

POWER POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION. NEW DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY

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Abstract: *A review about the european power policy. Fundaments, definitions and historical backgrounds, contemporary and future prospects. Understanding the european power policy under it`s all aspects of economic, culture, political and military impact. First and secondary actors in the european power policy. Official agenda of the key-stakeholders vs hidden agenda. Sovereignty in the newest process of european integration vs Brexit. Teritory borders and Schengen zone in the new EU (post Brexit). Questioning the benefits, but also the drawbacks of exiting the european community. Security and world politics in the new european settlement.*

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I. INTRODUCTON

Following Brexit, there is a resettlement of forces in the European Union, with Germany turning its attention to Central and Eastern Europe, in an attempt to increase its influence on the continent, but also between member countries.

In 2020, the EU has become smaller but European policy has become more competitive and tougher than ever. The British departure from the European Union will have special consequences, starting with January 1, 2021, not only on the balance of power in the community. but also on macroeconomic stability, at the level of intra-Community trade, as well as at the level of the security of the European Union.

Following Brexit, the Schengen area will shrink, with controls on the UK frontier regaining its rights. This, on the one hand, will mean a much heavier trade, as well as a slow movement in the interstate flow of goods, services and business, but also a slowdown and a difficult flow of tourists, but, on the other hand, which could mean an additional security opportunity on both the British and European sides.

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There is a return to the historical structures after the separation. The new context will also include the construction of an Eastern Central European bloc, where the Habsburg Empire used to be: these are the four countries in the Visegrad group (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia), plus the other countries in the region, increasingly linked between them.

Along with these, Romania presents a potential non-European economic node, having at its feet the entire Black Sea region, and thus being able to offer the European community easy access to areas and trade routes with the Eurasian area. Romania is actively looking for a new role in this context, a role of influence at least in terms of the Black Sea region. However, Romania has chosen to present itself in a tone and in a more discreet way in pursuing its own desideratum, towards states such as Hungary or Poland, countries that are not afraid to challenge, even vehemently, sometimes, decisions of the Union. European.

Given all this, we can say that in the context of the new Europe (post Brexit, pressured by the crisis in Ukraine, hard hit by the health crisis following the new coronavirus Covid-19, but also subjected to external tests such as the war in Nagorno- Karabakh) the historically strong states of the old continent are at risk of being challenged at least by young state actors in terms of imposing intra-community power policies.

In any case, this issue must be approached with diplomacy and last but not least with maximum vigilance, because, it is not so, when two fight, the third wins. And the European Union simply cannot afford to allow, regardless of who will officially or less officially hold the reins of the union between the Member States, an external threat to it.

II. MAIN AND SECONDARY ACTORS OF THE NEW POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN POWER

Germany must ask itself what its place is in Europe. The future of the European Union depends on Berlin's decision. German politicians often act as if they are not in control of the continent's center of power. However, the rest of the Member States know how things are. It is one of the reasons why the British are leaving the Union. It is one of the reasons why the President of France uses any foreign policy opportunity to be able to express his opinion publicly, with which, thus, to become Germany's partner in the

management of the union. Despite all this, both France and the rest of the Union recognize German domination and no longer want to remain in such a structure. Especially states such as Hungary and Poland whose voices have been heard lately, inclusive, not infrequently, in a vehement tone in an attempt to combat this dominant position of the German chancellery.

If Hungary and Poland can only express their views loudly and clearly, lacking any other foreign policy leverage suitable for a strong enough stance to bring about any change, France is the only state in the Union that, although gone shoulder to shoulder with the German partner in the realization of the dream of a united Europe, he finds himself with great difficulty, today, in the position of co-managing the fate of the union with Germany. And this is because over the last two decades, France has lost valuable ground to Germany in terms of strategic decisions on the fate of the European community. We can say that, historically speaking, Germany's hegemonic desire manifested at the level of the European Union was clearly superior to France's desire.

It is good to know or more correctly, it is good not to forget the economic factor that Germany, with its extremely strong industry and benefiting from a very well developed foreign trade, has been and continues to be the economic engine of the European Union, but also ensuring the de facto support of the European currency. Of course, as far as the European currency is concerned, it wanted as its main two currencies on which it was based in the original money basket, both the German mark and the French franc. However, the latter failed to keep its original amount, due to lack of economic power on the one hand and lack of political and diplomatic endurance on the other (Germany has outperformed France in all these years both in terms of economic and foreign policy, giving the impression of an exact European time coming exclusively from Berlin).

However, the biggest impediment in this process was also created by German policy through the debate on compliance with the rule of law and the Article 7 procedure against Poland and Hungary. Although it is a more unilateral action than a group cohesion, no one seems to oppose this Berlin decision, at least not out loud. No one has the audacity to forgive the "wrongdoers", for fear of becoming the object of attacks themselves. The

two countries cannot be condemned either - unanimity would be needed in this regard, so the least apparent solution would be the rule of law mechanism proposed by the new European Commission, which would be valid for all Member States.

It would be an opportunity to include the current procedure in the new mechanism, but it is a slippery slope, which must be acted with extreme caution, because there are many pitfalls, such as the approach to independence of the Constitutional Court of France, highly politicized institution or Austria's corrupt traditional fair trade policy or, why not, the dubious practice of allocating European funds to Greece.

In view of the above, the year 2021 (with the de facto entry into force of Brexit) would mark the birth of a continental European Union, whose policy will once again look like individual, state, and not group policy. , as before.

Obviously, we can easily blame Britain and its Brexit for this, although all European actors know that this new approach has been tacitly smoldering for a long time among many European nations, just waiting for a good time to break out. as if in unison.

In this context, 2020 was a year with more and more frequent disputes between Paris and Berlin, with Brexit being the beginning of a struggle for domination in a new, continental European Union.

France is aware that Germany could dominate the continent politically in the future, even more than it has already done and more than ever after World War II, and is trying to avoid this scenario. Through mechanisms tried in the past by other French presidents, such as De Gaulle or Mitterrand, France is trying to persuade Germany to create structures that do not allow the adoption of unique directions and to occupy as many key positions in these structures. France's call for the creation of a European army is one such measure, which is also a matter of growing concern for European security, especially after the invasion of Crimea by the Russian Federation or, why not, for a good and effective fight against terrorism. , so present in recent years in Europe and especially in France. Thus, France would dominate such a European army, as the only nuclear power on the continent and as the only country (within the EU) that has the will to intervene militarily abroad.

However, Germany is drawing attention to the east, where it is facing a new reality, but which is not, however, a first. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are allying. The decisive development in recent years in the East has apparently been verbally contested with Berlin on issues such as migration, the rule of law and European integration, but in fact focusing on the desire of Central and Eastern European states to be recognized by Germany as a strategic partner. at least as a real discussion partner at EU level. Should Germany wish to discuss with these countries the principles of a pragmatic and realistic policy of interests and influences and to abandon the current tax policy, these countries would offer to extend German power in Europe. And not only. This is exactly the German paradox. Germany does not seem to understand how successful it would be if it pursued such a policy with member states, instead of trying to manage them authoritatively. Germany's gains would be far superior to open dialogue, and listening to and understanding the views of other Member States, unless it seems to want nothing more than to impose its wishes. Berlin simply doesn't seem to understand that you receive and yes, you do receive, but only if you are ready to offer (first) something in return.

Allover, it is a dynamic situation that has been going on behind the scenes since 2014, after the Crimean peninsula crisis, in terms of Berlin's opening policy, which, according to several signals, seems to be beginning to consider this option, the right dialogue, pragmatic and responsible with countries like Hungary, but especially Poland. This approach can only be a winner, given the basic idea of the European Union, namely the cohesion of the Member States.

In addition to the well-known actors of Europe, and the Hungary and Poland situation, we have an increase in the strategic importance of some countries that, although not part of the European Union, are also countries of Europe. Here, we are talking primarily about Ukraine, but it is already treated as an important, albeit secondary, actor on the politico-military scene of Europe, with a disputed territory, both by pro-european and pro-russian homeland political forces, which led in 2014 to the annexation of the Crimean peninsula (until then an integral part of the Ukrainian territory) to the Russian Federation.

However, in addition to Ukraine, a new country that we should look to in the near future is Serbia. Serbia is a Christian country, like the rest of European countries, Orthodox, such as Romania or Greece, at the geo-strategic confluence between the Adriatic and the Black Sea and very close to the Central European states, with a direct border with Hungary.

But the similarities with the riparian or less riparian European states stop here. The differences between Serbia and the rest of the European states are felt on a particular level. From this perspective Serbia, apart from other southeastern European states, is a hard-fought state of military conflict, such as Kosovo, now officially called the Republic of Kosovo, which is a partially recognized state and another disputed territory in the southwest of the former Yugoslav Republic of which Serbia was part, till 17th of February 2008, when Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia.

The main difference between Serbia and the rest of the European states is that it is a Slavic state. Hence the special attention we must pay. This, historically speaking, places Serbia much closer to the vision of other Slavic states than to various European states.

In other words, Serbia is much more attracted, by linguistic similarities, by religious similarities, more than other European "Slavic brothers" with their "Slavic brothers", the Russians.

Obviously, the idea of a "bridge foot" that the Russian Federation, through its friendship with Serbia could obtain in the Balkan Peninsula, has been circulated in the European political environment not infrequently, but here, following the new European politico-military evolutions, generated in Eastern and Southern Ukraine also by Russian influence, this idea is gaining more and more shape, becoming partly a reality.

III. CONCLUSIONS

At European Union level, there are still two main players, namely France and Germany.

If France is characterized as a soft power in terms of EU policy and economic dominance at community level, despite its military power and the fact that it is the only nuclear power within the union, Germany is still constrained by military limitations (for reasons of domestic policy), however, excels in the rest of the chapters. Thus, Berlin has ensured its

supremacy in terms of political within the union and at the same time economic through the financial power that is an engine both for the economy of the European Union and for the european currency itself.

European poles of power tend to change, but change will not come, at least not now and not as many imagine. The change that is looming, however, is a new understanding of Germany's own approach to foreign policy, especially in relation to other Member States, which will bring it considerable gains, and not only in terms of influence, both domestically, union, as well as, even in the external one, proving a strong, assumed, responsible, resilient, dynamic state and here, able to reinvent itself, to be reborn, even stronger.

And of course, the strong states of Europe must fully embrace this in terms of the fate of european countries that are not, at least for the time being, part of the European Union. These must begin to be viewed with much more attention, and with much more political wisdom. The European Union, its member countries, whether strong or less powerful, must not focus their attention and concern on exclusive state affairs. On the contrary, they must be in a perpetual dynamism, always open to new challenges and very attentive, especially to the neighboring riparian countries. States that must, of course, be able to be helped and guided to a european path. Obviously, not against their sovereign will, nor forgetting the historical or legal ties with other peoples. But, with understanding, through tolerance and inclusion it can be brought closer to the european sphere of interest, to the european and euro-atlantic peace and human rights aspirations, of course with a strong guaranteeing, political, economic factor and not in lastly, the military.

Let's not forget that small states will always either seek to be in an active partnership with strong states or they will be courted by states that want to do so.

The European Union, and especially its powerful states, cannot be great, except through its own political game of power, a correlated game, not only at the union level, but here, at the european level. Because, as long as there will be on the one hand within the union political games of power of some states that act singularly, and on the other hand the same type of

game with other European states but outside the borders of one, things will not be good, neither for some nor for others.



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