INTELLIGENCE AND EARLY WARNING

Lieutenant-colonel Adrian-Cristian DAVID, PhD*

Abstract: Providing strategic warning to policy makers is a key function of governmental intelligence organizations. Today, globally networked challenges have increased so that warning efforts have become considerably bigger. Within the intelligence community it is recognized that many of the current warning problems arise from continued reliance on analytical tools, methodologies and processes that were appropriate to the static and hierarchical nature of the threat during the Cold War.

Keywords: strategic, warning, challenges, threats, tools.

Introduction

While the nature of security challenges and the study of security itself have undergone some changes since the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001, the central mission of intelligence structures has remained essentially the same: preventing surprise. A failure of espionage is considered, due to the implications, much more serious than the surprise as such. That most critical information focuses on this aspect is thus easy to see in: the attack on Pearl Harbour, the coordinated Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel on Yom Kippur, the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces, the end of the Cold War, the attacks of September 11, 2001 and, most recently, the Russian attack on Ukraine. These are just a few of the "surprises" that have been attributed to the failures of the intelligence structures. Most of these incidents resulted in a series of investigations and inquiries whose explicit purpose was to identify the causes of these failures and recommend the necessary corrective actions. The points of view presented in these reports and also in the academic literature dealing with this subject, emphasize that surprises can be prevented by adequate warning. Warning is an informative function that assists politicians both in analyzing various aspects before they become problems, but also in creating contextualized, coherent frames of reference.

Early warning can be considered as the classical strategic role of intelligence. Therefore, it can be said that nothing is more important in the field of intelligence than providing strategic warnings to policy makers. Surprises due to a proper warning error have many causes. The dominant idea resulting from the study of surprise attacks is that the problem does not lie in the lack of information as such, but rather in the incorrect

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^{*} Ministry of National Defence, email: acdcristi@yahoo.com