

ABOUT INTELLIGENCE - tabs in the history of intelligence services-

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***Abstract:** The approach of intelligence from the historic point of view regarding intelligence services in Romania contributes to defining the „intelligence branch” and describing essential aspects referring to the mechanisms of secret service functioning and the history of Secret Police (Romanian Securitate) not only as political police, but also as an Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Secret Service.*

This article also presents the preoccupations and manner of working of certain espionage services on Romanian territory as well as some secrets of the coup in December 1989, including those related to operations conducted by agents of foreign secret services (and of subversive Russian missions) in Romania. Obviously, these are, now, a matter of Romanian history alive in our minds and memories of Romanian citizens who suffered the consequences of the unpleasant experiences. The paper concludes with a glimpse of a few of the Secret Police problems in comprehending history..

***Keywords:** intelligence, intelligence services, secret services, intelligence branch of service, Secret Police, coup*

1. Introduction

The English word *intelligence* has several meanings: intelligence, understanding, skill, information, news, secret information, espionage, secret service etc., while the phrase „intelligence agent” refers to an agent of a secret service or a spy.¹ The secret services work with classified information that represents, in fact and in law, information, data and

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¹ Academia Republicii Socialiste România, Institutul de Lingvistică, *Dicționar englez-român*, Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1974, page 1974. (Leon Levițchi).

documents / acts on national security which, due to the importance of a high level of security and the consequences of their disclosure or unauthorized dissemination, must be protected in all circumstances.²

National security information is an essential element of information communication as it conveys the new "relevant and useful meanings to the beneficiary, in the form of risk estimates, warnings, security assessments, according to his needs and skills."³

The intelligence activities of the intelligence agencies for ensuring national security have the character of "state secret" and, therefore, the information can be communicated only to the beneficiaries authorized by law and their dissemination, voluntarily or involuntarily, to persons (natural or legal) or other unauthorized officials is outlawed and therefore liable to criminal liability⁴. The intelligence process is viewed, today, from three complementary perspectives: 1) from the perspective of the process; 2) from that of the organization and 3) from that of the product.⁵

That is the reason why, in the next pages, we are going to refer to the intelligence activity of secret services, but not in an exhaustive manner, rather dealing with only a few essential aspects regarding the „intelligence branch” of the armed forces and the mechanisms of secret services functioning. We are going to objectively present some aspects of the history of Romanian Secret Police (Securitate) not only as political police, but also as an intelligence and counter-intelligence service, as Secret Police used means that were specific to all intelligence services in universal history.

We may state from the beginning, due to the aspects above, that Secret Police, just as other security services, defended not only the interests of the political (socialist) regime, but also Romanian interests in general (our country's national interests). So, it played two roles: a negative and a positive one. This is the historic truth.

² Law nr. 182/2002 regarding the protection of classified information.

³ Cătălin Peptan, "Information and intelligence in the security equation", VITRALII. LUMINI ȘI UMBRE, *SRI Veterans Magazine*, year XI, number 41, page 117.

⁴ *Ibidem*, page 118.

⁵ *Ibidem*, pages 118-119.

Secret Police, as an institution from the past, collected information using the means and procedures used by the intelligence and counter-intelligence services of democratic countries.⁶

We are also going to refer to other aspects to be found among of the activities carried out by intelligence and counter-intelligence services, for instance tailing actions, using a „spy that was apprehended to the benefit of both parts engaged in confrontation; as espionage and counter-espionage are another facet of diplomacy”⁷; certain operations of Secret Police etc.

Moreover, we are going to shed some light upon the concerns and manner of acting of foreign espionage services on Romanian territory such as, for instance, recruiting young activists while they were students at „Ștefan Gheorghiu” Academy related to the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party as they were prone to acquiring leadership positions in the near future. This is also a proof that all secret services have a long-term strategy in the mentioned domain.

Secret Police had numerous informants and collaborators among whom some signed a pledge of collaboration; yet, there were some writers who collaborated without signing any pledge.

This latter category included, for instance Eugen Barbu and Vadim Tudor who were not collaborators in the sense of being informants⁸. Eugen Barbu’s group was adversary to the Union of Writers and Florin Mugur, considered a terrible enemy. This enmity was exploited by Secret Police through the magazine led by Eugen Barbu, „Săptămâna”, which did some favors to Secret Police. In other words, there was an exchange of services because Eugen Barbu had been ostracized by the Union of Writers. Vadim Tudor went to Iulian Vlad and then to Constantin Olteanu, general mayor of Bucharest, to advocate against the demolition of churches and buildings that were historical monuments.⁹

Another example that is going to be approached is related to the secrets of the coup in December 1989 and especially certain operations conducted by agents of foreign services on Romanian territory.

⁶ Ion Cristoiu, foreword to *Puterea Umbrei*, authors Aurel Rogojan and Dan Andronic, page 17.

⁷ *Ibidem*, page 19.

⁸ *Ibidem*, page 39.

⁹ *Ibidem*, page 42.

Furthermore, we are going to present some aspects known to the general public in connection to the activity of secret services in the years after 1989 showing the fact that intelligence officers need to have a strictly secret activity in order not to become vulnerable or to be a vulnerability of the state's security system. Their job description includes not only elements related to one's professional conduct, but also its legal, ethical, and methodological imperatives.¹⁰

2. December 1989 - January 1990

In order to „oust socialism at global level” „covert operations” were carried out by the Pentagon, C.I.A., the other U.S.A services and agencies as well as their counterparts in NATO member states”.¹¹ Harry Truman authorized C.I.A. „to conduct psychological operations in Eastern Europe and U.S.S.R. in order to undermine them and, subsequently, to change their political regime”¹²; thus, „France, the Netherlands, and Italy had as targets Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania.”¹³ There was clear sabotage of Romanian exports of cars, tractors, oil installations, metallurgic products, furniture, butter, and other food products etc.¹⁴ Rațiu and „the subsequent correspondents of Intelligence Service in Romania were endowed with BBC code.”¹⁵ Tens of thousands of Romanians fled to Hungary who would send back thousands of refugees among whom a few hundred had been recruited by Hungarians and trained (undergoing paramilitary training in Hungary). They had to be identified by name as they had turned into agents with missions against the Romanian state. Hungarian consul Rudas Ernő was declared „persona non grata”, as well as the consul following him and that is why Ceaușescu „decided to close down the consulate”.¹⁶ In December 1989, tens of thousands of Soviet „tourists” literally invaded Romania and stayed for a few months in our country.

¹⁰ Rogoian A., Andronic D., *Puterea Umbrei: istorii din lumea informațiilor secrete: de la Ceaușescu la Băsescu*, Editura Proema, 2019, page 197.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, page 482.

¹² *Idem*.

¹³ *Ibidem*, pp. 482-483.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, page 483.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, page 490.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, page 512.

The replacement of Nicolae Ceausescu by Ion Iliescu was accepted by the USSR and the USA and the Western states. The Americans, with the consent of the Russians, sent Silviu Brucan to Moscow because Mikhail Gorbachev had decided to remove Ceausescu. So Brucan received an order in Moscow on how to proceed with this coup. Therefore, in December 1989, on the eve of the end-of-year holidays, he directed a short trial of Iulian Vlad, a mock trial in which he “left his faces a few days to prove his loyalty and good faith, necessary time and the new power to direct his arrest, without encountering any surprise, because they were afraid that General Iulian Vlad and General Ștefan Gușă could overthrow them.”¹⁷

Generally speaking, espionage and counter-espionage are known to the general public through what went wrong, not at all through what turned out as being successful. Generals N. Militaru and N. Eftimescu as well as the first rank captain Emil „Cico” Dumitrescu were collaborators of the Soviet military intelligence services (GRU)¹⁸ and acted lamentably.

After "December 9, 1989, the number of soviet" tourists "in private cars skyrocketed ... weapons were found on the cars ... it was determined that they were espionage personnel ... they would have waited for an order that did not also come...they were driving in LADA cars of recent production, in groups of 3-4 cars and 2-3 passengers each, most of them men (up to 50 years old), athletic outfit and Romanian speakers ... they avoided public accommodation that would have required registration and remained in parking lots, grouped ..."¹⁹ "Such an order (which did not come) was not necessary because the entire politico-military power of Romania, starting with December 22, 1989, was agreed and accepted by the USSR.²⁰ The groups of young people dressed in black who appeared during the tragic events of December '89 ... "were among those who were the first to resort to violence (shop windows breaker, etc.) to stimulate the outbreak of the popular revolution ... and subsequently to the provocation of the police in order to generate the violent reaction. Unclaimed actions (for example, those of persons who acted with blunt objects on some participants in the

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, page 523.

¹⁸ V. Mălureanu, "Confirmations and limits of an indictment", VITRALII. LUMINI ȘI UMBRE, number 41, page 77.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, page 78.

²⁰ *Idem*.

rally of 21 December 1989) may be attributed to them." ²¹Therefore, on December 20, 1989, at 9:00 pm, Nicolae Ceaușescu handed a protest to the USSR charge d'affaires. Ambassador E. Tiajelnikov was in Chișinău at the Soviet Command for the coordination of actions in Romania. The head of the DSS, Iulian Vlad, drafted a report-note in which the involvement of the Soviets in the events in Timișoara was presented ...²²

The study of the history of intelligence services led us to infer that the dignitaries occupying the highest positions in the state really need fully competent intelligence officers, capable of documenting (analyzing) different situations and elaborate propositions for decisions to be made or points of view in various domains (see table no. 1). Actually, this did not happen in December 1989 when the „leadership of Secret Police required their subordinates in the institution to join the anti-Ceausescu actions, which had been long prepared, and then asked its employees to hide their deeds, based on military legislation related to keeping state secrets, a legislation that was repeatedly ignored by some commanders within Secret Police. (...)...actually, there were some commanders who did not defend the secrets of Secret Police..., but actually aggressed Romania and brought it to its knees.”²³

At the same time, in trials and in front of public opinion, „they denied any foreign intervention, but they did not spare the Romanian Army that they repeatedly accused of various things... they kept the secret regarding the foreign secret services’ actions, but they did not ensure the secrecy regarding the actions of Romanian Army.”²⁴

Romanian justice got involved in investigating and judging the „crimes of the Revolution” and the terrorists in December 1989 – January 1990. „There were cases in which some of the prosecutors did not do their duty, starting from breaking procedural rules and ending with files that were if not entirely „fabricated”, quite „thin”, without adequate evidence.”²⁵ The

²¹ *Ibidem*, page 79.

²² *Ibidem*, page 79.

²³ Lupu C., *Trădarea Securității în decembrie 1989, secrete ale intervenției străine împotriva României*, Editura Elion, București, 2015, page 4.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, page 5.

²⁵ Ioan Dan, *„Dosarul revoluției” ADEVĂRUL DESPRE MINCIUNI. Noi probe prezentate de un fost șef al Procuraturilor Militare*, Editura BLASSCO, 2015, page 17.

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judges that sentenced general Iulian Topliceanu invoked „a series of lies in order to provide arguments for their actually unjustified solution. Ignoring the reality established clearly and completely by the first court, the misinterpretation and even spoofing of evidence were practiced in the effort – not really justified by anything – of producing a sentence that is illegal and unsupported.”²⁶

In the "Revolution File", unfortunately, several illegal and unfounded convictions were handed down due to the interference of the political factor in the judicial process, i.e.²⁷ the interference of politics in the affairs of justice, but also some (serious) judicial errors. There was, therefore, an obvious political control over the influence of the judiciary by certain politicians who at one time represented the public authorities. They appointed and promoted to office certain magistrates with the role of personal instruments, who would execute the orders and give the ordered sentences. Thus, for example, Emil Constantinescu "interfered in the affairs of justice in an unqualified manner."²⁸ But, as General Magistrate Ioan Dan noted in the paper mentioned here: "THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION OF DECEMBER 1989 is a historical and not a legal issue."²⁹ The same author found that "a professional action has been and is being carried out, with the obvious support of the real owners of the mass media (especially TV, na), meant to hide exactly the TRUTH he has been claiming for over 25 years. , important segments of the country's population. "³⁰

The revolution of December 1989 is a historical problem, but “no historical problem has a definite answer. Every generation must start the good fight from the beginning or perish ... ”³¹

²⁶ *Ibidem*, page 298.

²⁷ short for id est (that is).

²⁸ *Ibidem*, page 42.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, page 16.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, pages 385-386.

³¹ Hendrik Willem van Loon, *The history of humanity*, Humanitas, Bucharest, 2014, page 456.

Table 1. Intelligence view points for supporting political-military decisions

Domains	Details (documents)
Daily and stage analyses and syntheses; operative situations analyses and syntheses	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- daily operative informative reports;- informative stage reports of national security;- informative reports (analyses): the operative situation of espionage services and terrorist-extremist organizations targeting Romania;- synthesis of the evolution of international security environment.
Mass-media	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- telegrams from abroad describing certain positions, gestures, and attitudes believed to be enemy/hostile to Romania;- internal media: the state of mind of the population (discontent) and causes;- monitoring foreign radio channels broadcasting in Romanian;- monitoring TV foreign broadcast meant for Romanians;- the discontent and different problematic issues of national and religious minorities;- foreign press review.
Embassies	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- embassy security;- diplomatic issues;- events organized by embassies.
Operative issues of Secret Police etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- espionage and treason;- disclosing state secrets;- attempts at somebody's life and plotting;- sabotage/undermining national economy;- extremist propaganda or propaganda against the state;- airport and aircraft security (terrorist acts) etc.

In 1970, anti-terrorist missions (AT) were conducted by Counter-espionage Directorate (the head of the directorate was Neagu Cosma) who disclosed the intentions of „Black September” organization to bring into Romania a considerable amount of guns to carry out attacks against Israeli people, including the Israeli ambassador. After a few years, the Operative Action Group for Reprimanding Arab Terrorism (ARTA) was established. This group, together with a small unit within Secret Police troops, annihilated the terrorist plan made by „Baader-Meinhof” group against Romania and other countries and discovered and confiscated a large quantity of armament. Then, U.M. 0625/RP (B) was set up as an anti-terrorist unit. In 1972 „Șoimii” (Falcons) Operational Group was established for ensuring the security of aircraft while flying and preventing attacks against Romanian airplanes (TAROM). A significant role in disclosing

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terrorists was also played by Pursuit-Investigation Directorate. In 1977 USLA³² was created, after 1989 being re-named Anti-terrorist Brigade in SRI.

After 1989, Sorin Roșca Stănescu (SRS) took a job as a journalist at „România Liberă” newspaper and, in 1992, he was exposed. His file was published – proving that he was an under-cover agent in the Romanian press – and he was forbidden to work for „România Liberă”. Under these circumstances, Ion Cristoiu invited him to work as part of the editorial board of „Expres Magazin”. Actually, exposing an agent, irrespective of nationality, who had been infiltrated in one of the terrorist groupings was and still is a criminal action as it means putting his/her life in danger. It was about exposing a very important and dangerous anti-terrorist operation, similar to those conducted by „agent 007”. Some people say that this scheme was pulled off out of revenge by some officers against the former Directorate of Military Counter-Intelligence which had, before 1989, agents infiltrated in all the units of the Armed Forces. Being a collaborator of Anti-Terrorist Brigade, Sorin Roșca Stănescu was supposed to be well-protected by SRI and far from being exposed. This exposure happened following the subordination of Secret Police to the Ministry of National Defense³³ even though, at each change of political regime (social system) the Romanian intelligence structures were saved by placing them under the umbrella of the Army. This happened in 1944-1945 at the time of passing from capitalism to socialism and in 1989-1990 when Romania passed from the socialist (communist) regime to the capitalism because secret services were „blamed, condemned, and held accountable without any reason, without any judgement and therefore at the level of political decision-makers it became clear that they could not give up the power conferred by holding classified or secret information, leading to this alternative solution”³⁴. Thus, the umbrella of the Army was used until that secret service had recovered.

On December 22, 1989, after the helicopter left with Ceaușescu, Ion Iliescu was informed that a new government was being formed in the former

³² Special Anti-Terrorist Combat Unit.

³³ By Decree no. 4/26.12.1989 of CFSN it was decided to pass DSS and Secret Police Troops Command under Ministry of Defense subordination.

³⁴ Rogoian A., Andronic D., *op.cit.*, page 36.

Central Committee with Dăscălescu and Verdeț and "very alert, he says:" "I must go immediately to the CC to do cleaning there. "35

On December 26, Ion Iliescu says: "for the special role he played, Mr. Mihail Montanu is appointed chairman of the Organizing Committee" of FSN, but Silviu Brucan did not agree and on January 13, 1990 Iliescu says directly to Mr. Montanu: " Mihai, darling, I was wrong. I thought you were part of our group, but you don't, you have to leave. "36

During the bloody fight for power in December 1989, CFSN, the acting leadership of Romania, had decided to rely on the image of Romanian Armed Forces, on the credibility of the Army in order to rescue and redeem the intelligence and counter-intelligence services.

By Decree no. 4 / 26.12.1989 of the F.S.N. Council, DSS and the Security Troops Command passed in the composition of M.Ap.N.³⁷ On the same day, General Iulian Vlad was appointed Secretary of State at the Ministry of National Defense.

On December 30, by Decree no. 33, Ion Iliescu-president of the FSN Council-abolished DSS.

On December 31, in the evening, General N. Doicaru came to the headquarters of the Ministry of Interior together with Virgil Măgureanu and Gelu Voican-Voiculescu and convened the DSS Board of Directors. Măgureanu announced, in front of the members of the Council, that Voican-Voiculescu took over the leadership of the abolished DSS as head of the Security.

Then, on New Year's Eve,, General Iulian Vlad was arrested. In the evening, Gelu Voican - Voiculescu was appointed vice-president of the Government for issues of national security. On January 3rd, 1990, Generalul Nicolae Militaru forbade his access into the central office of Secret Police because the Ministry of National Defense was against the triumvirate Voiculescu-Doicaru-Măgureanu, who were KGB agents, while Militaru was a GRU agents. GRU agents (Militaru, V. Ionel and Ghe. Logofătu), which formed another triumvirate, managed to disband, on January 3rd, 1990, four

³⁵ Hagop Hairabetian, "Talk to a real revolutionary. Interview with Ambassador Mihail Montanu ", *Vitralii.Lumini și umbre, SRI veterans magazine*, number 41, Bucharest, 2019-2020, page 25.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, page 27.

³⁷ Ministry of National Defense.

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central directorates of Secret Police (U.M. 0110, 4th C. I. Directorate, 5th Directorate and 6th Directorate) as well as four Secret Police inspectorates at district level and Bucharest Secret Police. Thus, GRU dismantled first of all the Directorates that controlled and dismantled Russian and Hungarian assets and the four district offices (Timiș, Cluj, Sibiu and Brașov) whose role was to clarify the diversions with the largest numbers of dead and wounded in December 1989.

General Ilie Constantinescu, former secretary of Country's Defense Council, together with ten generals recalled into activity by N. Militaru (all ten of whom had been recruited by Soviet secret services) took over the documents in General Iulian Vlad's safe and the inventory of strictly secret documents.

Mihai Montanu is announced that: "President Iliescu is urgently calling you"; then he recounts: "I went and he received me immediately. Without too much introduction, he proposes me to organize the new Intelligence Service of the country. I agreed and went out into the hallway where I met general Victor Atanasie Stănculescu and, telling him about the proposal made by Ion Iliescu, he asked me: "Do the Russians know you?" Surprised, I told him that I had no relationship with any Russian, to whom Stănculescu assures me: "Do you know what Iliescu is doing now? Talk to Moscow on the phone, and if they don't know you, you won't be accepted, listen to me. " We don't finish smoking a cigarette together because one of the guards appears on the run: "Oh, it's a good thing you didn't leave, come to the president quickly." I go and I am greeted by Iliescu who informs me in a honeyed voice that they have changed their minds and will put Măgureanu. I didn't say anything and I went home quietly. "³⁸

Even if Ion Iliescu did not appoint Virgil Măgureanu as head of Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), the first page of the decree was replaced by another one, with another name on it (Măgureanu) and, on the next page, there already was Ion Iliescu's signature. If the decree had had only one page, it would not have been as easy to fake.

V. Măgureanu's helpers elaborated the decree draft of CPUN's President³⁹ in which the name of the first SRI head was on the first page and

³⁸ Hagop Hairabetian, *op.cit.*, page 27.

³⁹ Provisional Council of National Union (Consiliul Provizoriu de Uniune Națională).

Iliescu's signature, on the second page.⁴⁰ We may say that Iliescu wanted to appoint somebody else as the head of the former Secret Police because there were three candidates on his list: 1) Mihai Montanu, 2) Ghe. Diaconescu and 3) Virgil Măgureanu. So, Măgureanu was not the first, but the last on the list and it is well known that Iliescu had had two talks with Ghe. Diaconescu during which he had promised him this position of Director of SRI.⁴¹

The tailing / surveillance activity of each target was performed very accurately by the person designated to do it who was supposed to put down in writing any movement made by that target, everything he did, as if he had been filming the scene. Moreover, each target was given a coded name as any detail that apparently bore no significance or importance in the target's behavior may have held particular significance for the officers in Analysis sector, disclosing, for instance, the fact that the target may have been the secret agent of a foreign country. So, each surveillance agent – except for the chiefs – was not supposed to know the identity of the target (individual) pursued. The target could have been taken over from the case officer who handed him/her over openly or simply by saying „This is Cristian” (code name), so as each surveillance document might be made using the code name (Cristian). At all times, the surveillance request was to be written using the real data of the target (individual), but on the request the code name had to be mentioned in order for the surveillance team to use only that code after being told the manner in which they were supposed to take over the target, namely being given a photo, actually seeing him/her or receiving the exact description from a certain address or place.⁴²

3. Pages of the history of S.S.I., D.G.S.S. and D.S.S.

The Special Intelligence Service (S.S.I.) was reorganized by the director Eugen Cristescu according to the intelligence model in order to correspond to the exigencies of the war necessities and to the satisfaction of the national interests. He discovered Operation "Autonomous" organized by the British Secret Service and captured three British intelligence officers.

⁴⁰ Rogojan A., Andronic D., *Op.cit.*, page 114.

⁴¹ *Idem.*

⁴² *Ibidem*, page 18

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After August 23, 1944, he destroyed many files and hid with part of the SSI archive in the commune of Bughea, where he was arrested at the end of September 1944. He was handed over to the Soviets, investigated in the USSR and sentenced to death. At the intervention of Minister Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, his sentence was commuted, by royal decree, to forced labor for life. He died in the Văcărești penitentiary on June 12, 1950.

In August 1944, Traian Borcescu (head of the CI section) took over the leadership of SSI.

In September 1944, the Soviets sealed the radios to paralyze connections with service agents. In addition, the Soviets abusively arrested some people and agents from the intelligence structures of the former Eastern Front.

The Ministry of War reorganized SSI according to Decree-Law no. 158, signed by King Mihai I, by which SSI was transferred to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. On September 12, 1944, Colonel Ion Lissievici was appointed director general of the SSI and restructured the intelligence service (of the Army). As he reacts against the intimidation of the Service's officials, who were threatened with imprisonment, he was dismissed in December. Only in April 1945 the Intelligence Service of the Ministry of War (SIMR) will resume its name of SSI.

Between August 23rd 1944 – August 30th 1948, N.K.V.D.⁴³ (precursor of KGB) infiltrated a lot of S.S.I. agents⁴⁴ in General Security⁴⁵ of Romania (D.G.S.S.) in order to place them under control of Soviet occupation army.

This operation of subordinating the Romanian secret services was led by Soviet agent Emil Bodnăraș, who during this period was undersecretary of state for coordinating S.S.I. and State General Security. He had been born at Iaslovăț (near Suceava), graduated Artillery Officers' School and in 1932 he had deserted and defected to U.S.S.R. to Higer School for Special Services in Moscow. In 1935 he came back clandestinely to Romania where he was arrested and sentenced to 10 years of hard labor. Upon the request of S.S.I., he was freed from prison which makes us think

⁴³ U.S.S.R. People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs

⁴⁴ Special Intelligence Service (Serviciul Special de Informații).

⁴⁵ General Security of the State (Siguranța Generală a Statului).

that he was a S.S.I. secret agent who received the mission to infiltrate Soviet secret services (and in Comintern). In August 1944 he was part of the communist team that arrested Marshal Ion Antonescu.

A few agents of N.K.V.D., who had been arrested for espionage, were released after August 23rd 1944, from the Romanian prisons where they had made friends with some communists. Thus, they infiltrated Romanian force structures.

One of the N.K.V.D.'s agents, Timofei Bodnarenko, born in Tiraspol, was prepared for espionage and sabotage against Romania. He changed his name in order to be assimilated to Romanians (Gheorghe Pintilie). In 1928 he received the mission to set up a network of espionage and diversion in Romania. He was arrested by S.S.I. and for three years he remained in prison where he met Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. The former gave him the task to discover who were the S.S.I. agents infiltrated among communist inmates.

Secret Police (Securitatea) was initially started as Service 1 Organization (from Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party) coordinated by Gheorghe Pintilie, alias Timofei (Pantiușa) Bodnarenko.

Some of the duties of Service 1 Organization were ensuring the security of P.C.R. leaders and administrative issues. Then, Service 1 Organization turned into Political-Administrative Section and, later on, into Party Administrative Establishment. In addition, Service 1 dealt with covering Soviet spies (I.N.U.)⁴⁶ and N.K.V.D. espionage actions, namely the subversive network from Romania, as well as countering the activities of Western secret services. Also, it monitored the actions of white Russians who emigrated to Romania.

The deputies of Soviet agent Ghe. Pintilie were the Soviet spy Valeriu Bucikov and the Bulgarian agent Gheorghii Ivanciu who had been sent to Romania by the Bulgarian Communist Party as he had been convicted for several crimes in his country.

S.S.I. comprised the Mobile Brigade that was a counter-intelligence (C.I.) structure. Some valuable S.S.I. agents were kept in the structures of Secret Police (Securitate) until they retired.

⁴⁶ I.N.U.= Directorate of External Operations of Communist International from Moscow (Directoratul Operațiunii Externe al Internaționalei Comuniste de la Moscova).

Prime Minister dr. Petru Groza reorganized this Mobile Brigade (within the State General Security⁴⁷) that was led by Boris Grünberg, alias Nicolschi. He studied a special espionage course in Cernăuți. As an N.K.V.D. agent, he came to Romania having a mission of espionage, under the name V. Ștefănescu, having fake ID. Right after illegally crossing the border, on May 26th 1941, he was arrested and sentenced to life in prison and hard labor. After August 24th 1944 he was released just like the other Soviet spies as they were supposed to occupy important positions in P.C.R. and in Secret Police.

Soviet agent A. Nicolschi was the general deputy director of General Directorate of People Security (D.G.S.S.) during 1948-1953 and then state secretary at the Minister of Interior (M.I.A.) until 1961. A. Nicolschi manned the Detectives Corps in Capital Police (C.D.P.C.) with I.N.U. officers and N.K.V.D. agents (covered agents in P.C.R. structures).

Thus, C.D.P.C. became Secret Political Police which closely resembled Legionary Police and had the secret mission of identifying the wealth of bourgeois political class representatives, to arrest them, to take away their goods and valuable assets which were to be transported over Prut by Soviet agent Mitea (General Nicolschi's driver). This man turned in the assets practically looted to N.K.V.D. chiefs and heads of the Communist Party of U.R.S.S. whose Nicolschi was actually thanking this way for being promoted general secretary within the Ministry of Interior.

Agent Mitea was parachuted by Soviets in 1943 together with a reconnaissance and diversion commando of the Military Intelligence Service of Soviet Army and had a secret encounter with Nicolschi.

Mobile Brigade crashed the opposition towards the Soviet aggressor, eliminated political parties and instituted the regime of Romanian Communist Party (P.C.R.).

In addition, it was in charge of deporting 70,000 people of German origin to U.S.S.R. and establishing compulsory residence for them as well as arresting and imprisoning legionnaires. Moreover, it reprimanded the National Resistance Movement led by General Aurel Aldea (former M.I.A.). He was arrested in 1946 and sentenced to hard labor for life for organizing the military resistance in the mountains against communist power.

⁴⁷ D.G.S.S.

Resistance groups were led by legionnaires and financed by political parties (except for P.C.R.) and were struggling to overthrow the communist regime, assassinate government members, etc.

Mobile Brigade supported the agrarian reform and the forced collectivization of agriculture and defended the safety of C.F.R. transportation etc.

In June 1947 D.G.S.S.⁴⁸ was established, „taking over integrally the domain of security police from all M.I.A. structures.”⁴⁹

The leadership of D.G.S.S. included, beside A. Nicolschi, the general director, criminal deputies such as Mișu Dulgheru, alias Dulberger and Sepeanu Tudor. The central directorates of D.G.S.S. were led by I.N.U. officers and agents (from Mobile Brigade and Security). The lawyer Sepeanu Tudor procured passports for the communists who went as volunteers to Spain, enrolling in International Brigades that fought against General Franco (fascist dictator). He was moved to Service 1 Organization led by Ghe. Pintilie and then to Mobile Brigade within the Detective Corps of Capital Police.⁵⁰ He (Sepeanu Tudor) was the one who initiated the torturing system in penitentiaries, being called „The Butcher” and was the first director of Capital Security. „In 1954, he was arrested and investigated for the draconic torture system applied in penitentiaries, a system known as the „Experiment” or „Pitești Phenomenon” and other atrocities.”⁵¹

From the establishment of D.G.S.S. there was only one step to the General Directorate of People Security (D.G.S.P.) set in Ministry of Interior in August 1948⁵², with the role of ensuring R.P.R. security against the plotting of internal and external enemies. Yet, external intelligence and counter-espionage actions remained as attributes of the Special Intelligence Service (S.S.I.) subordinated to the Presidency of Ministry Council. In March 1950 D.G.S.P. took back its old name D.G.S.S., which, in the next year, also included S.S.I.

Teohari Georgescu, the Ministry of Interior, was a Soviet agent, he was part of Comintern and was twice arrested by S.S.I. He had General

⁴⁸ General Directorate of State Security

⁴⁹ Aurel Rogoian, Dan Andronic, *Puterea umbrei*, editura Proema, 2019, page 67.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, page 68.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 68-69.

⁵² *Ibidem*, page 69.

Dmitri Gheorghievici, as a superior operative connection, who was the head of I.N.U. resistance, Ghe. Pîntilie (Soviet agent) was appointed general director of D.G.S.P., while two other Soviet agents, Boris Grünberg and Vladimir Mazuru, were general deputy directors. The latter was N.K.V.D. agent who was infiltrated in 1947 in Romania in M.I.A. as director of M.I.A. Director of Personnel.⁵³

Soviet agents were long present in the leadership of Security although Ghe. Gheorghiu-Dej ordered A. Drăghici to make Secret Police specifically Romanian. Yet, this „did not mean a de-activation of Soviet agents” because many of them were Romanian traitors.⁵⁴

Although Soviet agent Piotr Gonciaruk was caught and sentenced to 8 years in prison (1936-1944), although he was appointed first head of Romanian Counter-Espionage.⁵⁵

„In 1948, when Secret Police was created, its employees belonged to the following ethnicities: Romanians: 3334 (83,9%); Jews: 338 (8,5%); Hungarians: 247 (6,2%); others: 54 (1,3%)”⁵⁶, but in reality, starting 1945, Secret Police included 1,102 Jews, so as 60% of the positions of heads of directorates and 69% of those of regional directorates were held by Jews.⁵⁷

Romanian officers of Secret Police respectfully admitted the fact that „the real professional skills, related to espionage and counter-espionage, were learned from their Jewish chiefs”.⁵⁸

Yet, Secret Police also had a „strictly secret directorate, with a visible anti-Romanian character, which had as goals fabricating Romanian history, fading national identity in the international melting pot, ransacking the cultural and archivist heritage, etc.”⁵⁹

Those in charge with these goals were „N.K.V.D. agent Teodor Rudenko and historian Mihail Roller, the author of a Romanian history treaty in Comintern vision.”⁶⁰

⁵³ *Ibidem*, page 71.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, page 72.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, page 73.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, page 74.

⁵⁷ *Idem*.

⁵⁸ *Idem*.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 74-75

⁶⁰ *Idem*.

Still, after the withdrawal of Soviet councilors from Romania, Soviet agents became inactive in the interval 1962-1963; yet, they left followers after them to continue to hold informative control over Ministry of Interior and Security. So, the Russian espionage networks are still present in Romania nowadays.⁶¹

A. Drăghici transmitted to Neagu Cosma (chief deputy of Counter-Espionage Directorate) the warning issued by Ghe. Gheorghiu-Dej for K.G.B. Soviet network to immediately stop its activity on Romanian territory. Neagu Cosma identified approximately 80% of the Soviet espionage network and made tables with the activities conducted by each agent (in tables there were approximately 180 Soviet agents). Ghe. Gheorghiu-Dej ordered Patilineț (the chief of Military Section of Central Committee of P.C.R.) to choose a group of officers in Military Section and the Counter-Espionage Directorate and discuss with each of the 180 agents and tell them: „We are aware that you worked with the Russians, we know your activity from the past; we are asking you whether you confirm or deny it, but irrespective of your answer, we know and we are telling you that, starting this minute, if you are still going to work for the Soviets, you are subject to criminal law provisions and you are going to jail. For whatever you have done so far we are not holding you accountable, we are not pressing any charges.”⁶²

Actually, Dej excluded everyone from Secret Police eventually.

In 1968, when the leadership of Secret Police was taken over by general Ion Stănescu, intelligence officers started to receive another kind of training; they were supposed to know at least one foreign language, they had to know close combat techniques, self-defense, swimming and parachute training and also to have a post-graduate degree and specialization. Intelligence officers were trained (specialized) in different domains: economic counter-intelligence, radio counter-intelligence and enciphered communications, counter-espionage, foreign languages, investigations, operative surveillance using surveillance technique, general intelligence, etc. They were recruited from among the students who graduated the higher

⁶¹ Idem.

⁶² Idem.

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education institutions (universities) and then were trained at the centers in Bran and Grădiștea.

Regarding the counter-intelligence training of the regular citizens, a few models were used (Swiss, British, American etc.). The American one was based on the movies, while the British one was based on literature. Prevention work consisted in identifying vulnerabilities and risks and the other factors that made a citizen commit crime against the security of the state.

Counter-espionage had the mission to create filters and build counter-intelligence defenses by following the espionage services and discovering human targets and the secrets of these services in order to be able to protect our own secrets.

As we mentioned earlier, „Ștefan Gheorghiu” Academy was at some point a true base of „study and recruitment by foreign espionage services of the people with potential who were thought to form a pool of resources for all leadership positions in all the fields of activity.”⁶³

Thus, Nicu Ceaușescu was taken into account by the espionage services as a probable successor of Nicolae Ceaușescu to Romanian leadership. That is why Nicu and the people in his entourage were followed/ surveilled by different spy networks in order to acknowledge, study and define his entourage and thus be able to anticipate who is going to lead Romania in the future.

At the same time, in order to know the state of mind, the habits, the sensitivities and vulnerabilities of the Romanian people, its negative and positive features, espionage services also had in focus the personnel of the Museum of Ethnography and Folklore that had valuable studies of anthropology, ethnography and folklore. Thus, spies knew the state of mind and the spirit of the nation, the reactions that people are likely to have to the measures taken by Romanian Communist Party (P.C.R.), therefore being able to anticipate people’s reactions in the future.

Before the Revolution, the open opposition that was challenging and violent diminished the capacity of Secret Police to discover / disclose the hidden / silent opposition that could act efficiently against Romania.

⁶³ *Ibidem*, page 25

The events in December 1989 – January 1990 exceeded by far the capacity of defense of the Socialist Global System with a few exceptions (North Korea, China, Vietnam and Cuba). Western intelligence services struck a lethal blow to the states belonging to Warsaw Treaty.

For Secret Police (since 1989) it was not important to save the socialist regime, but rather to save the national state and national spirit. So, we cannot talk about a revolution per se, but rather about confiscating people's uprising and crushing it through the force of weapons. A revolution cannot be made by reversing historic evolution. It was then that M.R.S.O.⁶⁴ of 1917 and its consequences were finally defeated. So, it was a kind of reset / restauration of world order and in our case there was an attempt to destroy Romanian state by breaking it to pieces, the same as in the case of Yugoslavia, because Ceausescu had an opposition that disturbed the other members of Warsaw Treaty that tried to sanction him by dividing Romanian territories through violence / force.⁶⁵

„It is said that even since the '70s Ion Iliescu was the chosen one, even before Leonid Ilici Brejnev had agreed to ousting Nicolae Ceausescu from power, irrespective of the means, even including violent ones.”⁶⁶ As the latter eventually became a dictator, he acted like a monarch and did not abide by or even take into account all the information that D.S.S. provided for him. That is why we consider it appropriate to use in this context one of the famous sayings of Jacoby (a German deputy) told to Prussian king, Frederic Wilhelm the 4th in revolutionary year 1848: „Kings' disgrace comes from the fact that they are unwilling to hear the truth”.⁶⁷

On April 3, 1978, the DSS attributions entered into force⁶⁸ (table no. 2).

⁶⁴ October Great Socialist Revolution

⁶⁵ A. Rogoan, D. Andronic, *op.cit.*, pp. 662-663

⁶⁶ *Ibidem*, page 140.

⁶⁷ I.Berg, *Dicționar de cuvinte, expresii, citate celebre*, Editura Saeculum I.O. și Editura Vestala, București, 1995, page 242.

⁶⁸ A. Rogoan, D. Andronic, *op.cit.*, pp. 94-95.

The duties of D.S.S⁶⁹ (Table no. 2)

Categories of duties	Activities
Organization and conduct of activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- defending state security (preventing, disclosing and annihilating the actions conducted by espionage services and agencies- activating external intelligence for acknowledging and countering the dangers and actions hostile to Romania- preventing, uncovering, neutralizing and annihilating terrorist actions in cooperation with other institutions- counter-intelligence activities to the purpose of preventing, discovering and annihilating espionage services- governmental communications and radio counter-intelligence- conducting criminal prosecution of perpetrators of different crimes within the range of Secret Police- collecting, transporting and distributing secret mails.
Acting	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- for countering and neutralizing activities believed to be fascist, national-irredentist and propagandistic against the socialist regime- for acknowledging, preventing and annihilating the acts of undermining the national economy.
Measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- for defending state secrets and for checking the manner of applying legal provisions.
Ensuring	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- the security of P.C.R. and state leadership as well as the security of foreign state and party leaders
In charge	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- with applying P.C.R. and state policy in the field of security

4. Pages from S.R.I. history

A journalist accused S.R.I. director, Virgil Măgureanu of getting involved in illegal economic actions, of turning the service in political police, of being at war with the other intelligence services, of not being able to put an end to the aggressive Hungarian irredentism in Romania and of allowing K.G.B. to continue to have great influence in our country.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Department of State Security according to State Council Decree no. 121/1978.

⁷⁰ Rogojan A., Andronic D., *op. cit.*, pp. 118-119.

Similarly, he was accused of helping Patapievici to accede to a high public position despite being „the son of an N.K.V.D. agent”, namely a Soviet agent.⁷¹

S.R.I. professionalism was underlined in May 2003 by American Journals The Washington Post and The Washington Times which spoke about S.R.I.'s disclosing the Iraqi plan of organizing terrorist attacks against a few important targets (Western and Israeli) from our country. In order to make these attacks, the intelligence service within Iraqi Embassy was planning to ensure a few AG-7⁷²; yet, the actions comprised in that plan were well controlled by S.R.I. agents who cooperated with the partner (foreign) intelligence services. Right after they identified the people who had been preparing for executing the attacks, they were expelled from Romania. In order to disclose and annihilate the terrorist attack, S.R.I. worked together with the other services in the system of national security and with partner foreign services especially for „adopting the special anti-terrorist protection measures.”⁷³

Upon achieving the security goal by S.R.I., it proposed, according to the law, a few measures among which declaring, in March and April 2003, „persona non grata” a number of ten Iraqi diplomats as well as other Iraqis and people of other nationality, who were expelled from our country.

Romanian ambassador in the U.S.A., Sorin Ducaru, expressed his gratitude to S.R.I. director on May 19th for the excellent relations of cooperation between S.R.I. and U.S.A. Embassy from Bucharest / Romania and sent to S.R.I. director the article called „Romania foils plot” in The Washington Times underlining the professionalism of S.R.I. „in thwarting terrorist attacks against American and Israeli targets in Romania.”⁷⁴

According to the provisions of article 65, line (2), letter h, in Romanian Constitution, the Parliament, supreme representative organ of the people, to the proposition of Romanian President, appoints the directors of intelligence services.⁷⁵ The Deputy Chamber and the Senate, in common

⁷¹ *Ibidem*, page 119.

⁷² Grenade launchers.

⁷³ *Ibidem*, page 617.

⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, page 618.

⁷⁵ Romanian Constitution, Autonomous Administration "Official Monitor", Bucharest, 2007, page 38, art.65, alinieatul (2), pct. h.

gatherings, exercise control over these services; yet, this control was really complicated to be exercised in the over 30 years that passed since the Revolution in December 1989. One of the causes of this dysfunctionality is the political struggle among the three powers (legislative, executive and judiciary), which are actually four: Parliament, President, Government and Justice. De jure there should be a separation and a balance among these powers, no matter how many they are, within this Constitutional democracy. Yet, de facto, there is a Romanian- Romanian war between parties and institutions due to the serious and repeated breaking of Romanian Constitution by those who are leading public authorities. They forgot that „national sovereignty belongs to the Romanian people who is exercising it through its representative bodies, constituted through free, periodical and fair elections, as well as through referendum. No person or group can exercise sovereignty on its own and to its own interest.”⁷⁶ So, no person has the right to act according to the Roman saying „divide et impera” (divide and master) used as a principle of government, which is also known in its more explicit formula: „divide ut regnes” (divide in order to reign). This Roman saying has been applicable since ancient times until nowadays by authoritarian people and oligarchic governments in order to obtain absolute power. As an example, we chose Louis 16th – King of France – whose famous words were: „L’Etat c’est moi” (the state is myself) thus expressing the principle of absolute monarchy. Even in a Republic there is the danger of a dictatorship just as Cicero said in the Roman Senate, in year 63, when spoke against Patrician Catilina (who had been plotting against Roman Republic) starting with the words „Quousque tandem...?”, namely: „Until when..., Catilina, are you going to abuse our patience?” These words can actually be addressed to anybody who wants to become a dictator in any republic on Earth.

S.R.I. has to permanently collect information and data referring to vulnerabilities, threats, risks, problematic issues, actions, facts, etc. and notify / inform public authorities (state decision-makers), according to the law, about illegal deeds, corruption, attacks, different dangerous attempts, extremist actions, endangering citizen and state security, deficiencies, money laundering, terrorist prevention and combating etc. and propose the

⁷⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 7-8, art.2.

most adequate measures and actions of preventing and countering threats and vulnerabilities (Table 3).

Some of the yearly activities performed by S.R.I.⁷⁷ – Table no. 3

Domains of activity	Vulnerabilities, threats, risks, problematic issues, facts, etc. notifications, informative reports, etc.
Informing State decision-makers	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- illegalities and acts of corruption;- attempts against national patrimony;- social security and stability;- vulnerabilities/dysfunctionalities (in health, educations, socially under-privileged categories, child protection);- lack of involvement of certain institutions in managing emergency situations;- illegalities for imposing certain group interests;- extremist (anti-constitutional) acts.
Economic security	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- citizens' food security;- industrial insecurity;- risks regarding the privatization processes /liquidating state-capital firms;- dysfunctionalities/deficiencies in transportation, tele-communications, IT etc.- failure to complete /compromising grand investment projects;- dysfunctionalities/deficiencies in protection of classified information, in fields of public interest, in the activity of economic agents etc.;- illegalities in banking and financial systems;- money laundering operations;- tax and customs evasion;- illegal relations with financial organizations.
In the domain of counter-espionage	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- issues of security of the Black Sea;- issues of security of the Middle East;- issues of European integration;- issues of Western Balkans;- risks associated to some interests;- prevention and combating terrorism;- trans-border threats.

⁷⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 629-631.

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Preventive measures and actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - security measures of the target and preventing terrorist acts of destruction and sabotage; - measures of classified information protection; - informative reports to state institutions; - countering threats; - informative reports and protecting targets against espionage / terrorism.
Notifying law-enforcement institutions etc.	On issues related to: corruption, tax evasion, cyber-crime, abuse of power, fraud, foul play and other deeds such as organized crime (forgery, embezzlement, drug and people trafficking, illegal migration, smuggling, money laundering) etc.

In Romania there was a fratricide war among the 7 secret services: S.R.I., S.I.E., D.G.I.P.I., S.T.S., S.P.P. and specialized intelligence departments of the Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Justice. These intelligence services have continually been competing in order to impose their supremacy in their relations with Cotroceni Palace, Victoria Palace and Palace of Parliament.

Among all these services, S.R.I. was and still has the most comprehensive array of responsibilities as it is S.R.I. that ensures internal security and presents in front of the Parliament the State of National Security.

Even after the National Intelligence Commission was established (after 2006), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Vasile Blaga) and the general director of D.G.I.P.I (Ardelean) acted so as D.G.I.P.I. might take over part of S.R.I. duties / competences in „certain domains up to the complete substitution of duties.”⁷⁸

„S.R.I. director, Virgil Măgureanu, used in a brilliant manner – used in a negative sense – the heritage of the Service as well as the vulnerabilities induced to it in order to increase his personal power. He wanted to become strong by drying out the energies of the Service.”⁷⁹ ”Quia nominor leo”⁸⁰ or ”La part du lion.”⁸¹

⁷⁸ *Ibidem*, page 634.

⁷⁹ *Ibidem*, page 643.

⁸⁰ ”Because i’m named lion”

⁸¹ ” The lion’s side”, it is addressed to someone who abuses his power and commits unjust, arbitrary deeds (Primo Mihi).

5. Conclusions

The weapon, of attack or defense, of intelligence officers is the information obtained through intelligence and art in a "game" of identifying and countering espionage and secrecy in an "invisible war" and on an invisible front full of agents (spies) of foreign services.

The espionage activities of the foreign secret services carried out on the Romanian territory must be permanently countered. Numerous agents entered Romania under the cover of journalists to fulfill the secret missions, on the territory of our country; to obtain information on: the attitude of the population towards the Party, the Army and the Security, the relations between the Security and the Army, the relations between the Security and the PCR, state secrets, economic, military, political-diplomatic, etc. There were at least 60 foreign journalists permanently in Romania, about half of whom were Russians (Soviets). Of the 60, only 25% were genuine journalists, and the rest were undercover spies / agents with espionage missions.

Intelligence services are controlled by public authorities, the directors of these services being appointed by the Parliament at the proposition of the President of the Republic. The quality of the activities performed by intelligence services depends on the quality and professionalism of directors and the entire personnel; sometimes the directors of these services may use these institutions to serve their own interests, as it actually happened a few times throughout centuries. After 23rd August 1944, N.K.V.D. and then K.G.B. infiltrated numerous Soviet agents into S.S.I., D.G.S.S. and D.S.S. Yet, after 1963, when Soviet councilors were withdrawn from Romania, Ghe. Gheorghiu Dej excluded all Soviet agents from Secret Police (Securitate - D.S.S.), even if they left a few followers behind so as not to lose informative control over the Ministry of Interior and Romanian intelligence services.

SRI is, today, a prestigious intelligence service, which is respected and appreciated by the international intelligence community, having concluded over a hundred partnership agreements with other foreign intelligence services and numerous successes in intelligence operations including thwarting terrorist attacks.

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In having attempted to explain the value of security as a fundamental part of the education, it is important to transfer values of mental training that security can yield.



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