the opponent's center of gravity casting;
 - multidirectional - as low forces that echelon can run missions with strategic value, operational and tactical in wide strips in different conditions;
 - automatic - will be used as weapons systems that will incorporate a high degree of robotics, artificial intelligence, expert systems and simulation for decision-making;
 - digitized - through the use of high technologies and miniaturization of the computer;
 - integrated - using all categories of military forces;
 - multinational - determined by using forces from many countries in alliance relationships.

Also the forces designed to take action in this battlefield must meet the following main characteristics:

- high availability - understood as the level and extent of training and the time the unit will be ready to complete a mission;
- technological capacity and versatility - understood by its ability to adapt to missions that strategic uncertainty could an advertisement;
- mobility and autonomy - the right response to the diversity of possible action scenarios;
- Interoperability - understood as the ability to operate with allied forces from other nations;
- adaptability - driven by the opportunity to learn in a short time new forms of action.

In the modern battlefield, the technologies of the information age will be determined, the forces will support information systems, especially for management, control and communications. Fight Information will aim detailed knowledge of the situation in the theater of action and use of measures of misleading data acquisition systems of opponents. The means of data acquisition, detection and communications protected and the high precision striking considered the objective

requirement and essential requirements in the efficient action of forces in the new framework.

Using new generation of electronic means and some software are targeted for management performance and increase combat effectiveness of the fight means (either tanks, armored combat vehicles, missiles or laser devices).

The battlefield of the future actions will succeed in a fast pace due to the ability to maneuver land and air combat means and velocity information available. Success, it seems, will belong to those forces that will decide and act promptly and efficiently as possible.

2. INFORMATIONAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL FACTOR'S SUPREMACY – DECISIVE CRITERION IN ACHIEVING THE MILITARY OBJECTIVES

Some of the authors, especially Anglo-Saxon, believe that in modern times, Europe has experienced a military revolution, and this mutation is the basis of European superiority to the rest of the world and explains the colonial expansion in the seventeenth century and in the nineteenth century. Others, especially the French, disagree with such an explanation, since it is very difficult to define a concept so elastic that describes a phenomenon whose conduct is difficult to identify and to assess and whose circumstances are difficult to locate in time. Therefore, RMA debate around the impact of the global order, social, international relations in general and military art, in particular, it remains open. Some even believe that RMA belongs to the Americans and it concerns only the Americans.

When asked about whether or not it is about a revolution in military affairs, meaning in the military field, the answer can be only affirmative. Such a revolution has seen many cycles and stages, which depended on the great scientific discoveries and their implementation in the military, the advent of efficient means of fighting that led to substantial changes in the design and execution of war. Although the general principles of war have remained almost unchanged in their essence, for hundreds of years, the military actions have known over time, radical changes. The journey from physical confrontation with his sword, lance or bow, of two entities in front of the non-contact war is very long.

Therefore, recent discoveries in the field of armaments - satellite intelligence, directing the infrared laser, microwave and GPS, creating and using high-precision weapons, integrated weapon systems, etc. – have created a new facet of belligerence.

A report by the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO cites a definition given conclusive revolution in military affairs (Revolution in Military Affairs, RMA) by Andrew Marshall, director of the Office of Evaluation U.S. Department thus: "A Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a fundamental change in the nature of war, driven by innovative application of new technologies which, combined with the profound changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts, radically alters the character and conduct of military operations."

Revolution regarding armaments is undeniable. In a few years, there has been a huge leap in terms of form and effect kicks from massive precision uncertainty to certainty, thanks to new high-performance technologies in information, research, recognition and collision. Nanotechnology is completely changing the configuration of military action and reaction in the theater. The new dimension of control violence is built, under the RMA, the strategic fluidity and even spatial-temporal virtuality which in turn are based on information omnipotence. "Who has the information has the power".

Information dominance is a strategic paradigm enshrining" real time "as a cancellation of strategic spatial depth of the opponent ("asynchrony ") thereby inducing decision superiority. At the strategic level global - military, geopolitical and geo-economic - information dominance allows systematic control of world order (shaping the world):

At the military level, the informational dominance allows RMA the integration of battle and speed operators in decision-making and execution of operations, and full integration joint, interagency, interlude, civility, military-industrial synergy, i.e. the integration of **systems' system**².

The American concept, RMA aims mainly three areas: **technological** (integration of new information technologies in weapons systems and integrating C4ISR - command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, recognition) the **doctrinal and operational** (technology experimentation and translating its effects on concepts, theories and actions) and the **organizational** (integrating joint, civil-military integration, institutional etc.).

² The concept of systems' system belongs to the integrated strategy and is about the C4ISR integration (command, control, communication, computer, information, supervising, recognizing) of some systems and sub-systems (weapons, forces, logistics, infrastructures, strategic culture and even political and juridical systems) in a whole for which RMA assures a unitary and very efficient functionality. (see the article published in "Disarmament Forum de l'UNIDIR, 4^{ème} trimestre 2001" entitled La revolution dans les affaires militaires ET LA "COURSE AUX CAPACITIES", BY Sad'da Bedar, English version: <http://www.unog.ch/unidir//e-df1-4.html>)

The essence is the **integration of RMA** (information, weapons, sensors, structures, etc.) And the synergistic effect of the system is given information superiority systems' system, i.e. integral action based on: knowledge of the situation permanent theater in the world, due to the network information, action and reaction speed and timing required rapid neutralization crisis and conflict called "preclusion".

Preclusion is actually a compression of time for action to neutralize crisis and this may not be possible if you did not provide synergistic information networks and integrated perfectly as weapons systems.

RMA is contemporary with the concept of globalization. Somehow, these two concepts go hand in hand. Performance in information and weapons systems involve increased performance in industry, communications, in nanotechnologies etc. Such a vision is beyond the paradigm of war between states and involves one technological dominance by companies widen the type information using information offensive strategies.

This is a reality and not just an American reality. Even though the European Union and the United States there are some inconsistencies and some differences in terms of military spending, production and acquisition of weapon systems and particularly rapidly transport distance, Europe is not strictly interested in such investments, everyone is agreement with the impact of technology and information and information technology to all areas (economic, political, cultural, social), including the military art.

2.1. The technological revolution and the military art

Military art, understood as a philosophy of war, which includes both the science of war - polemology - the practice of war (armed struggle) and strategic art (art design and management of military action), do not change so easily. General principles of military confrontation are almost unchanged for hundreds and even thousands of years, and the commanders' intelligence, their experience, creative capacity of the commands, the ability to capitalize on specific conditions (depending on the available information, technology, quantity and quality of forces and other measurements), the inspiration of the moment, the courage to make asymmetric decisions will always be surprise factors, impossible to be put into the equation, to calculate, to predict. Chaos theory applies very well in the armed confrontation too. But nonlinear equations - the ones that change the complex determinism, of chaotic type - will not ever capture the totality and diversity, the man's creative capacity, his endless opportunities to put ingenious into practice a decision way or another. They

are the moving space, the law and compliance in bifurcations³, and technology is always the source and their substance.

Not everyone shares ideas and arguments of the Americans about RMA. Some believe, according to the report's special Lothar Ibrügger, that the world took place only three revolutions (agrarian, industrial and informational), and others believe that the number of revolutions can rise to number 14. And even if so, technological innovation would not be sufficient to cause a revolution. Since the discovery of gunpowder, for example, the applications of effective have been five centuries.

The example is however debatable. The impact of technology on physiognomy theater of war is developing in geometric progression. The day will come when such impact will be instant.

In terms of the technology influence on military art must distinguish between principles change (revolution) and rapid adaptation of the structures (forces strategy and means strategy) and of actions (operational strategy) to new possibilities. For example, in the Second World War, Germany has relied on a strategy of rapid actions, based mainly on a very good communication system in place and as a strategic concept. In this way, it managed to stand in front of the French army which had hung from the positional warfare philosophy, neglecting the role of the movement, i.e. armor and aviation in its possession sufficient to counteract the Nazi forces. Late French military art technological impact, especially in the field of forces strategy and the operational strategy, cost the glorious army of this country the defeat and humiliation at the beginning of the second world war.

Referring to this painful episode, the French say categorically that "the greatest French military inferiority lies in the brain of his generals. The commandant's breviary, the instruction on tactical usability of large units expressly provides that the war of the future will be the continuation of the previous war. "So not the German technological superiority was due to the defeat of the French army but the strategic inflexibility of the latter, not adapting concepts to engineering requirements.

³ The system, developing in a certain direction, due to the variable initial conditions, depending on the circumstances and many other causes, applies different in bifurcations; the direction where it goes can't be calculated very exactly, but this direction will be extremely important until the next bifurcation. This assertion proves the impossibility of an exactly prediction in a system evolution and more than that in a military active system.

Americans are the first to have drawn appropriate lessons from the experience of military confrontations, especially after the war in Vietnam.

They understood perfectly that new technologies create possibilities hitting far away, which led to setting up several new ways to engage the forces and, accordingly, some types of war it is considered that it might be involved: low intensity war, moderate war intensity and high intensity war. The U.S. armed forces, as the economy and infrastructure got, after the dramatic experience of Vietnam, to the application of a new concept of forces training. The strategic vision of the 80's, the Americans had to be prepared to fight a war and a half, even two wars in different regions of the world where interests require. Regarding the East – West confrontation, Americans have created, at that time, a rigorous system of action and reaction, based on a concept that has evolved from the doctrine of massive retaliation "aero-grounded battle 2000", under a containment policy of the Soviet Union. After the end of the "cold war", the concept remained somewhat pointless. But technology has gone forward, both in the creation of advanced research, information, monitoring and impact systems, as well as the design and implementation of systems' systems.

But the concept has immediately found a new object, a new space applied. Operation "Desert Storm", for example, took place not according to a strategy, but according to the strategic concept on aero-grounded battle.

Thus, during the Gulf War, the transmissions system of Saddam Hussein's army was destroyed in less than 24 hours - even in the early hours of action - allowing almost unrestricted use of 6,250 tons of guided⁴ munitions to 81,980 tons of blind bombs. The first have achieved the object in a rate of 80-90%, while, it is known, only 25% of unguided bombs (blind) reach their target.

The primacy of information and technology has become, according to the U.S. indisputable. General Gordon Sullivan and Lt. Col. James M. Dubik believe that there are the following trends in technology development, which are valid for all areas:

- Increasing power of destruction;
- Increasing the volume and accuracy of fire;
- Increasing technological integration, which ensures high efficiency;
- Enhancing the role of small units;
- Strengthening invisibility and detecting.

⁴ Precision Guidance Munitions (PGM).

In this regard, a team from the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) proposed a typology of warfare areas that NATO Assembly's special report which we referred above considers interesting.

It is due to these new coordinates RMA impact on confrontation and contains:

- precision attack from a great distance;
- Information warfare;
- dominant maneuver;
- space war.

In this way the direct confrontation gives way to a more complex and multidimensional one in technological diversity. This way raises the concept of "non-contact war" based on technological superiority and therefore strategic. The report highlights a compelling example: in 1943, 8th Squadron U.S. Air Force hired throughout the year, only 50 targets of strategic value. In the first 24 hours of the 1991 war against Iraq, the Air Force Combined hired 150, which means a thousand times more than in 1943, plus precision strikes and minimizing side effects. It is estimated that in 2020, could be hit around 500 such objectives, the first few minutes of the campaign, that is 5,000 times more than during the Gulf War.

The weapons precision is astounding. Cruise missiles, laser-guided and GPS bombs, AWACS systems have introduced entirely new elements in belligerent physiognomy, space of confrontation.

This reality prompted Gen. John Shalikashvili to publish, in 1996, a document entitled **Joint Vizion 2010** (JV 2010), which emphasizes that in revolutionizing the ways of warfare, not only the technology matters, but also the quality of command, personnel, organizational structures and operational concepts. Major trends in the evolution of technology, in the opinion of former Chief of Joint Staff of the U.S. Armed Forces are:

- Accuracy striking distance with the range of vectors;
- A wide range of effects on neutralization to destroy targets protected;
- technologies to ensure a good invisibility and masking its own forces;
- Information systems and systems integration (systems of systems).

U.S. General in 2020 shows that **JV 2020** is supported by four new operational concepts:

- dominant maneuver;
- Engage precision;
- Integrated protection;

- Logistics Network.

These concepts have been extensively discussed in the United States and accepted as such. Each theory translates into reality governed by technological impact, revolutionary weapons and information and communication systems and opens new directions into practice belligerence in operational strategy. **Dominant maneuver** is not just the same with what military art has been recording for hundreds of years (surround, back, front kick), making a clear distinction between them, but also covers how to identify, select and categorize goals, establish centers of gravity the enemy and hit them very accurately, whenever needed, combining shares information (informational war) with the space, air, sea and land, rapid transportation of forces and especially the necessary resources, the actions choosing is best suited to simultaneously hitting sensitive points of the enemy and planned success.

Other concepts – **accurate employing, full protection and network logistics** - are complementary to the dominant maneuver, ensuring consistency and efficiency. Americans are masters of effective actions. Their pragmatism is relevant. Logistics must be tailored to the situations, flexible and precise and the protection to ensure the implementation of the concept of "zero loss" (minimum) and action security for all forces and not just for some.

Shalikashvili's work through the key ideas that he promoted in 1996, opened a new horizon not only for the military theory, but also to the practice. After all, the American general was not a theorist in the established sense of the word, but a practical person, as befits a chief of staff.

Therefore, almost immediately, his ideas were taken up, continued and turned into action and reaction for combined forces. The Concept for Future Joint Operations (CFJO) develops concepts of JV 2010 and gives them a practical purpose. Concept for future Joint Operations (Integrated articulated) requires major changes in six critical areas:

- staff;
- leadership;
- doctrine;
- education and training;
- organization;
- material.

Starting from here, concepts Army Vision 2020 and Army After Next were developed, which take place for 30 years, until 2045. Research taking place in these coordinates aims mainly four areas:

- geopolitics;
- military art;
- human and organizational theory;
- technology.

However, even if seemingly they bring nothing new (always research the area was conducted and coordinated or primarily on these coordinates), they focus on the same plane the effort of correlation the politics with the means and forces strategies, according to the scientific and technical performances where they reached and to the quality of the communication systems. The results are already visible through the implementation (by the Americans, of course) on some operational imperative regarding the forces projecting, decisive operations, shaping the battlefield, protecting and forces supporting etc.

We deal with a revolution in all components of the military field, and not only here but also in the adjacent covering economic, political and strategic culture. Regarding the physiognomy of combat means, RMA involves designing, testing and producing new generations of weapon systems based on information technology, nanotechnology and even biotechnology. They still maintain the traditional platforms - aircraft carriers, fighter jets with pilot, tanks and chassis systems - force level - 12 aircraft carriers, 20 air squadrons, 10 divisions - but it is growing at the same time, the systems of the future, within a budget two times higher than the rest of the military world. In these new systems, the information warfare, transport (ships with a speed of 100 knots, supersonic planes and hypersonic air transport, suitable logistics, smaller and faster units, etc.) and the space warfare will play a very important role.

2.2. RMA, NATO and Europe

According to the report of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of specialty, the debate over RMA is conducted in the United States. No other country had such a wide debate on the future conduct of military operations and apparently nobody hurries to make a fundamental analysis of operational concepts. Americans often complain that Europeans under invest in this area.

Between Europe and the United States there is a real gap in terms of military technology and this crevice does not shrink, but deepens more and more. Currently,

Americans are able to work anywhere in the world and against anyone, without EU support.

In the field of long-distance transport, the invisibility, the informational war, electronic war and precision strikes, the United States are so far that it is unlikely that someone can even propose to approach such a performance.

Although qualitative and quantitative differences in the equipment are unavoidable, since the operational technologies and concepts are similar, NATO can operate as an integrated force. Action against Yugoslavia - NATO's first war action - although had some limitations, it highlighted this possibility too. It is estimated, however, that it will be very difficult to integrate NATO forces in a coherent whole. Americans have already developed studies regarding the experience of RMA operations carried out by a coalition. They revealed data, information and feedback on the experience of coalition operations in Bosnia and Yugoslavia, they were developed possible scenarios of the coalition actions, it was emphasized the role of technological demonstrations and of the simulation techniques to strengthen the compatibility of a coalition C4ISR systems development, the interoperability and also of the use strategies and tactics, the principle of complementarity, of the American forces and those of partners in a coalition.

Widening the differentials between the U.S. and European partners in terms of technology - especially information integrated technology, communication and weapons systems, including the ones of strategic transport - is not convenient for the Americans, or either the Europeans can not try to improve this difference. And not to please the Americans, but because, at this stage of the reconfiguration of the world order, Europe can not be complacent. Switching to the type of information society, the battle for resources, the market expansion, asymmetrical conflict prevention, reducing vulnerabilities and increasing security are goals that Europe can not be achieved only through a close collaboration with U.S. partner.

Joint Vision 2020 emphasizes the need for the U.S. to work with friends and allies in almost all operations. The trenchant question that arises (and which can not remain without a right response) is whether the European partners are meeting short-term strategies to deal with this. For this, they have to admit that, actually, there is a revolution in military affairs and that, this revolution will expand in both the Alliance and beyond.

The performance means should be opposed by those performance means. The humans never gave in this competition and will not give up. Alliance, to the extent that it wants to build a new philosophy and a new strategic identity must be

with the United States, not only in terms of political strategies but also in terms of revolutionizing the means of combat, of the military strategy and, therefore, of the military art, in almost all its components. A new philosophy in the future war is built. Information, cosmos, weapon systems and capacity of forces planetary projection changes completely the concept of belligerency and war theater configuration. Europe will have to make a great effort to close the U.S. or even on track to RMA.

However, these technologies exist, some of them have been tested in the theater, and the world will have to adapt to them. And the first structure which will make important steps towards high technologies is NATO of course. This option means inter-European and Euro-Atlantic (geopolitical, military and industrial) cooperation.

CONCLUSIONS

Analysis of the military phenomena in order to determine solutions for success is far from being complete. Revolution in the military field, with all avant-garde achievements is just at the beginning. Europe meets the NATO defense capability initiatives (DCI), which comprises five areas: deploy ability and mobility; logistics support capability; effectiveness of employment; the survivability of forces and infrastructures; C4ISR systems.

The main factor for the victory, the technologic one was caused by computer, driven by the globalization of emphasized communication and helped by the moving, in geometric proportion, of the gap between the discovery phase (through scientific research) and the application.

Today, the planet is covered by the surveillance of airspace and aircraft radar and computer networks and the information, with the image appears almost instantly on the screens of the TVs in the world.

Following this reasoning, it is expected that the technological process to bring substantial changes especially in forces strategy, in the means and obviously in the operational strategy. In the first stage (which has already started), decisions will be made in hours, minutes and even seconds, enemy vital centers will be hit quickly, instantly, by surprise, from a distance, dominant maneuver will connect in a fluid space, a whole (a system of systems) information-impact research that will make the opponent unable to respond effectively.

This is the *technological effect in the immediately strategic space*, whose, in the plan of action, it corresponds the *disproportionately war*, usually, *non-contact* rule. The *response effect*, in the same context created by RMA, will probably be a

great one that will characterize the second stage of the overall involvement of this revolution. The first expression of this effect was the *asymmetric reaction* (which Americans contemplated before) and notably increasing the terrorist activity. The asymmetric war of the third wave described by Alvin Toffler has already begun. In coming years, there will be, no doubt, a remodeling of the confrontation space and belligerence philosophy, both in terms of military revolution and that of a potential counterrevolution in this field.

For the Romanian Army, the alliance system which integrated innovation, technology, strategy and geopolitics, created opportunities for adherence to a security environment adapted to the current requirements.

Our army is undergoing an adaptation and even remodeling the coordinated Euro-Atlantic strategy and, within this framework, to redefine (i.e., to refresh) its strategic concepts, acquiring them with the new ones.



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