

STRUCTURING THE NATO DEFENSE PLANNING PROCESS DURING THE COLD WAR

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Abstract: *Even in the initial stages of NATO establishment, the way in which the necessary resources for sustainment of the defence posture in front of Soviet threat was one of the most important topic. The complexity associated with this objective was even more challenging in the multinational context and common desire to reach an integrated character. From this perspective, the creation of a defence planning system was the adequate solution for managing the Cold War security challenges, while consolidating the interaction between the agreed objectives and their national implementation.*

Gradually, the defence planning system became one of the main instruments through which NATO could translate in capability targets and defence plans the objectives assumed by successive Strategic Concepts since the establishment of this organisation. Although, fundamental parameters were agreed during Cold War, their relevance is going beyond the temporal framework of this episode. Today, defence planning system incorporates typologies and procedures agreed half of a century ago demonstrating thus, the viability of thinking and the conceptual premises that were for structuring this system.

Keywords: *NATO, Cold War, USSR, forward posture, Force Goals, capability targets, allied planning.*

Context elements

From the earliest stages of NATO's operation, the structuring of defense resource planning has been one of the pillars on which the defense system dedicated to Western Europe will be developed. The variety of topics associated with the planning process as well as the way in which they are integrated in the response to threats has so far meant that there is no integrative definition of the concept of defense planning. From a NATO perspective, the agreed definition refers to "the military political processes used by nations to provide the capabilities necessary for the fulfillment of

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their defense commitments”¹. The applicability of this concept is extremely diverse, taking into account the political, economic, technological and military factors that may influence the development of capabilities. At the same time, the definitions at national level fall within the scope of "extended courses of action or guidelines adopted by the government to meet national objectives”².

Based on these definitions, one can comment on the intrinsic nature of the link between defense planning and the creation of conditions for meeting national security objectives. This requires, from a multinational perspective, an appropriate correlation between national approaches and collective defense planning, as is the case with NATO. Within this dynamic, two interconnected concepts were defined, aiming at defense planning and operational planning, on which the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP) will be developed. Within this paradigm, the purpose of defense planning is to provide strengths and capabilities that will be considered in operational planning from the perspective of use in potential commitments. During the Cold War, these elements were approached from the perspective of an integrated response, with the participation of all Member States in response to an armed aggression.

The principles on which their contribution was established were related to geographical location, industrial capacity, population and military capabilities. From this perspective, the goal of NATO defense planning in the context of the 1950s was to ensure a "*successful defense of the signatory nations of the Washington Treaty by maximum efficiency in the use of their own armed forces and with minimal personnel, financial and materials costs*”³. For the coming decades, these guidelines will remain valid and be approached from a geographical perspective, through regional planning groups that ensure the geographical coverage of the entire Allied territory.

¹ „ NATO Defence Planning Process”, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49202.htm#:~:text=The%20aim%20of%20the%20NATO,in%20the%20most%20effective%20way, accessed at 14.04.2022

² *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defence, 12.04.2001, Washington D.C.

³ NATO Strategic Concept, adopted at 16 January 1950 (DC6/2) in Gregory W. Pedlow (ed.). *NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969*, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Mons, pp.65-71.

In the early 1960s, additional elements of flexibility were integrated into the planning process, as NATO's defense concept evolved from the massive retaliatory doctrine to the flexible response in which conventional capabilities were addressed integrated with nuclear potential.

The report of the three wise men

Basically, the planning process was determined by the level of threat, in this case the military capacity of the USSR and, since 1955, the member states of the Warsaw Pact, to launch a potential act of aggression against NATO. In this context, the main premise was to ensure an appropriate link between the requirements for ensuring the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and the way in which the Member States' contribution is based on their economic and industrial potential. The conceptual-institutional structure of this theme was achieved in 1956, through the so-called "Report of the Three Wise Men", composed on May 5, 1956 by the Foreign Ministers of Canada (Lester B. Pearson), Italy (Gaetano Martino) and Norway (Halvard Lange). The reason for this was due to the concerns of European allies regarding participation in developments in the international security environment and, consequently, to the deepening of consultation on relevant issues not necessarily of a military nature. From this perspective, the initiative can also be seen as a way to deepen the politico-military consultation component available to NATO, starting from the provisions of the Washington Treaty (signed on April 4, 1949). Thus began a new process of adapting NATO to changes in the security environment to a more comprehensive organization, in which the political dimension was treated in the same way as the military.

The context of this approach was, however, extremely challenging in terms of developments in the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War. For the reference period, we can talk about a relative thaw, in the context of Nikita Khrushchev's rise to power in the USSR, followed by the launch of an extensive de-Stalinization program which, externally, was placed on the coordinates of the so-called "peaceful coexistence". In this context, post-war arrangements in Europe were to be strengthened by the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria and the signing, on 15 May 1955, with the United States, France and Great Britain of the Treaty by which it became

independent again. The reflections of Soviet policy can also be identified in terms of relations with the communist bloc states where Moscow shows relative flexibility in accepting individual behaviors. Tito's reconciliation with Yugoslavia, recorded during Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade (May 27 - June 3, 1955), is also on this level. On this occasion, the so-called Belgrade Declaration was adopted by which the USSR recognized the possibility of developing "different paths to socialism."⁴ Khrushchev is also engaged in an intense program of visits and international contacts with the main objective of removing the USSR from isolation.

Thus, during 1955 he made visits to Switzerland, India, Afghanistan, Burma. The culmination of his policy of reconfiguring the image of the USSR came in February 1956 when Khrushchev made a scathing critique of the Stalinist regime. From the rostrum of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, Khrushchev condemns, through the famous "Secret Speech"⁵, the abuses and violence of the Stalinist regime against the population. However, Khrushchev's approach must be seen as aimed more at consolidating his position by delimiting it from the previous regime and not necessarily as a fundamental change in Soviet policy. It must be said, in this sense, that the promotion of the new course of Soviet policy was accomplished by a vehement critique of the capitalist states, thus inducing conviction in the USSR's intentions to maintain the bipolar confrontation and, subsequently, close control of the states. The communist bloc. Developments in 1956 would confirm this assessment, with Khrushchev brutally repressing any form of protest or dissent, as was the case in the June-October 1956 movements in Poland and Hungary.

Khrushchev's approach to Western Europe and the United States cannot be seen as one of radical change, oscillating rather towards a policy of de-escalation and openness to dialogue. This option has not materialized enough to be considered with extreme caution in conditions of significant escalation⁶ of the East-West conflict in the following years. For NATO, this

⁴ *Joint Soviet – Yugoslav Declaration on Future Relations*, The New York Times, 3.06.1955, p.3

⁵ Text of the „Secret Speech” published by Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1976, pp.19-81.

⁶ Especially with the U-2 incident (May 1, 1960) in which an American spy plane is shot down by the USSR and the pilot, Gary Powers, is captured, tried and sentenced to 3 years

period brought a series of challenges and uncertainties as to the timeliness of the political dialogue with the USSR while maintaining the defense capacity of the Member States in the face of potential aggression. An additional factor of concern in the context of the reflection process initiated by the "Report of the Three Wise Men" was the outbreak of the Suez Crisis. In it, France and Britain intervene militarily against the regime led by Gamal Nasser (1954-1970) following his decision to nationalize the Suez Canal. The way in which the two NATO member states took up the military option was not conducive to the process of reflection, but instead helped to intensify the debate on defining allied ways to strengthen the process of mutual consultation and information.

Under these auspices, the Report put forward a set of proposals focusing on the need to deepen the consultation process between Member States, identified as one of the key pillars of NATO. The general approach of the proposals was of a pronounced multidisciplinary nature through which NATO had to deal with other areas outside the military spectrum but whose implications could affect the security of the Member States. Under these auspices, the planning process would be adapted to capitalize on a wide range of issues related to the ability of Member States to fulfill their role as Member States.

Defining operating principles

As mentioned, the functional parameters of the planning system created after the signing of the Washington Treaty were aimed at implementing a regional approach with the main goal of the Soviet threat. Thus, five Regional Planning Groups were created with the following configuration:

- Northern European Group - Denmark, Norway, Great Britain;
- Western European Group - Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Great Britain;
- Southwest Mediterranean Group - France, Italy, UK;

in prison and six months of forced labor. The upward trend in tensions between the two blocs is accentuated after the election, in November 1960, of the new President of the United States, J.F. Kennedy, culminating in the so-called Missile Crisis in Cuba (October 16-28, 1962).

- North American Group - Canada and USA;
- North Atlantic Group - all member states except Italy and Luxembourg.

The activity of these groups was to materialize in the formulation of recommendations to the Military Committee in the form of defense plans⁷. In the period immediately following the creation of NATO, the regional groups made the first proposals to defend the areas of responsibility, accompanied by concrete sets of requirements for their implementation. The main problem of this period was inevitably linked to the plight of Western European states and the weakening of their military capabilities in post-war conditions. US military and financial support remained essential to ensuring an effective defense in the event of a Soviet aggression. On October 5, 1949, President Truman signed the Mutual Defense Act, which provided \$ 1.3 billion for military assistance. The largest share of this amount (900 million) was intended for NATO, and could only be used after the approval of plans for "integrated defense of the North Atlantic area". Against this background, the first NATO Strategic Concept was adopted on 16 January, based on a division of roles between Member States based on their capabilities and experience in managing the security situation at regional level. The advanced operating model thus focused on the main responsibility for the US in terms of strategic air operations. The US contribution was also valued, along with that of the United Kingdom in ensuring the protection of ocean communications lines while Western European states were to manage the land aspects of the defense system as well as ensure the protection of ports and coastal areas for tactical air operations⁸. These provisions were the first steps in the development of an allied defense planning system, the principles advanced through the 1950 Strategic Concept for its structuring aimed at:

- Joint action in defense against an armed attack, both by own capacity and by mutual assistance;
- Individual contribution of each Member State, reasonably determined according to its situation, responsibilities and resources;

⁷ Lord Ismay, *NATO. The First Five Years, 1949-1954*, Bruxelles, 1954, p.25.

⁸ The Strategic Concept, adopted in 1950 (DC6), in NATO Strategy Documents, 1949-1969, pp. 54-55.

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- In developing their military capabilities, according to the strategic plans, it must be borne in mind that economic recovery and the achievement of economic stability are important elements for the security of the Member States;
- Member States' armed forces that can provide mutual support in the event of aggression must be developed in a coordinated manner so that they can operate efficiently and economically in accordance with the common strategic plan;
- Successful defense of Member States through the most efficient use of existing armed forces and resources is the goal of defense planning;
- A basic principle of planning must be that each Member State assumes the objective for which it is most appropriate. It should also be borne in mind that there are states that, due to their geographical location or their own capabilities, will undertake specific missions⁹.

Based on these principles, the first concrete objectives / Force Goals (FGs) regarding the finality of the planning process were adopted in 1950 with the aim of creating 18 active divisions and 16 reserve divisions. Subsequently, they were significantly modified by the decisions of February 1952, adopted on the occasion of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, with a time perspective of the period 1953-1954. These decisions would serve, even in the wake of subsequent changes, as a benchmark for NATO's defense planning for several decades. From a quantitative point of view, the creation of 50 divisions (25 + 25 reserve) was considered until 1953, a goal later extended to 56. From the perspective of the entry of Greece and Turkey into NATO (February 18, 1952), the objectives of force¹⁰ they would grow to about 98 divisions of which 50% were reserve forces. It also aimed to achieve the goal of 1,000 ships and over 9,000 aircraft. As can be seen, the disparity between the large number of forces expected to be generated by the Member States and the estimated level of forces for the

⁹ *Ibidem*, pp.52-54

¹⁰ NATO Press Release 1952 Annual Review, doc. C-M(53)52, available at https://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/2/1/21757/C-M_53_51_ENG.pdf, accessed at 16.04.2022.

USSR was very large. According to the data¹¹ of that time, about 25 Soviet divisions were stationed on the territory of the communist bloc states and 75 divisions were stationed on the territory of European Russia. At the same time, the satellite states under the Warsaw Pact could employ 60 divisions, which contributed to accentuating the asymmetry of forces between the two politico-military blocs. However, the indicative nature of the figures should be emphasized in the face of disparate information but also overestimation of the parameters of the Soviet units in terms of framing, combat capability and deployment speed. Equally, meeting NATO's capability targets posed a number of challenges under the relatively initial stage of strengthening the military capabilities of Western European states after World War II. Therefore, in April 1953, the objectives were revised and new targets were set for 31-32 active divisions and 26-27 in reserve. In addition to these aspects, the significance of the decisions also lies in the development of the first forms of structured defense planning, focused on the evaluation and setting of objectives adapted to each Member State. Added to this is the strengthening of predictability in defense resource planning by developing an advanced four-year perspective through the so-called Medium-Term Defense Plans (MDTPs). In setting these benchmarks, a sufficiently long time frame was taken into account to allow quantifiable progress to be made, but not too far away to be considered unrealistic. The position of the forces associated with the MDTP was a defensive one, structured on a geographical alignment framed by the Rhine-Ijssel (East) river line; the Alps in Italy and Austria - the Isonzo River (south) and the Kiel Canal (north). At the same time, it provided the first assessment of what was needed¹² forces that Member States should have provided to cover this area. The entry of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO (May 1955) also helped to deepen this approach.

Numerical disparity at the conventional level was to be managed through a particular focus on strengthening deterrence through nuclear capabilities. This approach was to be one of the directions on which NATO's defense strategy would focus, given the significant development of

¹¹ Richard A. Bitzinger. *Assesing the Conventional Balance in Europe, 1941-1945*, RAND Note, Santa Monica, 1989, p.4.

¹² Doris Condit, *History of the Secretary of Defence, Vol.II – The Test of War, 1950-1953*, Historical Office of the Secretary of Defence, Washington DC, 1988, p.312

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the USSR's nuclear capabilities, illustrated by Moscow's 1955-1958 series of nuclear tests and the launch of the Sputnik satellite (October 4 1957). The integration of nuclear capabilities into NATO planning was achieved through the Strategic Concept adopted in May 1957 (MC48 / 2). The risks of escalation and the accelerated development of intercontinental nuclear transport capabilities have led to substantial changes in NATO's strategic approach. This was done by introducing the concept of a flexible response by which the wording of the response to an aggression was to be adapted using the full set of conventional and nuclear instruments available to NATO. The reason for this approach stems from the need to be able to address and discourage any kind of aggression with the appropriate means, also supported by nuclear means as a last resort. The concept of flexibility will be the dominant element of the new Strategic Concept adopted in December 1967. At this level, the basic principle for defense planning was to combine the strength and capabilities of the Member States in an efficient formula in terms of the resources required. Against this background, each Member State was to assume, through the planning process, the roles and missions for which they were prepared.

Governance of the planning system

The governance framework that ensured the planning process at NATO level underwent a series of evolutions until 1971 when it will move to a system that will work until new members join, after the end of the Cold War. In this context, the first specific planning formulas were based on an annual defense analysis exercise to assess the effectiveness of the juxtaposition between military requirements and the potential of Member States. From 1952, the three-year review procedure will be passed, a decision that will pave the way for substantial adaptations to the NATO structure. This was likely to reflect the changes made at NATO level by creating, on the basis of regional planning groups, the first North Atlantic Alliance command elements (Allied Command Europe, Atlantic Command and Channel Command). Based on these, the architecture of the NATO command structure will be developed in the coming years, which will strengthen the operational dimension of the operational planning process.

Also, at the beginning of the second decade of operation, the structure of NATO Headquarters has undergone significant developments, from the perspective of reorganizing the upper tier of the decision on the military component. Its main purpose was to strengthen the role of the Military Committee and to gradually take over the responsibilities of the Standing Group (USA, UK and France). The approach to strengthening the multinational character will also be translated into the structures responsible for managing planning issues. Thus, on the occasion of the North Atlantic Council meeting held in Ottawa on 22-24 May 1963, a review process was initiated¹³ on how to interact between the defense strategy - the force requirements - the available resources, so as to allow a better adaptation of the Allied position in the context of the Cold War. It is worth mentioning the particular conditions of this period marked by the effects of major crises in East-West relations, such as the Berlin Crisis (1961) and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). A series of institutional measures will be adopted in the coming months to adapt the NATO structure as a matter of priority in terms of strengthening defense planning capacity. Thus, in September 1963, the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) appears, which will play a central role in the integrated management of the defense planning process, including the approval of the general plans of allied forces. Although subordinate to the North Atlantic Council, the DPC could meet at both the working and defense ministers levels and be able to make decisions with a significant strategic impact on the Allied planning process.

From the perspective of the evaluation process in the field of defense carried out, until that moment on an annual basis, it will be transformed in the sense of consolidating the character of predictability within a more consolidated temporal perspective. Thus, since 1962, a three-year planning system has been introduced in which the main element was the dialogue between the Member States and NATO structures on how to juxtapose national defense plans with the obligations of forces and capabilities that they had to fulfill. The results of this process were deepened in a mid-term evaluation process that took place regularly, at an interval of two years after

¹³ Press Communique M1(63)4, 24 mai 1963, Final Communiqué of the Ottawa North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, available at https://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/1/3/138203/PRESS_COMMUNIQUE_M1_63_4_ENG.pdf, accessed at 24.04.2022.

the end of each triennial cycle, thus ensuring the necessary element of continuity.

The goal of continuous alignment between the Allied planning process and national approaches led, two years later, to the extension of the planning cycles to five years. According to the decisions taken at the meeting of the Ministers of Defense from 31 May to 1 June 1965, the planning process will be based on a five-year planning cycle¹⁴, with the maintenance of the intermediate and triennial evaluation systems respectively. In this context, the functional landmarks were ensured by the Force Objectives which were developed on the basis of proposals from NATO commanders and integrated under the coordination of the Military Committee. New adaptations were to be made to the procedural typology of this area as well as to the system of governance by adopting, at the level of the North Atlantic Alliance, the "Allied Defense Report for the '70s". It was intended to be a strategic guidance document on how to articulate the NATO profile in the context of that period, with a focus on strengthening the contribution of European allies in collective defense efforts as well as in relation to commitments in forces and capabilities in supporting NATO's position. These objectives will also be reflected in the Allied planning process in terms of increasing predictability and the interaction between overall defense plans and national defense priorities. Thus, immediate priority was given to the development of an integrated planning system that would ensure a continuous rotational cycle at the level of allied planning while providing a much better consolidated perspective for national investment in capacity development.

¹⁴ To a large extent, the inclusion of the five-year cycle in the Allied planning system was also based on the model introduced in the United States during this period by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (1961-1968). NATO's first five-year defense plan was adopted in December 1967 for 1968-1972. Its particular significance must also be seen in the perspective of expressing the acceptance of the Member States regarding the continuation of NATO's functioning in accordance with the provisions of Article 13 of the Washington Treaty that at the age of 20 Member States could express their option to withdraw. The text of the Treaty is available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, accessed at 24.04.2022.

The new framework will be maintained for the next decades, continuing to be used until the start of the first round of NATO enlargement since the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the communist bloc. The mainstays of this approach to the defense planning process were essentially three levels of work with different purposes but integrated into a conceptual logic, doubled by a synchronized sequence, so as to create the possibility of permanent evaluation of the objectives of forces and , subsequently, of the general defense plans.

The starting point was the Ministerial Directive, which was intended to provide strategic reporting on the planning process for the security situation and the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. This document also indicated the directions of action in terms of covering capacity gaps, at the level of force categories, as well as the priorities in the configuration of NATO's position on all its components. The reporting sources of the Ministerial Directive were found in the provisions of the NATO Strategic Concept, thus setting priorities and objectives in the context of the allied defense strategy for this period aimed at flexible response (generated by combining conventional and nuclear capabilities) and advanced defense. Given these aspects, the dominant character of the document was a multidisciplinary one, the political evaluation being doubled by concrete tasks for NATO structures, in a long-term time perspective. From this perspective, in order to ensure the traceability of issues with military implications, the Ministerial Directive was subject to a specialized assessment by the Military Committee. Also, from a procedural point of view, the elaboration of this document was done every two years, being approved at the level of the Defense Planning Committee, meeting in the format of the defense ministers.

On these coordinates, the second tier of the planning process focused on the development of force proposals and, subsequently, the adoption of the Force Objectives. In order to ensure the functional cyclicity with the implementation of the Ministerial Directive, they took place every two years with a view to identifying concrete contributions with strengths and capabilities of the Member States for collective defense. The practical way of developing the allied forces package was done through the Military Committee and, subsequently, the Defense Analysis Committee, the latter ensuring the overall correlation between the objectives assumed by the

Ministerial Directive and the package of objectives. As before, the conduct of this process was aimed at ensuring the main mission of collective defense at the level of NATO's area of responsibility. The major difference between the post-1980 period is the emphasis on the role of the Member States in assuming the targets of strengths and capabilities and, subsequently, the type of allocation of obligations for each of them. The individualized dialogue between NATO structures and the Member States has begun to become much more applied than ever before, materializing in the adoption of individualized target packages for each Member State to which they had to express their acceptance in order to enter into force. . This constituted the general package of NATO Force Objectives which projected a concrete five-year time perspective and directions for action for a longer period. They also provided the benchmarks for structuring national defense planning plans and, subsequently, the resources needed for implementation.

The third element of the new system was the analysis of national plans in the context in which the concept of multilateral dialogue is introduced. This was to take place annually, based on data provided by Member States whose overlap with the general provisions of the Force Objectives was carefully verified. In the event of any inconsistencies being identified, the evaluation process will take place in several stages. The first of these aimed to carry out a trilateral analysis with the participation of the main NATO entities, namely the International Secretariat, the International General Staff and the strategic commanders. Based on the recommendations made following this evaluation stage, the purely military implications of how national defense plans meet the requirements are also analyzed. By integrating these elements, the Defense Planning Committee advances the force plan for the approval of the Ministers of Defense for the next five years. According to the procedures used during this period, the evaluation and approval took place in December so as to allow the use of the five-year perspective in national planning and, most importantly, as a way of firm commitment for the first year of this period.

All three levels presented were the medium-term planning component that will be used consistently at NATO level for the next two decades. Starting from the benchmarks thus advanced, the Allied focus was on deepening the parameters and benchmarks that Member States had to take into account in

order to fulfill their commitments with strengths and capabilities. Until now, the typology of the planning process had, rather, a general character not being approached from the perspective of the domains / categories that the field of defense presented. In order to meet the need for more precise guidance in relation to the objectives of force, the planning system was structured on the coordinates of four planning disciplines - the structure of forces, armaments, logistics and infrastructure - on the basis of which Member States had to define priorities according to the objectives of the forces assumed. In addition to this approach, the adoption of more precise benchmarks and approaches also aimed at further consolidating the time perspective associated with the planning process. In addition to the issues of predictability and economic efficiency, the aim was to strengthen the integrated approach to the pursuit of the objectives of the forces, by interconnecting the targets allocated to each of the Member States in a coherent and multidisciplinary perspective.

Conclusions

The defense planning system was one of the main supporting elements of the system developed by NATO from the first moments of operation. During the Cold War, the development of Allied planning had as its main point the threat initially posed by the Soviet Union, which later included the member states of the Warsaw Pact Organization. For these reasons, the main element considered was the adaptation of the planning system to the main objective of ensuring collective defense.

Obviously, the definition of the operating algorithm of this system was a first for the security environment of the post-World War II period and can be seen, from this perspective, as a period of successive transformations. From this perspective, the development of the planning system must be seen both from the perspective of ensuring the implementation of the objectives of the Washington Treaty and as an integral part of the internal adaptation process of the North Atlantic Alliance. Last but not least, the planning system must also be seen as the main tool for ensuring the interaction between NATO and the Member States, from the perspective of assuming the commitments and responsibilities but also of the way in which the national plans support the integrated objectives at allied level.

To a large extent, the articulation of the planning system in the particular paradigm of the Cold War was one of the significant aspects that contributed to the strengthening of the Allied position in Europe by generating an integrated mechanism of interaction between Member States in a comprehensive approach. Although it can be assimilated as a product of the Cold War, the planning system continued to be used even after 1990, benefiting from the adaptations required by the revision of the strategic guidance framework (Strategic concepts adopted in 1991 and 2010).



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