

## ASPECTS OF THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

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**Abstract:** *The whole liberal world order appears to be falling apart, nothing is as it once was. When Vladimir Putin annexed Crimea and started the bloody conflict in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, many considered him to be the major cause of global destabilisation. Just a few years later the US President, has seriously challenge the current international order when he questions free trade and the Western or NATO set of values. This has massive consequences, not just for Europeans. The global security situation is more dangerous today than at any time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. We are experiencing an epochal shift; an era is ending, and the rough outlines of a new political age are only beginning to emerge. No matter where you look, there are countless conflicts and crises that greatly affect us Europeans. In this context of transformations that seem chaotic, is it topical the establishment of a European army with all the specific resources available, as a way of ensuring security and defense of the European Union?*

**Keywords:** *NATO, EU, common defense, European Army.*

### **I**ntroduction

*“Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union (CSDP) establishes the framework for the political and military structures, as well as for missions and military operations and civilian EU abroad.”<sup>1</sup>*

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) constitute the operational arm of the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy).

CSDP is an instrument of EU intergovernmental level, in conceptual evolution from 1998 (summit of the Franco-British from Saint Malo) and carried out since 2003 – when the European Security Strategy (SES) was

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<sup>1</sup> Descriptive files on the European Union. Politica de securitate și apărare comună, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/ro/sheet/159/politica-de-securitate-si-aparare-comuna>

adopted and have been released first missions – and achieving the objectives set out in Strategy.

Issued to the general objective of establishing a Common European Defense capacity, achieved through the Member States' contribution with civilian and military capacity, the CSDP has undergone major changes recently at strategic and operational level, in order to respond to security challenges.

Global Strategy for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) adopted in June 2016 represents the principal framework of the external action of the Union in the medium term and long term, which also includes CSDP.

In the field of security and defence, the operational size of the EU commitment was strengthened by the creation of the **Military Planning and Conduct Capability** (MPCC) for Union's non-executive missions and the measures taken in relation to Optimizing the mode of engagement of EU Battle Groups, including the size of the financial resources insurance for their deployment.

### **Directions for the Development of Defence Capabilities**

The segment on the development of defence capabilities has benefited from particular attention by adopting a package of initiatives, including:

1. The European Defence Fund (EDF)<sup>2</sup>

The European Defence Fund will contribute to Europe's strategic autonomy in terms of protecting and defending its citizens. EDF will coordinate, will complement and strengthen national defence investments. The Fund will promote cooperation between Member States in the production of cutting-edge and interoperable defence equipment and technologies. It will also encourage the participation of small and medium enterprises to cooperation projects and will stimulate innovative and groundbreaking solutions.

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<sup>2</sup> European Commission EU Budget for the future PDF ISBN 978-92-79-7484-0 doi:10.2873/806911 ET-01-18-586-RO-N, [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/budget-may2018-eu-defence-fund\\_ro.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/budget-may2018-eu-defence-fund_ro.pdf)




Figure 1 EU budget dedicated to the European Defence Fund<sup>3</sup>

For the period 2021-2027, the Commission proposes to allocate a budget of EUR 13 billion to the European Defence Fund (figure 1). The EU will become one of the top four investors in defence research in Europe. Support from the European Defence Fund can be complemented by providing financial support from the InvestEU Fund for the defence sector.

2. Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD) to strengthen defence cooperation between Member States.

3. The adoption of Permanent Structured cooperation (PESCO) to strengthen defence cooperation between Member States wishing to go further in this cooperation<sup>4</sup>.

- The Treaty of Lisbon stipulates that a group of Member States can strengthen their defence cooperation by establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)

- EU leaders agreed to launch permanent structured cooperation to strengthen Europe's security and defence – June 22, 2017.

<sup>3</sup> Idem.

<sup>4</sup> European Council, Council of the European Union. EU Security and Defence Cooperation, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/policies/defence-security/>

- The Council adopted a decision establishing PESCO. All EU Member States participate in PESCO, with the exception of three countries (Denmark, Malta and the United Kingdom) and agreed on an initial list of 17 projects to be undertaken under PESCO. The projects include areas such as: training, capability development and operational availability in the field of defence. These initial projects were formally adopted by the Council on March 6, 2018. On the same day, the Council adopted a roadmap for the implementation of PESCO.

- On June 25, 2018 the Council adopted governance rules for projects under PESCO. An updated list of PESCO projects and their participants, including the second set of projects, was foreseen before November 2018.

4. Strengthen the EU's rapid response toolkit, including EU battlegroups and civilian capabilities.

- The EU's battlegroups are one of the tools the EU has at its disposal to respond quickly to crises and conflicts. These are military forces that can be deployed quickly on the ground.

- The tactical battlegroups were created in 2005, but were never deployed due to political, technical and financial obstacles.

- The financing of the tactical battlegroups will be managed at EU level through the Athena mechanism at all times, which was agreed on 22 June 2017.

- The EU also works to develop civilian capabilities and improve the responsiveness of civilian crisis management, including through the possible creation of a central response capability.

#### **European Constitution and Common Security and Defence Policy – CSDP**

In the European Constitution the new concept of the Common Security and Defence Policy, CSDP, replaces both the old European Security and Defence Policy concept – ESDP and its 'unfolded' policy, European Common Security and Defense Policy – ECSDP.

*"The European Constitution brings five important elements of novelty in the sphere of the Common Security and Defence Policy:*

1. Extending Petersberg missions;

2. Decision to establish a European Agency on Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities;
3. Application of structured cooperation to international missions;
4. The possibility of closer cooperation of Union States in the sphere of mutual defence;
5. Introducing a solidarity clause for the cases of terrorist attacks and natural or man-made disasters”<sup>5</sup>.

### **EU-NATO Cooperation**

Cooperation between the EU and NATO was established over 15 years ago. This has led to the development of a wide range of instruments that provide greater security for citizens in Europe and beyond.

On July 10, 2018, the EU and NATO signed a new joint statement. It establishes a common vision of how the EU and NATO will act together against the common security threats.



*Figure 2 EU-NATO Joint Declaration – Implementation areas<sup>6</sup>*

<sup>5</sup> European Institute of Romania, Phare project RO-2002/000-586.03.01.04.02 2005. European Security and Defence Policy, [http://beta.ier.ro/documente/formare/Securitate\\_si\\_aparare.pdf](http://beta.ier.ro/documente/formare/Securitate_si_aparare.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> European Council, Council of the European Union. EU Security and Defence Cooperation, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/policies/defence-security/>

### **Developments in EU-NATO Cooperation**

Let's go back to the EU-NATO cooperation agreements.

What do we notice?

On July 10 2018, the EU and NATO signed a new joint statement. It establishes a common vision of how the EU and NATO will act together against the common security threats.

*“Cooperation between the EU and NATO will focus on areas such as:*

- *Military mobility;*
- *Cybersecurity;*
- *Hybrid threats;*
- *Combating terrorism;*
- *Women and Security”*<sup>7</sup>.

The new joint statement highlights that recent EU efforts to intensify defence and security cooperation and reinforces transatlantic security.

*“The declaration is based on the objectives of the previous common declaration of July 2016. The latter aims to strengthen cooperation between the EU and NATO in seven strategic areas, namely:*

- *Hybrid threats;*
- *Operational cooperation, including maritime matters;*
- *Cybersecurity;*
- *Defence capabilities;*
- *Industry and research;*
- *coordinated exercises;*
- *Capacity Building” (Fig. 2)*<sup>8</sup>.

Therefore, the last four areas of cooperation: defence capabilities, industry and research, coordinated exercises, capacity building, which are specific to common defence – as it was conceived at the beginning of NATO's existence – are no longer on the list of common action directions, constituting the PESCO apantage – a genuine European treaty to ensure security and defence of Member States, equivalent to NATO. This, despite

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<sup>7</sup> Idem.

<sup>8</sup> Idem.

the assertions that PESCO's objectives are complementary to those of NATO.

Another aspect of the EU-NATO discord is also the “*surprising idea, (for the moment of public opinion testing), that the new EU to become a nuclear power (according to the New York Times, from 03.06.2017), so to be autonomous towards the United States and from the perspective of the security umbrella, especially under the unpredictable Trump administration. The common European defence will, sooner or later, require Member States to use common European military technology, in other words, everyone will have to buy French, German and not American weaponry. That is the meaning of financing through the European Defence Fund. This will hasten the political, military and financial decommitment of the United States from NATO and Europe, or will spur the creation of a NATO 2.0 of the United States and its allies (Canada, the United Kingdom and the Eastern Flank interested States)*”<sup>9</sup>.

Let us also note that according to a study (the Munich Security Report, 2017)<sup>10</sup> conducted by NATO itself, through the International Institute for Strategic Studies, **Stockholm International Peace Research Institute** SIPRI, the lack of cooperation between Member States in the field of Security and Defence costs annually between EUR 25 and 100 billion. So, even collaborating within NATO, the EU loses money by failing to coordinate efficiently (Fig. 3).

Having regard to the three recent spheres of crisis (Russia, Migration, Brexit), accompanied by a loss of confidence in Donald Trump's American leadership, it is clear that the European Union must increase its contribution to security. How could it do it?

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<sup>9</sup> Valentin Naumescu, *Are the Western European States heading for the signing of a separate Treaty? How important does the size of the defense becomes?*, 2017. <https://www.hotnews.ro>.

<sup>10</sup> “*To the Brink - and Back?*”, *Munich Security Report 2018*, Munich Security Conference, 2018.




Figure 3. Cost of current fragmentation and inefficiency of EU defence structures<sup>11</sup>

It is estimated that the lack of cooperation between Member States in the field of security and defence costs EUR 25 to 100 billion annually.

Currently, around 80% of public defence procurement is carried out strictly at national level, which leads to a costly doubling of military capability. From 2010 onwards, less than EUR 200 million have been spent each year for European collaborative research and defence technology activities.

### The European Army – Is it possible?

“We need an army to defend the European Union from Russia, China or even the United States,” President Emanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel said (2017).

Quite recently (March 2018) Dr. Katarzyna Pisarska, a senior researcher in the Casimir Pulaski Foundation’s Foreign Policy Programme, developed the “idea of European security forces” in the World Economic Forum project “New Concept for Europe”, and argues that EU Member States should initiate the creation of a European Security Force<sup>12</sup>.

<sup>11</sup> European Institute of Romania, Phare project RO-2002/000-586.03.01.04.02 2005. European Security and Defence Policy, [http://beta.ier.ro/documente/formare/Securitate\\_si\\_aparare.pdf](http://beta.ier.ro/documente/formare/Securitate_si_aparare.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> Katarzyna Pisarska, *European security force – a step-by-step approach towards a european army?*, 2018. la <https://www.esjnews.com/european-security-force>



The purpose of such an entity will be to strengthen the EU's security capacities, without prejudice to the sovereignty of EU Member States, while they remain engaged in NATO.

The step-by-step approach foresees the creation of operational units under common European Command in the areas of information security, disinformation, Coast Guard and general representation of the EU as a security actor.

A Pan-European unit for combating cyber threats and disinformation should deal with the prevention of cyber attacks on the critical infrastructure of Member States and the fight against disinformation spread by hostile States and terrorist groups.

A pan-European Coast Guard would assist National Coast Guard Units in combating illegal migration, trafficking in human beings and smuggling.

A Common EU Security Force Representation Office would serve as a point of information on the EU's security activities and represent the EU Security and Defence Community on various official occasions<sup>13</sup>.

### **Are the United States a possible EU opponent?**

In the last two years, relations between the European Union and the United States have deteriorated more and more. The foreign policy led by President Donald Trump under the motto "America First" concerned the European leaders, who reacted accordingly.

Throughout its history, the United States has oscillated between assuming a role of "international gendarme" and isolationism. After nearly half a century of interventionism, from 2016 the U.S.A foreign policy returned 180 degrees. President Donald Trump has moved from interventionism to isolationism. In this case, President Trump urged, rather aggressively, European leaders to pay contributions to NATO. And let us not forget the veritable EU-USA trade war, which is in full swing.

However, the European Union's States have a similar regime to the United States. None of the Alliance's members have territorial ambitions and the difficulties Europeans have in coordinating the external policies of a

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<sup>13</sup> Idem.

multitude of countries, which once were antagonistic, exclude Europe's evolution as a true rival of America.

In view of the shown, NATO will remain what has always been: an American Alliance. As long as the United States assumes this role, NATO will live – and will live better with the help of Vladimir I, the “new Russian Tsar”.

The United States leads, as always, but it is also a negative part that remains true: as long as the US remains a power in Europe, Europeans will not be able to build an autonomous defence. They can, of course, be economically equal to the American economy – this, however, to a population of approx. 500 million to a population a little more than 370 million as the U.S. has.

In Europe, the twenty-nine (recently twenty-eight) fail to be united, do not do what is called “e pluribus unum” (one for all), the USA motto modified in 1956 in “In God We Trust”.

Thus the Europeans will not want to be autonomous as long as “Uncle Sam” acts as a security lender of last resort. The key expression is “as long as”.

However, America's profits in this situation lower the costs of maintaining it. NATO – the European side (the producer of a quarter of the global GDP) is the strongest leverage in America's security structure.

Where it follows that a country wishing to remain number one in the world will not want to give up this bastion, no matter what the current misunderstandings are.

These are ways, more or less diplomatic, for achieving each other's goals – lowering their own costs, and preserving the existing advantages. These are the views of a working group of the Hoover Institution, from Stanford University entitled Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict<sup>14</sup>.

On the one hand, the group believes that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union are in turmoil, changing. The first accomplished his mission. If it were not for the confiscation of Crimea and

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<sup>14</sup> Paul Rahe, *A Future for NATO and the European Union*, Hoover Institution working group on Military History, Stanford University, 2018.

the invasion of Ukraine by Russia and the refugee crisis in Europe, caused by the secular Muslim conflict that mean in Iraq and Syria, NATO would have remained without an obvious function.

At the same time, the EU is considered a great success as a customs union, but it is a disaster as a monetary union. Attempting to transform it into a governing oligarchic-federation, equipped with an intrusive administrative apparatus “will end in tears”.

There are also many controversies about the economic interests of those involved in the arms trade. French Defence Minister Florence Parley criticised the practice of imposing U.S. arms acquisition to NATO Partners. The Minister stressed that the “NATO article on solidarity is called Article 5 and not article F-35. I am concerned that the force of solidarity in NATO can be dependent on the purchase of equipment. The alliance must be unconditional, otherwise it is not an alliance.”

France itself intends to increase exports of defence products to EU members. The fact that Washington uses political leverage to dominate the global arms market can only irritate Paris.

Last November, Emmanuel Macron said that Europe needs a unified army that could protect the EU “from China, Russia and even the US”.

“We will not be able to protect Europeans if we do not make the decision to create a true Pan-European Army. We must have a Europe that defends itself predominantly independently, without relying entirely on the United States,” Macron said.

Donald Trump called the words of the French President “insulting”. In this context, experts recall that in the North Atlantic Alliance, the commanders of the European forces of NATO were invariably American soldiers.

Subsequently, the French president said that, although the countries are historical allies, it does not mean that France should obey the United States.

“The USA is our historic ally and continues to be. But being an ally doesn’t mean being a vassal. We should not depend on the US ,”Macron said.

The European Union faces a dilemma: either it starts to concede or changes its line in relations with Washington and really begins to defend its interests. The probability of the last scenario is increasing, despite the fact that the United States has serious pressure levers on Europe.

### **Conclusions**

Returning to the question “Is a European army possible?” some conclusions can be drawn:

- Any competition between NATO and the EU is wrong from the start. This would lead to the need to double (economic and military) resources and administer them in a totally inefficient way, as shown in a review published by Carnegie Europe<sup>15</sup>.

- A fragmented West will be detrimental to all parties involved. And the direction that the leaders of France and Germany have chosen by building a joint European army will serve the main competitors of the West: Russia and China, according to the quoted analysts.

- The political divide that Europe’s detachment of NATO would generate will also have economic consequences.

- In addition to the international political consequences, including the fragmentation of the West, Europe will also have to manage the internal problems that a project of this kind brings: the difference of views between France and Germany on how it should look The European Army, the determination of the other European States to contribute in the long term to this joint process or the proper organisation of the army.

And as a corollary, we can mention the opinion of German defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen, who declared in February 2015<sup>16</sup> that she is sure that if not her children, then at least her grandchildren “will know the United States of Europe” with their own army.

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<sup>15</sup> Judy Dempsey, *Macron’s Call for European Boots*, 2018. <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/77703>

<sup>16</sup> Elena Badea, *Jean-Claude Juncker, President of European Commission: the European Union must have an army of its own*, 2015. [https://www.dcnnews.ro/jean-claude-juncker-pre-edinte-comisia-europeana-uniunea-europeana-trebuie-sa-aiba-o-armata-proprie\\_469-660.html](https://www.dcnnews.ro/jean-claude-juncker-pre-edinte-comisia-europeana-uniunea-europeana-trebuie-sa-aiba-o-armata-proprie_469-660.html)



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