

THE STRATEGIC EXPERTISE OF THE POLITICAL DECISION

General (ref) Professor Eugen BĂDĂLAN, PhD

The article that follows is a strategic study about strategy, strategic policy, strategist, policy, strategic expert, political decision, strategic examination of a political decision, strategic awareness and strategically turning a political decision into action in order to obtain a decision, a victory.

An expert in strategy means a specialist in the theory and practice of strategy, mastering the strategic art of defeating a superior enemy, and control over risk; he is an expert in the matter and performs analysis, synthesis, variant reading and suggests/proposes a course of action. Experimentally, the strategic expertise of the political decision means expertise in scientific research of the military phenomenon, strategic action, essential factors providing power and value, force development, force goal, force build-up, force distribution, force structure and financial resources in order to defend the Romanian national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The term “expertise” has the sense of research made by a high-class specialist (expert), a person who has special knowledge in a certain domain, over a situation, problems, etc¹.

The strategic expertise of the political decision means the research done by “Carol I” National Defense University, the Strategic Studies Institutions, the General Staff, the General Directorates of the Ministry of National Defense in areas such as the security environment, the military phenomenon, the strategic actions, the necessary forces, means and costs and the military connotations of the process of risk management, dangers, challenges, threats, non-military aggressions, military vulnerabilities, as well as of a political-military situation, by evaluations of the strategic situation and forecasts expressed in certain analyses, syntheses, variants and proposals for solutions.

The strategic expert is a specialist in the area of military art and sciences, war and research in military sciences, but also in the research methods and methodologies in these sciences. Furthermore, he is a high-class specialist in strategy, which represents a distinct domain of the military sciences, more precisely of military art, which means that not any military theorist is also a strategist.

¹ *Mic dicționar enciclopedic*, Ediția a II-a, revăzută și adăugită, Editura științifică și enciclopedică, București, 1978, p.360

Therefore, the expert in strategy masters the art of thoughtfulness of substantiation of the political decisions, the art of thinking and acting or of well thought action, where science is the result of experience, and creating intelligence collocates with pragmatism. Because this special military expert, a “diamond” among other experts, controls the strategic art and has the force to design strategies by valuing the force of the mind, which springs from the universe of knowledge and underlies the backbone of experience in the dynamic space of effective and efficient action.

The strategic expertise of the political decision is the privilege of intelligent, creative, intrepid, audacious people, who know that the odds are on the side of courageous and intelligent people. Out of the hundreds of thousands of skilled leaders and worthy commanders of the modern and contemporary world, very few have the quality, capacity or force to be strategy or strategies makers. As a consequence, the quality of being a strategic expert of the political decision belongs undoubtedly only to the chosen ones, to the elite, that are great masterminds in the domain of strategy².

We consider that the strategic expertise of the political decision is mandatory in today’s Romania, due to the geo-political and geo-strategic position of our country, with many risk factors, old and especially new, both international and internal which threaten the fundamental values of the rule of law, of the European Union and of the North Atlantic Alliance. That is why the National Security Strategy, as well as the Military Strategy of any state, and therefore of Romania, have to be periodically re-designed in the vision of the new protection requirements of the Romanian citizens and of guaranteeing their fundamental rights, individual freedom, as well as of guaranteeing the sovereignty, independence and unity of our state, the territorial integrity of the country, in the long run even by using military force.

Policy without strategy, without strategic expertise, is like a headless body or brainless head, a thing which has been demonstrated since ancient times in confrontations such as the experience of the Vietnam or Korean wars.

The expert in strategy is and is not the same as in the more or less distant, that means the one who knows how to put into practice, into operation, a political decision based on science, art, experience and ability to turn into life the dialectics of the will of one side and of own forces in conflict with the other side. Today he is more than he was before, because strategic expertise means a strategy which has suffered significant upgrades. It has extended to almost all domains and approached very much the dimension of the political decision which is, as we all know, a political strategy. The explanation consists in the fast development of the scope and content of the strategy as regards the new dialectics of the confrontation philosophy of today’s world. Nevertheless, the expert uses in his analysis the same strategy, which is science, experience, practice and the art of putting into operation the political decision by scientific rigor, judicious planning, realistic organization, exploitation of knowledge and information and accomplishment of the political objectives, by discovering the ingenious connections and determinations in order to get higher efficacy

² Eugen BĂDĂLAN, Valentin ARSENIE, Gheorghe VĂDUVA, *Eseu despre arta strategică*, Editura Militară, București, 2005

and an optimal efficiency. Nevertheless, the strategic expertise considers the widening of the conceptual scope of strategy, the enlargement of the applicability space, the multiplication of the definition coordinates, the entwining of principles and methods, their integration, the closer mutual reliance and their reformulation, as well as the multiplication of the connections and interdependences, which permits the holistic approach.

This expert never forgets that nature and life are domains with numberless events, connections and results which spring from a dynamic and complex phenomenology, and realizes that in time, the more he knows, the less he knows, because as the more knowledge and information we gather, the more our knowledge or necessities for knowledge increase. Anyway, the expert thinks in the space between political decision and action as a designer, builder, planner and organizer of the action. Without this strategy which the expert projects the political decision cannot become operational because the resulting action would be chaotic, incoherent, uneconomical in point of resources, and the results would be questionable and inefficient. That is why strategies are always needed, as long as politics exists. That is why experts are needed all the time, to mediate, to implement decisions, to translate plans into efficient and viable actions in order to lead to the achievement of the objectives.

The expert has foresight and builds action plans or strategies depending on the available resources and forces, on the political objectives and the established goals, but also according to the principles and laws for action, for peace and war, because humanity is today in a continuous war. As a consequence, the strategic expertise presupposes creative, cumulative and associative capacity, to design a strategy, i.e., any strategy. The choice or use of a strategy is a complex creation process even in the situation of choosing and connecting some principles, norms or rules related to the concrete conditions of the international security environment. Therefore, the expert uses the strategic knowledge as a way of projecting and designing the actions, based on the objectives established by the political factor, on the available forces and resources (financial, economic, technical, logistic, of time and of other nature). The expert who puts into equation all these elements, or better said variables, proves that he is in control of the strategic art and that he is a creator of art.

Because sometimes the political decision is made in conditions of uncertainty, depending on an uncertain event, on a subjective factor, it is mandatory that strategy, as a science, art and experience of using the forces, means and resources to accomplish it, ensure a certain resistance to voluntaristic behavior, ventured by the corresponding expertise of the political factor.

In this kind of uncertainty conditions, of political stammering, the strategic expert's opinion necessary, to ensure the quality of the cohesion between strategic theory and strategic art, between strategy and politics. It turns out that we have to beware of the temptation of merging strategy with politics and of abolishing the expert from this relationship, because the distinction between the political level and the strategic one is necessary and useful. The strategic and the political expert as well operate with theories, experiences and specific instruments, and the political person does not control those of the strategic space well enough, but the ones from the political sphere.

In order to fulfill his role of putting the political decision in operation, the military expert needs all the necessary means and procedures at his disposal.

Politics has especially the quality of art and science of solving the problems of the power of the state, which means art in politics has approximately the same role that it has in strategy. Experts from both domains know that political art generates policies and strategic art generates strategies.

Politics is a provider of freedom, more precisely freedom of action, but has to leave, may impose a sufficiently wide space to freedom of maneuver where strategy can organize and develop its own domain, in which the expert can build the strategies of putting in operation the political decisions. In other words, the political decision-maker, whoever he may be, has to transfer the authority of the strategic domain, respectively the strategic expert, whom he controls, but at the same time he should let him make the strategic expertise because somebody else cannot do it better. The military expert uses strategy as an instrument, as theory and methodology, experience and creative art and by his expertise he offers a wide but unitary, coherent range of forms and procedures for planning and organizing the action to political decision, in its different elaboration phases. The strategic expert perfectly controls both the inter-determination relationship between the political sphere and the strategic one (**figure 1**).




Figure 1: The interaction between strategy and political decision

Strategic expertise is applicative mathematics and logics of politics, especially of military and security politics, because the political expert tells the strategist what to do and

where to go, and the latter knows what to do and how to get there. For this, every idea, every decision, in order to become operational, needs a certain strategy.

The habit of making strategy and strategies is as old as the world itself, just that in the last century it left the military domain to be successfully included in the other fields in which conflict exists: economy, finances, international relations, the social sphere, etc., because strategy gives flexibility, intelligence and adaptability to the creative dialectics of the wills which confront each other in action.

Beaufre said the aim of strategy “to project a decision by which a situation which handles the moral disintegration of the adversary, in order to determine the latter to accept the conditions imposed to him”³ should be created and exploited. Sun Tzu thought the same over two millenniums ago. The decision belongs to politics, and the projection of putting it into practice, or the expertise which has to precede and accompany its elaboration belongs to strategy. This means that strategy participates, directly or in an interposed way, as an expertise to making the decision (**figure 1**).

Before initiating the operations in the Gulf, in March 2003, the United States President and the Congressmen knew precisely what forces and resources were necessary, which would be the stages of action, how the force projection had been made, which would be the losses, in what consisted the confrontation risk and how long action would last. The confrontation between the political and strategic rationales led to the decision of starting the hostilities.

The strategic essence lies, in Beaufre’s opinion, in convincing the the opponent that engaging or continuing the fight is useless, which means strategy goes beyond the strict military space, becoming also an art of negotiating, of obtaining an effect, and especially of imposing its own will. At the same time, Beaufre shows that strategy is “the fight for freedom of action”. In assessing the freedom of action, which is an old principle in military art, the military expert starts from the idea that this is not obtained solely by the appropriate containment of the opponents’ freedom, but also by the “dialectics of wills”, that means by flexibly building a space of information and strategic domination, in which the freedom of the other is “dependent” on your freedom, and not viceversa. That is why expertise makes allowance for the fact that strategy is not only an art of cheating on the enemy, but also an art of imposing will on him, of abolishing direct, implicit or collateral tensions and for solving conflict situations. Furthermore, strategy helps propose possibilities of getting access to the “well-being” to which people aspire. The capacity of the political factor is expressed not only by the authority of decision, but also by the way in which it knows how to choose what the military experts propose, with the aim to overcome obstacles⁴ and optimize the commitment system (i.e., political, economic, military, etc.) based on forces, means, resources, aims and objectives. It is the inverse relationship strategy-politics, the

³ André BEAUFRE, *Introducere în strategie. Strategia acțiunii*, Editura Militară, București, 1974.

⁴ <http://www.departmentofintelligence.com/fr/geopolitique/geopo6.html>, Julien Ducl, *op. cit.*

manner by which strategy puts at the disposal of politics the forms and ways of action in order to realize the established aim. Here it is about the expertise function of strategy⁵.

In order to elaborate a definition usually it is necessary to use the proximate genus and the specific difference. Both permit a good identification with the domain, the location and delimitation of the phenomenon, process or respective activity. But there also are descriptive definitions which are used if a genus cannot be clearly delimited in the case of defining the strategy. Even if, in this case, the proximate genus is the social or human action, and the specific difference is in the plan of violence, of using violent means, the differences that were and are given to strategy are usually descriptive. Whatever definitions would be adopted, strategy – military strategy, of course – as a form of war (i.e., a complex social phenomenon, complicated and very destructive), but also as a war instrument, remains a domain which concerns mankind.

Strategy is not only in the line of war because it supports, gives expertise and puts into operation the idea that “living means fighting”⁶.

Military strategy represents not only science and experience, but also the art of putting in operation of a political decision referring to composing, preparing and using forces and means necessary to war and armed fighting, but also theory, practice and art of war and armed fighting, as well as a modality of military expertise for the political decider. Renewing the idea that by strategy one can also understand the dialectics of the confronting wills (Baufre), we add that this is a definition which has the advantage to leave a very large space of action to the strategic domain, which is always presented as architecture with variable geometry.

The expert does not mediate, but transposes, applies or transforms politics into action plans, based on resources, the forces available and by the laws of action, respectively by the laws of military engagement, that means by the laws of war, whereas strategy is a way of projecting and building the action, based on the fixed aims and objectives, by forces, means, principles and resources.

Hence, the domain of military strategy which is also the domain of strategic expertise – even if we restrict military strategy to the military domain⁷ – has an architecture situated dynamically somewhere between the rigor of principles and the flexibility and unpredictability of action.

⁵ **Eugen BĂDĂLAN, Valentin ARSENIE, Gheorghe VĂDUVA**, *Eseu despre arta strategică*, Editura Militară, București, 2005, pp. 14-15.

⁶ **Gheorghe VĂDUVA**, *Consonanțe și rezonanțe strategice în condiții de normalitate, de criză și de risc militar extrem*, Impact Strategic, nr. 1/2009, p.39.

⁷ *Such an acception is debatable, because the military domain is not a reality in itself, but part of the building of each state, of the national and international environment. In all types of society, the military domain is integrated in the political and social one. In many countries, the political leader endeavors to keep the militaries as far as possible from political parties, but the military institution is an instrument of politics, more exactly one of its components. All world armies are controlled, one way or another, by the political leader of the state, because the political leader creates and uses them.*

In today's society which is one of an information type, and which is about to become a knowledge-based one (an epistemological society⁸), strategy comes very close to politics. In such a society it is hard to make a distinction between the political and strategic component of an action to be made. But such a difference is necessary and has to be made, because the political has the tendency to diminish the role of strategy, assuming functions it cannot fulfill, because it does not have the necessary competence. This way, for example, when the political makes the decision of starting the war, the necessity of strategic modeling not only of the war, but also of the deciding political process, appears in all its complexity.

According to a study by Julien Duval, politics represents the art or science which deals with the problems of power, of fighting for power, and of oriented or omni-directional exertion of power (of the power of the political state). Power means, firstly, resources, and also precise rules and mechanisms to transform resources into capacities, which cannot be realized only by political means, but especially by strategic ones.

Therefore, power means enforcement, resources, organization and modeling, i.e., strategy.

War is a construction on a solid or fluid political foundation, perverse or firm, clean or dirty. In its analysis the real coordinates which define and stake out war (flexible and changing) from the foundation and up to the roof have to be taken into account, otherwise unrealistic, wrong conclusions could be reached.

“The real domain for an army is war – wrote Helmuth Von Moltke (1800-1891). But the development of the conditions for such an activity, the abilities it has, its continuity belong to peacetime”⁹, when there is more time for strategic expertise than during times of war.

In his essay on strategy, he specifies that politics uses war to reach its aim; it has a decisive influence on the beginning and ending of war, but exerts this function also in the course of operations. The expert counts on strategy and therefore works in the interest, and for the advantage of, politics, having it all the time as a basis or spring. He takes shape after the political objective, knowing that as for the action way, strategy stays completely independent.

The expert uses strategy to prepare the fighting means, armaments, resources, and firstly the armies, as a whole. That is why the first thing he had in mind is the deployment of the armies, where he takes the most diversified political, geographical and national considerations into account. Any mistake in the initial concentration of the armies is very hard to be corrected during the campaign. That is why these operations have to be studied by military experts before the campaign itself, when the preparation for war of the troops, the organization of transports, communication, etc. is made.

The way in which the prepared combat means are used belongs to strategy, but the will of using these means in the envisaged operations comes at clash with the opponent's

⁸ *An epistemological society is dominated by scientific knowledge, every citizen participating effectively in the process of scientific cognition.*

⁹ **Eugen BĂDĂLAN, Valentin ARSENIE, Gheorghe VĂDUVA, Eseu despre arta strategică**, Editura Militară, București, 2005, p.405.

will. The expert knows that the opponent's will can be limited and tread down by means of tactics, if we have or get the strategic initiative. He also has to take into account that such a confrontation has all the time material and moral consequences of utmost importance, that the encounter with the enemy creates at the same time different situations, which require different measures. There is no operation plan which can be deployed with certainty the way it was conceived, from the first action to the last confrontation with the enemy forces. But an operation without an operation plan is not possible.

The only permanent element of this plan is the established objective. The expert always has this unchanged objective in front of him. As for the rest, everything is changing. No expert can precisely determine the necessary means for war, from the first to the last day of operations.

In order to clarify the relationship politics-strategy and politics-war, the debates go simultaneously on the theoretical, philosophic and pragmatic levels. The experience accumulated by the expert has a say, but the great scientific achievements and those of the philosophic reflections find a very useful correspondence on the plan of military reflection in a natural way. The time of Napoleon and Clausewitz, the same as our time, is one of strong connections strategy-politics, science-strategy, and war-strategy.

The expert is armed with this strong resolve, which facilitates his reflection and facilitates his intercession. He knows, it is vital for him to know, what he has to obtain by war, and he knows how to do it, but the concrete choice of the operation theatre and of the war theatre, the positioning of the forces, the establishment of the operation lines and of the other elements on which the efficiency of the tactical action depends are variables hard to correlate, and which are submitted to the conditional probability law. From here it does not result that he is in front of a fog cloud, of a cloud of uncertainties or quicksands, but only the strategic difficulty.

A good expert will never fear such challenges, because this is his job, his quality as a professional, a strategist. This aspect is essential in strategy; the more the strategy is called upon to put into operation an often changing political decision, an unclear or even perverse one.

The decisions an expert makes have only few solid bases which apply a more or less firm thinking or justifiable from a political or military point of view, of the international or moral right. Beyond these basic issues, there is sometimes an immense sea of uncertainties and immense responsibilities. That is why a part of his selections cannot be anticipated. They rely on new information, on the evolution of the situation and on the expert's capacity to understand the issues at stake and make wise decisions.

In **figure 2** [¹⁰], the identification and evaluation stages of the risks corresponding to the Risk Management Strategy are presented schematically.

¹⁰ Dr. ing. **Ilie GHEORGHE**, *De la management la guvernare prin risc*, Editura UTI Press, Editura Detectiv, București, 2009, p. 291




Figure 2. The risk management strategy

Because the successive actions of war are not deliberate executions, but spontaneous acts which meet the requirements of the moment, the expert has to make realistic analyses and syntheses, to project variants and solution proposals, tendencies and especially consequences with ingenuity and founded on calculations, graphics and comparisons which must reflect the realities and dynamics of the civilian and military structures, in the context of Romania's membership to NATO and the EU. The strategic expertise of the political decision has consequences upon:

- The resource needs:
 - Human resource;
 - Economic – Financial resource;
 - Technical – Technological resource;
 - Material resource;
 - Information resource;
 - Time resource
- adopting the programmatic documents (the Security Strategy; the White Charter; the Defense Strategy; doctrines)
- Organization;
- Procurement of the Armed Forces;
- Training
- Resource management (human; financial; information; material; time).

All of them are part of a specific general conduct, in a style, so to speak, they have a meaning and significance. Each emerging problem requires an expertise to match. No problem is identical to another, but no one can solve math problems, for example, if he or she does not know math.

This axiom is true for the military art, too. No matter how talented a military expert is, but he cannot solve a concrete problem if he does not know, understand or apply the science of war, if he does not make, sometimes at very short notice, thousands of connections between what he knows, what he learned, what he experienced and what is currently happening. An expert is not an expert if he does not know or see all the phenomena, processes and events necessary to pass the exam that he takes in front of victory or disaster.

An expert must see in uncertainties: he has to see through fog, often to guess and relate the unknowns, to keep balance and awareness, not to roam in the immensity of details, impressions, feelings, or situations. During the training for war, an expert is not his own master. He needs impeccable logic, fast analysis, lucidity, the ability to see beyond what people see, grasp, courage to take responsibility and accountability of courage. But above all, an expert means will, courage and wisdom. If strategy is the dialectic of facing wills, this has nothing to do with voluntarism, stubbornness or pleasure. This is neither strategy, nor military policy.

Many times, these things go beyond the analysis, but they should not go beyond the expert. When considering a military confrontation, they take into account, as a rule, the balance of forces, quantitatively and qualitatively, the positioning of armies, the fire system, the undertaken maneuvers, in other words, the performance of this operation. But, as Exupéry said, the important things remain often invisible, but not for the expert, we add.

The same applies in the case of military art, and also of strategy. A genuine expert is not interested in the performance battle, but in achieving the purpose of war. If such a goal can be achieved without struggle, without casualties, so much the better. If not, the expert will prepare a study for these losses to be as small as possible. That was also done for the two confrontations / armed conflict in the Persian Gulf in 1991 and 2003, and the losses were incredibly small, unlike in the present conflict in Iraq where the current losses are too numerous, which means that the strategy is not appropriate and another one has to be chosen.

Beyond this game, this clash of wills, life offers plenty of other variables - difficult to predict accurately, but they must be taken into account. In the multitude of factors, some of them known, others unknown, there is a third category of factors, which sometimes completely overlooked in the forecast: temperature, illnesses, accidents of all kinds, namely chance, fatality, force majeure.

The assessment a general makes depends on all these factors, i.e., by calculating the probabilities of which we should not exclude, no matter what. Such a calculation seems cumbersome and even inefficient, but the expert must be able to change the political decision in a victorious military action.

Military strategy is a military component of the human life, a complex way of thinking, planning, organizing and acting in case of a war or military conflict, in managing a crisis or a military conflict situation.

Military strategy is, in essence, the science and art, the skill, the ability, the experience, and the way to implement, by military means, a political decision by high-profile projects within a complex and conflict international security environment with many challenges, contempt, dangers, threats and vulnerabilities, which require a philosophy of identifying, calculating and assuming risk (internal and external), to develop, on this basis, a national policy of alliance or coalition of the most proper behavior and the appropriate expertise of the political decision.

Military strategy was understood in the past as the great commanders' ability to defeat the enemy, both in war and in preparation for war, using intelligently the forces, means and allocated resources by the political factor and also to prepare the necessary conditions for victory in a battle or a war, to realize the goals and objectives set by the policy-makers. It depends on the experience, skill and art of the General Staff, of the military commander, of the general to design, plan, organize, relate, operate and update, in a realistic, intelligent and brave manner, the systems and active processes, and the methodologies which create the best conditions to put into operation the political decision, optimize the synergy of the strategies of national security and alliance (coalition).

Military strategy requires, therefore, the existence of at least four major issues to be joined in structural systems and processes in support of high-risk or even extreme risk, in the context of complex determinations, with unforeseeable developments: a political decision; a conflict strategic environment; a strategic concept of forces, means, actions and resources; a support of legal and legitimate employment. All of these are mutually interdependent, not being able to exist one without the other in sizing and resizing the strategic action.

The interrelations of the four components are represented in **Figure 3**.

The conditionings are very flexible, so that the ability to act at any level of risk and of reaction-response, at any level of challenges, contempt, dangers and threats, to be able to be adapted appropriately to the situation demands.

As you know, military strategy is both a strategy of action and reaction in limited situations, i.e. in conditions of extreme risk, and *a strategy of implementing in action a political decision for any conflict situation*, from those which are related to solving the crisis by military means, to the ones meant to help the population in emergency civil or military situations and natural disasters.

Of course, military strategy must meet an extremely important request, without which no other action or reaction can be possible. We refer to the force generation of and means necessary for actions (preventive, preemptive, of reaction or response), which are complex, variable, planned and, depending on concrete situations, modeling and adaptive to them, meaning surprising and very unexpected, being of a very wide range in the conditions of some complex situations, from minor actions to ones of extreme risk and war.




Figure 3: Political and military strategic, decisional and active consonant and resonant

Generating the forces, means and actions is not an easy task and well established in policies and immutable strategies. The forces, means and necessary resources to the military action are of special order, with a special philosophy, usually inaccessible to common sense or understanding. They will be always situated between moving milestones, somehow, always the same and yet different, between complicated paradoxes and specific and time-consuming constructions. The expert explains why all these are needed, why the army needs many resources, why it must be given these resources, in a world where armed violence is and will always be condemned, outlawed, rejected and unacceptable.

An army always prepares for war for decades, even centuries, because no state, big or small, strong or weak, can afford to neglect preparation in order to face the serious or extreme risk, like the war. The statements, the policies to harmonize the interests of the world, the numerous international agreements could not prevent or limit (moderate) the research on weapons, advanced weapon systems, nuclear weapons, weapons based on waves, lasers, nanotechnologies, and on other modern technologies, some of them still unknown even to the evolved scientific world. The humanity does not give up its guns, and those submitted to non-proliferation treaties or reduction treaties are usually outrun or cannot be very well controlled. As noted, the world is, in essence, about conflict and the

dynamic essence of the world is not represented by values, but by interests. The dynamics, i.e., movement and conflict, is based on interests, not on values. There is political, social, information and military conflict. Conflicts are the interests, goals and objectives, active projections as the source of actions related to the access to the natural and energy resources of the world, from high technologies to financial resources, markets, infrastructures, etc.

The policies, strategies (including the military) and actions do not operate only in the area of interests, but also in the sphere of values, through their scientific and artistic components. Therefore, when we talk about the military action levels, the expert has in mind not only the interests that generate the action, but also the valuable, structural and organizational support of the action. Of course, the action consists of a system of activities and events that follow a goal fulfilled through the achievement of objectives. But the action has as main driving engine interest, beyond which there is the support of wisdom, a system of values which relates to each result, product and effect.

Military strategy is, in this context, not only the science, experience, approach and art to make a political decision, but also the science, experience, skill, ability, art and approach to harmonize the foreseeable effect of an action or a complex of actions with its axiological military and civilian-military coordinates¹¹. This means military strategy puts in relation the supports, mobiles and predictable levels of the military action in a construct with variable geometry and capacity to adapt to the expected, planned or only suspected but possible changes, in a context of values of legality and legitimacy. The strategic level can provide strategic expertise to the political level on strategic consonant or dissonant coordinates, or just signals the possible dialectic consonants or dissonances¹². This is of great importance, insofar as it draws the policy makers' attention on the responsibilities they must assume and better shapes the risk level of the action in the operational and tactical plan. A relationship of these levels is presented schematically by Gheorghe Vaduva (**Figure 4**)¹³.

The forces, means and resources are used for military actions and military response and in other situations that the policy maker considers to be resolved by such means, in the legal, legitimate and compliance conditions to the principles and rules set by the international law.

¹¹ **Gheorghe VADUVA**, *Consonanțe și rezonanțe strategice în condiții de normalitate, de criză și de risc militar extrem*, Impact Strategic, nr.1/2009, p.43

¹² *Ibidem*

¹³ *Ibidem*, p.42

INTERRELATIONS			
LEVEL	Interest (mobile of action)	Axiological support (of connection)	Effect of interrelation (expected, planned, developed)
Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Substantiation of the military policy component (security and defense) of the military field (architecture, construction, military transformation); ➤ Allocated resources; ➤ The purpose of the intervention (military action); ➤ The limits and political configuration of the employment. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The values systems of the conflicting parties; ➤ The intersection sphere of the multiple elements contained by the political decision on base of security and defense and values that define the real and lasting support of security and defense; ➤ The way in which the political decision affects the value systems. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The strategic expertise offered by the strategic level (and accepted by the political level), based on the strategic analysis of interrelations and expressed in the quality and realism of the arguments that support or weights (shape) the political decision; ➤ The development of experience in the plan of security and defense; ➤ The assimilation of results that can enrich the political and military patrimony of values related to the security and defense.
Strategic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The strategic scope and objective; ➤ The strategic level of engagement, depending on the allocated resources and limits established by the policymaker; ➤ The strategic maneuver. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The strategic culture; ➤ The war experience recorded in valuable works, in monuments, museums, but also in the collective conscience of the nation and the army; ➤ The organizational culture; ➤ The respect for the military institution; ➤ The quality of the strategic command; ➤ Trust in the military and commanders etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The ability to combine the interest with the axiological coordinates, to develop a support of strategic expertise for the policy-maker and a support of strategic culture for a strategic realistic and complete decision that will be broadcast to the operational level; ➤ The development of the strategic culture necessary to the strategic Command the commander of strategic level and headquarters.

Figure 4: Political and Strategic Interrelations

The must obey timely the national or international strategic command, alliance or coalition, within the boundaries stipulated in the Constitution and organic laws.

The parliament and government must take steps to defend the sovereignty over its territory with responsibility toward the past, present and future of the country because there is an express, vital requirement, to preserve the national identity, security and defense of its borders and those of allies and partners. But nowadays the borders of a country are not secured and defended by focusing the units on borders and developing a hostile philosophy of the borders, by separation and opposition, because the days of such borders have long passed. Today, the borders of countries that are part of the European Union separate, identify and join the countries of the Union.

It is necessary to be respectful of the borders, their security, the counter challenges, contempt, dangers and threats, by giving them targets and reduce their vulnerability. Moreover, each country's security depends on the security of the others, the conflict control and management, inclusive by military means, because, in the new conditions, when there are thousands of active nuclear heads in the world, performing weapon systems, cross-border networks of C.O., of terrorists and mafia, each state must become responsible for managing the conflict, the resolution, inclusive by military means, of crisis and conflicts. The moral dimension of the military strategy act has developed and transformed a lot; today it is moral to participate in the military and civilian-military effort of collective conflict control, crisis management and armed conflict, not to miss it. It is immoral to stand aside on the reason that you are not threatened by anyone at the border, and wait for others to resolve the crises and conflicts that take place outside the national borders.

One of the objectives of scientific research is the development of inferences by which we come to know the phenomena to which we do not have direct access, using the available data. The phenomena and processes that we do not know directly concern the researchers who elaborate theories and assumptions; the phenomena that we know provide data (quantitative and qualitative) on which research is based. There is descriptive inference and causal inference. The former formulates propositions about phenomena that have not been directly observed on the basis of some individual observations. Noticing the behavior of a sample, the description of the behavior of the entire population is estimated and tried. The causal inference tries to explain the variation of a phenomenon or social fact by the variation of another phenomenon or social fact, using models and methods for research on correlations. It starts from the idea the phenomena and processes are the result of a large number of factors, some of them essential, others insignificant, some measurable and others immeasurable. The combined action of nonessential factors can substantially influence the development of the process under analysis by relations of a statistical type, described by statistical laws. The production of causal inferences and their inclusion in the theory is the objective of the scientific research.

Military Sciences, as social sciences, cover a wide range of activities and social fields with military specificity: the military action; war; the action of the armed forces for peace and social stability; the influence of the geographic space on the military policy and the military phenomenon; combat means used in the military action, etc. The methodology of scientific research in the military sciences has to combine methods, techniques and tools for each objective of the study.

In his research, the expert in military sciences should observe the following principles:

1. principle of unity between theoretical and empirical data
2. principle of unity between understanding (comprehension) and explanation
3. principle of unity between quantity and quality
4. principle of unity between ascertaining and evaluative judgments.




Figure no. 6 shows in a table form a comparison between the qualitative and quantitative research adapted by the military expert.

DIMENSIONS	RESEARCH TYPE	
	QUANTITATIVE	QUALITATIVE
1. General guidance	Positivist-explanatory	Phenomenological, comprehensive
2. The dimension of the researched reality	Mostly global, formal	Micro-social, local, contextual
3. The relationship between the researcher and subject	The researcher looks from outside	The researcher is inside or at a close distance
4. The relationship between theory and empirical research	Verification of theory by empirical research	Of emergence of the theory, during research
5. Time of data collecting	Short, episodic period	Long and continue period
6. Main methods	The experiment, investigation (questionnaire), systemic observation from outside	Participative observation, comprehensive interview, analysis of the documents
7. The style of the research report	Figures, tables, charts, reviews of results	Eclectic language, with little statistical data and charts

Figure no. 6^[14] Comparison between the approaches (research) of qualitative and quantitative type

The research methodology in the military sciences is an analysis of methods and techniques applied by an expert in creating and completing such research¹⁵. The expert uses the methodology as expression of the critical and constructive consciousness in order to create the appropriate investigative strategies formulated on basis of reflection on past research experiences, indicating the ways of obtaining a legally valid strategy from the scientific point of view. The strategic research methodology, as a science about method, is identified with a logical scientific analysis of social reality based on *a priori* theoretical assumptions.

¹⁴ PETRUȚ, Florin, *Sociologie. Note de curs*, Biblioteca virtuala a Academiei Fortelor Terestre "Nicolae Balcescu", Sibiu, f.a., <http://www.armyacademy.ro/bibliotecalcursurisociologie/petrutindex.html>

¹⁵ VLASCEANU, Lazar, *Metodologia cercetarii*, in "Dictionar de sociologie", coord.: Catalin Zamfir si Lazar Vlasceanu, Editura Babel, București, 1998, pp.349-351

In terms of analysis methods and techniques in the military sciences, they are not different from the specific social sciences in general.

The method is the way of research, the system of rules and principles to know the social reality, existing quantitative methods, qualitative methods, the statistical method, the inductive or deductive method, etc. These methods can be classified according to three criteria¹⁶:

✓by the *temporal* criterion, there are transverse methods (investigation, survey, psychological and socio-metric tests, etc.) and longitudinal methods (case study, biographical analysis, panel study, etc.).

✓by the *type of investigative approach* there three methods are known: quantitative methods, qualitative methods and methods of intersection;

✓by the place occupied in the investigative process the following methods are known: methods of data collecting (survey, experiment, observation, etc.); data processing methods (statistical-mathematical, comprehensive analysis methods); methods of data interpretation (inductive, deductive, comparative, causal explanation).

The research technique is the manner of using various tools of investigation. With their help the data are collected or processed, and an instrument is the materialization of the stated methods.

In the research of the military field, the most widely known and broadcast method is **investigation**, which appears and develops closely related to the evolution of social and humanities sciences.

A very important method in the military field research is **observation**, which represents a concrete field, empirical, research, but in the limited sense it is a scientific method of collecting data by the senses, in order to achieve some military, sociological and psychological inferences, to verify the hypotheses or to describe the systematic and objective environment, people and interpersonal relationships, individual and collective behaviors, actions and activities, physical objects, the products of creative activities¹⁷.

In the military field research, the **experiment** is another important method offering qualitative and quantitative data on the effects of independent variables on dependent variables in a controlled situation, with the purpose of verifying the causal hypotheses.

The scientific research methods and techniques of the military field are drawn from the wider context of socio-human sciences. However, the military sciences have their own specificity which is also reflected in the methodologies, methods and analysis techniques, such as, for example, **the application and the game of war**.

¹⁶ **PETRUȚ, Florin**, *Sociologie. Note de curs*, Biblioteca virtuala a Academiei Fortelor Terestre "Nicolae Bălcescu", Sibiu, f.a., <http://www.armyacademy.ro/biblioteca/cursurisociologie/petrutindex.html>

¹⁷ **CHELCEA, Septimiu**, *Metoda observației*, in Septimiu Chelcea, Ioan Marginean, Ion Cauc op.cit., 1998, p.409